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INTRODUCTION 
Can the President refuse to enforce a law he deems unconstitu-
tional?  Take the Affordable Care Act.  The Supreme Court upheld 
the provision in the Act mandating that individuals purchase health 
insurance, but leading Republicans continue to press the view that 
the law is unconstitutional.1  Suppose one such Republican captures 
the presidency in 2016.  His first act in office is to recommend legisla-
tion repealing the Affordable Care Act,2 but a Democrat-controlled 
Senate tables the proposal.  Can the President instead dispose of the 
law by refusing to enforce its provisions?  Can he abandon enforce-
ment of the individual mandate?3  Can he decline to enforce federal 
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 1 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (holding that the 
individual mandate is constitutional under congressional taxing powers); Tom Howell, 
Jr., Ted Cruz Sees Legal Landmines Ahead for Obamacare, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2013), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/9/ted-cruz-sees-legal-landmines-
ahead-obamacare/ (“Sen. Ted Cruz . . . said many aspects of the Affordable Care Act are 
‘constitutionally or statutorily suspect’ and that the entire law should be repealed.”). 
 2 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (giving the President the power to recommend to Congress the 
“[m]easures as he shall judge necessary and expedient”). 
 3 The President might direct the Secretary of the Treasury not to demand payment for an 
individual’s failure to obtain minimum essential coverage.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2012) 
(providing for the individual mandate for purchasing health insurance); 26 U.S.C. § 
5000A(g)(1) (2012) (“The penalty provided by this section shall be paid upon notice and 
demand by the Secretary . . . .”). 
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regulations of state health-care exchanges?4  Can he decline to pursue 
insurers who deny coverage or employ underwriting practices in vio-
lation of the Act?5  Can he decline to pursue covered employers who 
refuse to provide health insurance for their employees?6 
Many commentators would say yes, assuming that the President 
acts on the basis of a constitutional objection to the provision in ques-
tion.7  Their principal ground for taking this position is an analogy 
between executive and judicial power.  They argue that the justifica-
tion for judicial review that prevailed at the time of the founding also 
justifies the President in refusing to enforce laws he deems unconsti-
tutional.8  For example, according to Sai Prakash and John Yoo, “the 
same constitutional reasoning that supports judicial review also mili-
tates in favor of a form of executive branch review in the course of 
executing the laws . . . .”9  Prakash and Yoo are joined in this view by a 
 
 4 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(d)–(e) (2012) (specifying requirements for state exchanges).  
Candidate Mitt Romney suggested during the presidential election of 2012 that he would 
issue waivers to states exempting them from various requirements under the Affordable 
Care Act, including those related to state exchanges.  See, e.g., Philip Klein, Romney and 
Obamacare Waivers, WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 7, 2011),  http:// washingtonexaminer.com/
article/993076 (“Romney said:  ‘as president, I will repeal Obamacare, I’ll grant a waiver 
on day one to get that started.’”).  The position verged on non-enforcement, since the 
waiver provision in the Affordable Care Act extends only to states that develop coverage 
mechanisms at least as comprehensive as those mandated by federal law, a requirement 
Romney aides suggested would not be strictly enforced.  See id. (“[T]he Romney aide said 
that under the campaign’s interpretation of the law, the administration would be able to 
give broad leeway to states, allowing them to opt out of many onerous provisions of 
Obamacare, including the individual mandate.  And, the aide said, there was wiggle room 
around how the various coverage requirements are defined.”); 42 U.S.C. §§ 18052(b)–(c) 
(2012) (detailing the restrictions on the granting and scope of state waivers under the Af-
fordable Care Act). 
 5 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (2012) (addressing the guaranteed availability of health 
coverage); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2 (2012) (addressing the guaranteed renewability of health 
coverage); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (2012) (prohibiting exclusion from health coverage based 
on preexisting conditions). 
 6 See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(d) (2012) (“Any assessable payment provided by this section shall 
be paid upon notice and demand by the Secretary . . . .”). 
 7 See infra notes 9–16.  I set aside the question of whether the agency charged with enforc-
ing the Affordable Care Act enjoys the discretion not to enforce the law under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.  See Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 
GEO. L.J. 351, 394–95 (2014) (discussing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985),  
which held that the APA does not grant judicial review of FDA decisions not to institute 
enforcement proceedings). 
 8 See Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President To Do?  Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of 
Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395, 405–11 (2008) (identifying the Bush Ad-
ministration’s use of the constitutional avoidance canon to declare that certain laws 
should not be enforced). 
 9 Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 
924–25 (2003); see also Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On:  The Obama Admin-
istration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 
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remarkable group, including Akhil Amar,10 Larry Kramer,11 John Har-
rison,12 Gary Lawson,13 Christopher Eisgruber,14 Michael Stokes 
Paulsen,15 and Judge Frank Easterbrook,16 among others.17 
The view is wrong.  The analogy these scholars draw between ex-
ecutive and judicial power simply cannot be sustained on a fair read-
ing of Founding-era history.  By the time of the Founding, and for the 
first decade under the Constitution, few were thinking about the 
President’s function in constitutional enforcement in terms compa-
rable to a court of law.  The vast majority of those engaged in the 
tasks of ‘political science’ and statecraft simply did not express them-
selves on the issue.  When they did speak, what came out was (unsur-
prisingly) a jumble, much of it at odds with modern views of the pres-
idency.  In contrast, by the mid-1790s, thinking about the role courts 
played in enforcing the Constitution had firmed considerably.  This is 
true across the emerging Federalist-Republican divide.  My purpose 
in this Article is to explain these developments and thus to argue for 
 
TEX. L. REV. 781, 800–01 (2013); Neil Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to 
Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 533 (2012); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s 
Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1645–46 (2008). 
 10 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 179 (2005). 
 11 See Larry D. Kramer, Foreword:  We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 87 (2001). 
 12 See John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 333, 336 (1998). 
 13 See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1287 (1996). 
 14 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches:  A Response to Professor Paulsen, 
83 GEO. L.J. 347, 350 (1994). 
 15 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:  Executive Power to Say What the Law 
Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 267 (1994) (positing that the rationale of Marbury v. Madison is appli-
cable to executive review, even in the absence of judicial review of a particular law). 
 16 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 919–20 (1989–-
90). 
 17 For example, Judge Nina Pillard endorsed the analogy between judicial and executive 
power, although she did not expressly conclude on that basis that the President may de-
cline to enforce a law he deems unconstitutional.  See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled 
Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 687 (2005) (analogiz-
ing executive power and judicial review).  Notably, the last twenty years have seen only 
one extended effort to rebut the claim that non-enforcement can be defended on 
originalist grounds.  See generally CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF 
“UNCONSTITUTIONAL” LAWS:  REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE (1998).  For leading tex-
tualist arguments against non-enforcement, see, as an example, Eugene Gressman, Take 
Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381 (1986) and Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faith-
ful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389 (1987).  There have been significant book-
length defenses of departmentalism without any emphasis on non-enforcement, but these 
mostly date from an earlier period and have had little impact on the contemporary de-
bate within legal scholarship.  See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES:  
INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 231–70 (1988); JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 77–95, 139–67 (1984). 
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an important disanalogy in the Founding-era understanding of execu-
tive and judicial power.  To be clear, I do not argue that the President 
under no circumstances may be understood to possess a power to de-
cline to enforce laws he thinks unconstitutional.  He may have such a 
power.  I argue merely that the analogy between non-enforcement 
and judicial review is mistaken, and that if there is such a presidential 
power, its source must lie elsewhere. 
The effort to tie presidential non-enforcement to a broadly ac-
cepted practice like judicial review has had significant practical con-
sequences.  It has played a key role in justifying the expansion of 
presidential authority.  As the nation’s chief prosecutor, early Presi-
dents did “direct non-prosecution[s],”18 and thus blocked the en-
forcement of criminal law.19  Today, however, Presidents do not con-
fine their claims of interpretative authority to the discretion 
traditionally afforded a prosecutor.20  During the presidency of 
George H. W. Bush, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department 
of Justice (“OLC”) advised the White House that “the Constitution 
provides the President with the authority to refuse to enforce uncon-
stitutional [statutory] provisions,” including those administrative or 
civil in nature, like the provisions of the Affordable Care Act cited 
above.21  In defense of this position, OLC drew an analogy between 
presidential non-enforcement and judicial review, invoking a found-
 
 18 MICHAEL PAULSEN, STEVEN CALABRESI ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
318 (2d ed. 2013). 
 19 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 49, 60–61 (2008) (identifying examples of non-
prosecution during the presidential administrations of George Washington and John Ad-
ams).  But see Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional 
Scheme:  In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 585–90, 637 (1989) 
(showing that prosecution in the 1790s was highly decentralized); Harold J. Krent, Execu-
tive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement:  Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 
286–90 (1989) (similar). 
 20 Notably, the examples cited by Calabresi and Yoo in which Washington or Adams ordered 
an end to a prosecution did not turn on the President’s view of constitutional meaning.  
See  CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 19, at 60–61.  The first President to stop a prosecution 
on constitutional grounds was apparently Thomas Jefferson.  See infra notes 42–43 and ac-
companying text; PAULSEN, CALABRESI ET AL., supra note 18, at 318. 
 21 Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C. 
18, 31 (1992); see also The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 17 Op. O.L.C. 
131, 133 & n.8 (1993), in H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS 
GENERAL 565–66 (1999) (advising White House counsel that the President may decline to 
enforce a “clearly unconstitutional law,” and citing a statement made by James Wilson to 
show that the proposition of presidential non-enforcement is “consistent with the views of 
the Framers”). 
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ing-era justification for judicial review and citing Marbury v. Madison.22  
Later, OLC sought to temper its advice; in a subsequent memo, is-
sued in 1994, the Agency suggested that that non-enforcement au-
thority was significantly limited, and should be employed only in cas-
es where the President had reason to believe the Supreme Court 
would concur in his judgment.23  Yet the limits proffered by OLC did 
not reflect, in any transparent way, the logic of the executive analogy 
to judicial review, on which the non-enforcement power had been 
rested.24  Consequently, the 1994 limits have proven illusory.  Presi-
 
 22 See Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. 
O.L.C., supra note 21, at 31–33 (“Where an act of Congress conflicts with the Constitu-
tion, the President is faced with the duty to execute conflicting ‘laws’ – a constitutional 
provision and a contrary statutory requirement.  The resolution of this conflict is clear:  
the President must heed and execute the Constitution, the supreme law of our Nation.  
. . . Thus, the Take Care Clause does not compel the President to execute unconstitu-
tional statutes. An unconstitutional statute, as Chief Justice Marshall explained in his ar-
chetypal decision, is simply not a law at all . . . .”).  But cf. The Attorney General’s Duty to De-
fend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 55–56, 58 
(1980) (defending a more moderate position, and conceding that “[t]he available evi-
dence concerning the intentions of the Framers lends no specific support” to non-
enforcement, and that there is “relatively little direct evidence of what the Framers 
thought” about a presidential power to decline to enforce “transparently” unconstitution-
al laws). 
 23 See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 200 
(1994) (“As a general matter, if the President believes that the Court would sustain a par-
ticular provision as constitutional, the President should execute the statute, notwithstand-
ing his own beliefs about the constitutional issue.  If, however, the President, exercising 
his independent judgment, determines both that a provision would violate the Constitu-
tion and that it is probable that the Court would agree with him, the President has the au-
thority to decline to execute the statute.”); see also David Barron, Constitutionalism in the 
Shadow of Doctrine:  The President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 
61–63 (2000) (describing the evolution in views at OLC, particularly with regard to the 
Clinton Administration).  According to Judge Pillard, the requirement that the President 
enforce the law unless he believes the Supreme Court will concur in his judgment effec-
tively embraces judicial supremacy.  See Pillard, supra note 17, at 735 (“Thus, even though 
the executive also has a ‘special role’ in the interpretation of the Constitution (and OLC 
in particular is assigned that role as to action not yet taken), the OLC opinion adheres to 
a judicial-supremacist reading of Marbury.”).  Another view is that the requirement of ju-
dicial concurrence serves to measure the obviousness of the constitutional defect, func-
tioning like a Thayerian doubtful case rule.  See James Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the 
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140 (1893). 
 24 The executive-judicial analogy is not explicit in the 1993 or 1994 O.L.C. opinions, but it is 
very much present.  For example, the 1994 opinion bottoms the President’s non-
enforcement authority on a reading of the Take Care Clause popularized by defenders of 
the executive-judicial analogy.  Compare Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitu-
tional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C., supra note 23, at 200, with Issues Raised by Provisions Directing 
Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C., supra note 22, at 32.  On another 
note, it is suggestive that restrictions on judicial review like those proposed for non-
enforcement in the 1994 opinion—such as limiting judicial review to “defensive” uses or a 
doubtful case rule—have also proved impossible to sustain.  For a discussion of “defen-
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dent George W. Bush asserted the authority in signing statements “to 
disobey more than 750 laws,” a pattern difficult to square with the 
1994 opinion.25  Tellingly, executive branch attorneys defended 
Bush’s action by invoking Founding-era arguments for judicial re-
view.26  And just last term, in United States v. Windsor, Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s defense of non-enforcement suggested no clear limitations 
on the power.27  According to Scalia, a President who concluded that 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause should have simply refused to enforce it.  Yet Section 3 
was a definitional provision; its effects spanned federal law.28  A non-
enforcement power applied across the reach of Section 3 would be 
broad, deep, and largely insensitive to considerations of institutional 
competence and political context.29 
 
sive” judicial review, see Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Supremacy in the Nineteenth Century, in MARBURY VERSUS MADISON:  
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 88–91 (Mark Graber & Michael Perhac eds., 2002); Mi-
chael J. Klarman, How Great were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 
1121 (2001).  For a discussion of the doubtful case rule, see Thayer, supra note 23, at 140. 
 25 See ABA TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS DOCTRINE, ABA REPORT 2, 14–18 (2006), available at http:// www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2006/annual/dailyjournal/200608231441
13.authcheckdam.pdf (listing laws); Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing 
Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 323 (2006) (identifying 844 “sec-
tions challenged” by signing statement); Johnsen, supra note 8, at 410 (“Although the 
Bush administration has not publicly replaced the 1994 nonenforcement guidelines, its 
actions have demonstrated unambiguously that it does not believe the President’s nonen-
forcement authority is so limited.”). 
 26 Cf. Johnsen, supra note 8, at 410–11. 
 27 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2702 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“He 
could have equally chosen . . . neither to enforce nor to defend the statute he believed to 
be unconstitutional . . . .”); accord Devins & Prakash, supra note 9, at 509 (presenting the 
view that the President has neither a duty to enforce nor a duty to defend laws he thinks 
are unconstitutional). 
 28 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (discussing the definitional aspect of § 3).  In an earlier 
case, Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Justice Scalia suggested that the President 
had a defensive non-enforcement authority.  See Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 
501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Citing Easterbook’s article, Justice Scal-
ia wrote that the President had a power to “resist legislative encroachment” by “disre-
gard[ing] [laws] when they are unconstitutional.”  Id. (citing Easterbrook, supra note 16, 
at 920–924).  Easterbrook’s article, however, defends non-enforcement by analogy to ju-
dicial review, and consequently does not limit non-enforcement to defensive uses.   See 
Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 919–20 (presenting this analogy). 
 29 In contrast, the 1994 OLC opinion emphasized the non-enforcement was a context-
sensitive determination.  See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Stat-
utes, 18 Op. O.L.C., supra note 23, at 199–202 (discussing the “circumstances in which the 
President may appropriately decline to enforce a statute that  he views as unconstitution-
al”).  For examples of non-enforcement in the Obama Administration, see Delahunty & 
Yoo, supra note 9, at 781–84.  Consider, as well, efforts by state executive officers to justify 
non-defense or non-enforcement of state law on the basis of an analogy to judicial review.  
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As I show below, none of this comports with Founding-era history.  
Somehow the argument for non-enforcement has garnered a reputa-
tion for resting on original meaning and practices.30  Too little effort 
has been made to limn the boundaries of period concepts.  Thus, 
what is supported by historical evidence is the abstract proposition 
that each of the branches of the federal government, or “depart-
ments,” enjoys a coordinate authority to interpret the Constitution.31  
“Coordinate” means equal.32  The departments are equals.  As James 
Madison put it in Federalist 49, “[t]he several departments being per-
fectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither 
of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of 
settling the boundaries between their respective powers.”33  In other 
words, being an equal implies being autonomous—each department 
gets to make its own determination of the nature and scope of its au-
thority under the Constitution. 
This abstract proposition is called “departmentalism.”34  Depart-
mentalism was conceived in response to a difficulty that arose as the 
Framers wrestled with the consequences of judicial review in a system 
with separated powers and judicial independence.35  Their concern 
was that the power of courts to interpret and enforce fundamental 
law would make an independent judiciary superior to (and not coor-
dinate with) the other departments, by giving courts ‘final say’ in de-
termining the departments’ powers.  Put simply, departmentalism is 
 
See, e.g., Virginia’s New Attorney General Will Not Defend Gay-Marriage Ban, NPR MORNING ED. 
(radio broadcast Jan. 23, 2014), available at http:// www.npr.org/templates/transcript/
transcript.php?storyId=265050444. 
 30 See Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001, 
1008–09 (2012) (“[O]ther scholars defend a strong, independent presidential authority 
to make constitutional judgments without respect to other branches' views, a position of 
en staked out on originalist turf.”).  Huq’s “strong” departmentalism includes a non-
enforcement power.  I do not mean to suggest that Huq himself takes the view that non-
enforcement can be defended on originalist grounds, or that he has misread any of the 
relevant sources.  For a defense of a duty of non-enforcement on originalist grounds, see 
Prakash, supra note 9, at 1649–59. 
 31 See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 24, at 92; Gordon S. Wood, Judicial Review in the Era of the 
Founding, in IS THE SUPREME COURT THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION? 153, 161–62 
(Robert A. Licht ed., 1993) (highlighting Thomas Jefferson and James Madison’s view 
that “all parts of America’s governments had the authority to interpret the fundamental 
law of the Constitution”); Paulsen, supra note 15, at 228–40 (discussing the equality of the 
three branches of the federal government since the Founding). 
 32 See Matthew Steilen, Collaborative Departmentalism, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 345, 355–60 (2013) 
(discussing the idea of “coordinacy” in early America). 
 33 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 273 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). 
 34 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 105–08 (2004) (discussing what is known as the “departmental” theory). 
 35 See id. 
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the idea that courts do not have the final say.  The executive and the leg-
islature have an authority to decide for themselves what the Constitu-
tion means.36  They need not acquiesce in a judicial interpretation—
any more than the judiciary is obligated to adopt their view when de-
ciding a case.  As Jefferson put it sometime later, “each of the three 
departments has equally the right to decide for itself what is its duty 
under the constitution, without any regard to what the others may 
have decided for themselves under a similar question.”37  It should be 
easy to see, however, that departmentalism does not entail non-
enforcement.  The two are very different.38  Departmentalism is an 
abstract statement of the relative interpretative authority of the de-
partments; non-enforcement is a specific presidential power.  Presi-
dent Thomas Jefferson professed to give effect to his “free & inde-
pendent judgment” of the Constitution’s meaning—but through “the 
functions confided to [him].”39  What functions actually were confid-
ed to him was another matter entirely.40  One could not determine 
that by inference from coordinacy alone.41 
 
 36 This is the basic point defended by Edwin Meese in his famous (or infamous) Tulane 
speech.  See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 983–86 
(1987) (“Each of the three coordinate branches of government created and empowered 
by the Constitution—the executive and legislative no less than the judicial—has a duty to 
interpret the Constitution in the performance of its official functions.”).  Herbert 
Wechsler made more or less the same point in The Courts and the Constitution.  See Herbert 
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1965) (“Under 
Marbury, the Court decides a case; it does not pass a statute calling for obedience by all 
within the purview of the rule that is declared.”). 
 37 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 12 THE WORKS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 135, 139 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905); see also Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra, at 259 ) (“I affirm that act to be no law, because in opposition to the 
constitution; and I shall treat it as a nullity, wherever it comes in the way of my functions.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 38 See Stephen M. Griffin, Executive Power in the U.S. Constitution:  An Overview 17 (Tulane 
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14-3, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2422927 (observing that “the relevance of departmentalism to 
presidential non-enforcement is actually quite limited”). 
 39 The Paragraph Omitted from the Final Draft of Jefferson’s Message to Congress, December 8, 1801, 
in 3 ALBERT JEREMIAH BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 605, 605–06 (1919); see al-
so James Madison, Letters of Helvidius, No. II, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 151, 
153 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1906) (arguing that the power to interpret a treaty or determine 
obligations to go to war “belongs to the department to which those functions belong”). 
 40 See Barron, supra note 23, at 91 (“[Jefferson] may be understood to be arguing only that 
the President has the constitutional authority to exercise the pardon power to remit sen-
tences, and that in the exercise of that constitutionally vested power, he is free to make a 
judgment as to a law’s unconstitutionality.”). 
 41 See infra Part II.C.1. 
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Jefferson did decide to “remit . . . execution” of the Sedition Act, 
and this is sometimes adduced as an example of non-enforcement in 
the modern sense.42  Even if it is—a proposition I doubt, but will as-
sume here for purposes of argument43—those who seek to analogize 
non-enforcement to judicial review face a significant problem of tim-
ing.  The problem is obvious, but remarkably unappreciated.  While 
there was a relatively widespread discussion of judicial review in the 
decade prior to Jefferson’s election,44 there was no discussion of presi-
dential non-enforcement.45  None.  This makes little sense if both 
practices were thought to cure the same defects of government.  Why 
was there no discussion of presidential non-enforcement during the 
Federalist period?  What accounts for the discrepancy in timing? 
To answer this question, I begin from a premise advanced by a 
number of leading historical studies of judicial authority and judicial 
review.46  According to Gordon Wood, Sylvia Snowiss, and Larry Kra-
 
 42 See, e.g., SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY :  THE ABORTION 
AND WAR POWERS DEBATES 3–4 (1992).  
 43 Jefferson defended his conduct by citing his powers of pardon and control over federal 
prosecutions.  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), su-
pra note 37, at 259 (“The President is to have the laws executed.  He may order an of-
fence then to be prosecuted.  If he sees a prosecution put into a train which is not lawful, 
he may order it to be discontinued and put into legal train.”); Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), supra note 37, at 138 (“A legislature had 
passed the sedition law.  The federal courts had subjected certain individuals to its penal-
ties of fine and imprisonment.  On coming into office, I released these individuals by the 
power of pardon committed to executive discretion . . . .”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to Mrs. Adams (July 22, 1804), in 4 MEMOIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES, FROM 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 22, 23 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829) (“I dis-
charged every person under punishment or prosecution under the sedition law . . . .”); cf. 
ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 33–35 (1971) (observing 
that Jefferson never publicly proclaimed an authority to refuse to enforce laws he thought 
unconstitutional). 
 44 This discussion took place in multiple forums, including the press and litigated cases.  
William Treanor and Philip Hamburger have recently shown that judicial review was ex-
ercised, and often discussed, in many more cases than was traditionally appreciated.  See 
PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 358–503 (2008) (showing widespread di-
sussion of judicial review in the founding period); William Michael Treanor, Judicial Re-
view Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457–58 (2005) (arguing that a much greater 
number of statutes were invalidated than previously thought).  
 45 On the lack of evidence, see infra Part II.A (detailing the Framers’ overwhelming support 
for presidential non-enforcement). 
 46 See KRAMER, supra note 34, at 107–08 (recognizing a distinction between ordinary law and 
“popular constitutionalism”); SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 1–2 (1990) (similar); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 291–305 (2d ed. 1998) (similar).  Sylvia Snowiss’s account of the 
origins of judicial review has been particularly influential.  See Treanor, supra note 44, at 
461 (describing Snowiss’s account as “the leading historical study of early judicial re-
view”).  To be sure, Snowiss’s account is now somewhat dated, and has certainly come in 
for its fair share of criticism, in part for insisting on an artificial reading of key sources.  
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mer, the founding generation distinguished the fundamental law set 
out in written constitutions from ordinary law, and believed funda-
mental law would ultimately be enforced by the people themselves 
acting ‘out of doors,’ through petitions, voting, and protest.47  If this 
is correct, as I shall assume it is, then we should think of the move-
ment to establish judicial review in the 1780s as being centrally con-
cerned with showing why violations of fundamental law should be de-
termined and remedied in court, as well as outside it, as was the 
traditional practice.  The evidence examined here suggests that the 
answer lies in the distinctive procedures utilized by courts of law. 
Much more than we, the Framers had a special regard for court-
room proceedings, or what some in that period called “forensic litiga-
tion.”48  Forensic litigation, they thought, could give shape to a dis-
pute in a way that made it possible for a judge or jury to resolve the 
matter in a non-partisan fashion, according to the law of the commu-
nity.49  This was a valuable institutional asset in the decades after the 
Revolution.  It was during that period that state popular assemblies 
became active law-making bodies—i.e., functional legislatures—
occupied largely by settling contests between constituent groups over 
the goods generated by public policy.50  Courts were an anodyne for 
this development.  By curbing fits of legislative excess, courts could 
promote the rule of the public’s reason—what that generation called 
 
See Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review:  In 
Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 333–49 (1993) (critically discussing 
Snowiss’s arguments); Gerald Leonard, Iredell Reclaimed:  Farewell to Snowiss’s History of Judi-
cial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 867, 867–73 (2006) (arguing that Snowiss misread Ire-
dell).  Nevertheless, Snowiss’s claims about fundamental law are quite close to those 
made by Wood and Kramer.  Moreover, the Snowiss study remains particularly important 
for my purposes, given its influence on those who have advocated the analogy between 
judicial and executive power.  See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 922 n.50 (citing 
Snowiss); Kramer, supra note 11, at 33 n.114 (acknowledging Snowiss’s influence); 
Paulsen, supra note 15, at 241 n.78 (citing Snowiss). 
 47 KRAMER, supra note 34, at 29–30 (explaining the idea of fundamental law and its opera-
tion); SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 1–2, 90–91 (highlighting the Founders’ view that revolu-
tion was the enforcement mechanism for fundamental law); WOOD, supra note 46, at 
291–92 (explaining fundamental law’s historic English roots).  For an important older 
study that casts doubt on the separation of fundamental law and ordinary law, see Thom-
as C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:  Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary 
Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978) (suggesting a separaton between fundamental and 
ordinary law). 
 48 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 95–96 (Charles T. Cullen & Leslie Tobias eds., 1984). 
 49 See infra Part III.A. 
 50 See, e.g., WILLIAM NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON:  THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 30–34 (2000).  
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“public opinion”—rather than the “passion” or raw interests that an-
imated the assembly.51 
Yet courts could play this institutional role only if they conducted 
themselves in the right way.  Procedure thus became the core of a mul-
tistate reform movement aimed at reshaping state and local courts at 
the turn of the nineteenth century.52  At the center of that movement, 
I argue, were two key ideas, which reformers used both to describe 
practice ideals and to justify proposed changes.  First was the idea of a 
case, which was the sort of dispute suited for resolution in a court of 
law.  Second was the idea of expounding the law, which was the form 
legal explanation took in deciding a case.  Philip Hamburger’s study 
of judicial duty devotes attention to both ideas,53 but, as others have 
noted, leaves the notion of expounding largely undeveloped.54  I try 
to fill in this idea as it was used in the United States in the 1780s and 
1790s.  In this context, expounding the law often meant more than 
simply making sense of it; it involved something like deducing an 
outcome from a systematic formulation of the community’s basic le-
gal principles.55  While all departments had to make sense of the law 
to exercise their functions, only courts expounded it, because ex-
pounding enabled courts to resolve cases non-politically.56  Sources 
from this period often describe judicial review as a kind of by-product 
of expounding, which occurred when a systematic account of poten-
tially relevant community law included the Constitution.57  Reform 
thus brought an end to the pre-revolutionary American paradigm, in 
which judicial “magistrates” exercised multiple governmental func-
 
 51 See, e.g., James Kent, Introductory Lecture to a Course of Law Lectures (1794), in 2 AMERICAN 
POLITICAL WRITING IN THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-–1805, at 941, 941–42 (Charles S. Hyne-
man & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983) (“[I]n this country we have found it expedient to estab-
lish certain rights, to be deemed paramount to the power of the ordinary Legislature, and 
this precaution is considered in general as essential to perfect security, and to guard 
against the occasional violence and momentary triumphs of party. . . . The Courts of Jus-
tice which are organized with peculiar advantages to exempt them from the . . . baneful 
influence of Faction, and to secure at the same time, a steady, firm and impartial inter-
pretation of the Law, are therefore the most proper power in the Government to keep 
the Legislature within the limits of its duty, and to maintain the Authority of the Constitu-
tion.”); see also infra Part I.A. 
 52 See infra Parts III.A–B. 
 53 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 536–48 (distinguishing a “case” as a form of judicial 
authority and discussing the idea of “expounding”). 
 54 See Mary Sarah Bilder, Expounding the Law, 78 GEO. WASH. L.R. 1129, 1140–42 (2010) (re-
viewing Hamburger and noting the arguing that he gave light attention to the notion of 
expounding). 
 55 See infra Part III.C. 
 56 This was the majority view, but it was not a universal one.  See infra Parts III.C– D. 
 57 See infra Part III.C. 
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tions and led the process of law-enforcement and even policy-making 
at the local level.58  By the time of ratification, then, most would de-
scribe courts as specially tasked with deciding cases and expounding 
the law.  While thinking about executives was less developed, they 
generally were not said to do either of these things.  And since execu-
tives did not expound, they had no power of review.59  The justifica-
tion for enforcing the Constitution in court thus did not extend to the 
executive—at least with respect to its office of enforcing the law. 
My aim in what follows is to substantiate these claims.  My argu-
ment will have three parts.  In Part I, I analyze a leading Founding-era 
justification for judicial review, and show how it can be adapted to 
support presidential non-enforcement.  In Part II, I describe histori-
cal evidence that the Framers would have rejected the argument for 
non-enforcement set forth in Part I.  This evidence falls into two cat-
egories:  first, the lack of almost any express support, in the period 
under examination, for the proposition that the President could re-
fuse to enforce the law; second, the large body of ‘negative evidence’ 
that implies the President was obligated to enforce the law.  In Part 
III, I turn back to the argument for judicial review, with an eye to 
showing why the Framers regarded courts alone as authorized to re-
fuse to enforce unconstitutional law.  As explained above, my argu-
ment turns on an examination of the ideas of a “case” and “expound-
ing” the law, which played a key role in justifying the court-reform 
movements in the last decades of the eighteenth century. 
I.  THE NON-ENFORCEMENT ARGUMENT 
I want to begin with judicial review, and with what has become, 
perhaps, the dominant account of its origin.  In a sentence, this ac-
count tells us that judicial review emerged in response to the politics 
of debt and paper money that gripped state assemblies after the Rev-
olutionary War.  Proponents of review sought to slow down the legis-
lative process in order to protect the rights of creditors and loyalists.  
Below, I sketch these developments and then examine a period text 
defending judicial review.  The text is James Iredell’s well known es-
say, “To the Public.”  My discussion of Iredell’s essay and its relation-
 
 58 Reform took decades in some jurisdictions, stretching into the nineteenth century.  See, 
e.g., JOHN PHILLIP REID, LEGISLATING THE COURTS:  JUDICIAL DEPENDENCE IN EARLY 
NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE 3–17 (2009) (describing legislative interference with judicial 
proceedings in a number of states). 
 59 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 545 (showing that the executive’s office did not include 
a power to explain the law). 
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ship to the politics of the time will be familiar to many readers.  To 
make the comparison between judicial review and non-enforcement 
as precise as possible, I lay out Iredell’s argument ‘formally.’60  I call 
the formal version of the argument the Standard Justification.  This 
formal argument is a creature of my own making and new to the lit-
erature, but the analysis is meant to track conventional wisdom, so 
that we can figure out later where that wisdom goes wrong.  By for-
malizing Iredell’s argument I am also able to show exactly how the 
Standard Justification might be adapted to support a presidential 
non-enforcement power, as a number of commentators have claimed.  
To help us keep our various arguments straight, I call this adaptation 
the Non-Enforcement Argument.  Thus, the Standard Justification justi-
fies judicial review; the Non-Enforcement Argument justifies presi-
dential non-enforcement.  As we will see, the Non-Enforcement Ar-
gument springs from the same political logic as judicial review, but 
recruits the executive (rather than just the judiciary) to resist the 
popular assembly. 
A.  State Politics and Judicial Review 
The American Revolution was followed by a period of deep-felt 
anxiety.61  Concern centered on the economy.  At the national level, 
the Confederation emerged from the war with a massive debt and few 
fiscal tools to discharge it.62  At the state level, there was a widespread 
perception that commercial trade was depressed.  Markets had disap-
peared; Britain closed the lucrative ports of the West Indies to Ameri-
can ships, forcing exporting states to locate new overseas markets.63  
Inland markets dried up as customers struggled to repay wartime 
 
 60 Here, by “formally” I do not mean that I abbreviate Iredell’s argument by use of a formal 
language, as in the study of formal logic.  Rather, I rephrase Iredell’s key assertions in 
natural language so that the argument is formally valid. 
 61 See ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE:  THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763–
1789, at 611–12 (2d ed. 2005) (detailing the various anxieites of Congress and the people 
after the Revolution). 
 62 See Janet A. Riesman, Money, Credit, and Federalist Political Economy, in BEYOND 
CONFEDERATION:  ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 128, 
130–33 (Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, & Edward C. Carter II eds., 1987) (detailing 
the size of the national debt and the difficulties in repaying it).  For a discussion of the 
Confederation’s fiscal difficulties, see MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 61, at 616–19 (explaining 
the Confederation’s struggles to repay interest and principle on its outstanding debts). 
 63 See MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 61, at 613 (describing the British exclusion of Americans 
from the West Indies). 
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debt.64  At the same time, states sought to discharge their own public 
debt through taxation.65  Governments wanted to collect “specie,” or 
hard money, but it was scarce, and a number of states resorted to 
printing paper currency so taxes could be paid.66  Inflation followed. 
It was perhaps natural that Americans would blame the Confeder-
ation Congress and the state assemblies for these events.  They did.  
What is remarkable, however, is the constitutional register in which 
their discontent was voiced.67  Americans drew ready inferences about 
their own character as a people.  They lacked “virtue” and had suc-
cumbed to a “licentious” addiction to “luxury.”68  “Having won inde-
pendence at great cost,” writes Jack Rakove, “Americans seemed un-
prepared or unable to manage their affairs wisely or peacefully.”69  
The people now held power in the state assemblies, but majority fac-
tions in the assembly used this power to pursue economic and social 
policies that advanced their private interests at the expense of oth-
ers.70  Thus, assemblies dominated by merchant interests sought to 
require full repayment of private debt in inflation-resistant specie, at 
the expense of farmers unable to repay notes at face value.71  In some 
states, and at other times, the opposite policy prevailed.72  Assemblies 
also made quick work distributing the landholdings of loyalists, con-
fiscating their property and creating ‘efficient’ mechanisms for quiet-
 
 64 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 248–49 (1991) 
(explaining how overleveraged consumers and the shrinking of credit contributed to the 
struggles of inland markets). 
 65 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 29–30 (1996) (explaining that many states taxed their citizens to repay 
debts). 
 66 Printing notes to be removed from circulation through taxation was known as “currency 
theory.”  See Riesman, supra note 62, at 130 (claiming that printing money was the only so-
lution to the debt problem); see also MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 61, at 617 (explaining that 
several states began printing money to repay their debts). 
 67 Cf. WOOD, supra note 46, at 393–96 (describing the 1780s as a period of deep discontent 
and prevalent criticism of the Revolution). 
 68 See WOOD, supra note 46, at 403–04, 419–21. 
 69 RAKOVE, supra note 65, at 29. 
 70 See WOOD, supra note 64, at 229 (discussing the fact that early Americans were too in-
volved in their own affairs to think about their neighbors). 
 71 NELSON, supra note 50, at 31. 
 72 WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW:  THE IMPACT OF LEGAL 
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 92 (1975) (referencing “the act of 
1782 that deprived judgment creditors of their common law right to obtain satisfaction 
out of the proceeds of their debtors’ goods sold at auction” to demonstrate “the arbitrary 
power of a majoritarian legislature . . . to change the law”); Edward S. Corwin, The Progress 
of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelph-
ia Convention, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 511, 519 (1925) (discussing the “class of farmer-debtors” 
that “now began to align itself with the demagogues in the state legislatures, in opposition 
to the mercantile-creditor class”). 
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ing title that dispensed with protective procedures traditionally avail-
able at common law.73  But most importantly, and most disquietingly, 
this style of politics—the politics of self-interest—was inherently con-
tentious.74  In place of the pre-war “consensus style of government” 
there was an openly hostile battle for state favor and public re-
sources.75 
The experience of state politics in the 1780s drove the develop-
ment of judicial review.76  According to the dominant account, the 
pivot point was a revision in the understanding of separation of pow-
ers.77  As alienation from state assemblies grew, the American people 
began to conceptualize themselves not as part of the government, pre-
sent in a popular law-making body, but as standing outside govern-
ment entirely.  The state assembly, such as it was, and such as it had 
conducted itself, was no longer the people’s presence within govern-
ment.  It became simply another form of governmental magistracy, 
 
 73 The seizure and distribution of real property is only one example of state laws targeting 
loyalists.  Other acts seized  personal property, cancelled debts, and stripped loyalists of 
basic civil and political rights.  See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minori-
ty:  The Loyalists, the Atlantic World, and the Origins of Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
825, 835–38 (2006) (discussing “[s]tate [a]ntiloyalist [l]egislation”); see generally Alison 
Reppy, The Spectre of Attainder in New York (Part I), 23 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 1 (1948); James 
Westfall Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the American Revolution (Part I), 3 ILL. L. 
REV. 81 (1908); James Westfall Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the American Rev-
olution (Part II), 3 ILL. L. REV. 147, 151 (1908). 
 74 See RAKOVE, supra note 65, at 30 (noting that the “contentiousness of state politics in gen-
eral” was “worrisome”); WOOD, supra note 46, at 399–403 (describing “party strife” in the 
states as “bitter”). 
 75 The expression comes from NELSON, supra note 50, at 27; see also WOOD, supra note 63, at 
245–47 (discussing the push for “interest-group politics”).  Nelson argues that this devel-
opment followed a transformation in the understanding of the authority of law:  after the 
Revolution, law was an instrument that could be used to advance one’s interests.  See 
NELSON, supra note 50, at 32–33; see also NELSON, supra note 72, at 3–5. 
 76 KRAMER, supra note 34, at 54 (discussing the role of state governments in the 1780s in the 
development of judicial review); Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review Before John Mar-
shall, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 65–67 (2003) (describing the judiciary’s role in curbing 
legislative overreaching); Prakash & Yoo, supra note 9, at 930; Sylvia Snowiss, The Marbury 
of 1803 and the Modern Marbury, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 231, 233 (2003); Wood, supra note 
31, at 156–57 (discussing that Americans in the 1780s began to have “second thoughts 
about their earlier confidence in their popularly elected legislatures” and thus reevaluat-
ed “their former hostility to judicial power and discretion”). 
 77 The claims in this paragraph derive from Gordon Wood’s seminal study in The Creation of 
the American Republic.  WOOD, supra note 46, at 446–53 (discussing the “[r]evision of 
[s]eparation of [p]owers”); see also GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY:  A HISTORY OF 
THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 450–52 (2009) [hereinafter WOOD, EMPIRE] (arguing 
that “separation of law from politics” was needed to popularize judicial review); Wood, 
supra note 31, at 159 (discussing the tension between judges and legislatures).  For a criti-
cism of the separation of powers explanation, see Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins 
of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 509 (2006). 
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answerable to the sovereign people through elections.  This shift in 
understanding was evidenced in a period of constitutional reform at 
the state level, where the people’s delegates sought to design the in-
stitutions of government in ways that would inhibit a politics of self-
interest and the concomitant risk to individual rights.78  Adjustments 
were made throughout the system—to apportionment in the assem-
bly, to its form and powers, to qualifications for membership in the 
upper house, and to the term and powers of the governor.79  Some 
proposed expanding government with a system of public schools to 
promote virtue among the people themselves.80  But courts of law un-
derwent perhaps the most striking change.  They emerged as a sepa-
rate and independent branch of government:  the judiciary.81 
As agents of the people, equal in status to the other great depart-
ments, the judiciary could play a role in safeguarding individual 
rights and preserving constitutional limits.82  Its role, to be sure, 
would not be unique.83  The judiciary would not be the “appointed 
arbiters” of the legislature’s constitutional boundaries.84  The primary 
mechanisms for determining and enforcing constitutional limits 
 
 78 The same concern guided constitutional design at the national level.  See RAKOVE, supra 
note 65, at 48–55 (discussing the temptation of legislators to act in their own self-
interest). 
 79 See WOOD, supra note 46, at 433–46 (describing the new role for courts of law).  Notably, 
no state gave its governor an express power of non-enforcement.  See infra Part II.A. 
 80 See SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW:  ANGLO-AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 88–89 (1990) (discussing Jefferson’s promotion 
of education); DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785–
1954, at 14–15 (1987) (discussing Congress’s efforts to promote a republican government 
through public edication).  Outside government, the “public sphere” of voluntary socie-
ties and print media would filter and shape public opinion.  See John L. Brooke, Ancient 
Lodges and Self-Created Societies:  Voluntary Association and the Public Sphere in the Early Repub-
lic, in LAUNCHING THE EXTENDED REPUBLIC:  THE FEDERALIST ERA 277, 296–309 (Ronald 
Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1996). 
 81 See REID, supra note 58, at 114; WOOD, EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 407 (describing the rise 
of the judiciary by the 1780s).  For examples of state constitutions establishing independ-
ent judiciaries, see MASS. CONST. of 1780 ch. III; N.H. CONST. of 1784 art. XXXV; S.C. 
CONST. of 1790 art. III; PA. CONST. of 1790 art. V. 
 82 See W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 125 
(1965); KRAMER, supra note 34, at 60 (describing courts’ duty as agents of the people not 
to enforce unconstitutional laws); M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION 
OF POWERS 174 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining the viewpoint that the judiciary was needed to 
limit the power of the legislature). 
 83 See SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 55 (noting that all three branches of government were 
equal under the law); Prakash & Yoo, supra note 9, at 917 (“[J]udicial review is nothing 
special.”). 
 84 Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in 2 GRIFFITH J. 
MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL, ONE OF THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 178 (1858). 
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would be the structural features established to check the legislative 
power.85  Yet courts would be duty-bound to contribute to this effort.  
Now, just like members of the state assembly, judicial officers were 
agents of the people, and as such were themselves bound by the limits 
of the Constitution.86  A judiciary co-equal (or “co-ordinate,” as that 
generation put it) with the legislature, whose principal was the peo-
ple, should refuse to give effect to a legislative act that violated consti-
tutional limits.  So conceived, judicial review was an “extraordinary 
political act” of resistance to a usurping popular assembly, not an ex-
ercise of “conventional legal responsibility.”87 
It is with these aims, according to our narrative, that judicial re-
view took its first, halting steps in state courts in the 1780s.88  The 
leading state cases in this period are familiar:  Commonwealth v. 
Caton,89 Rutgers v. Waddington,90 Trevett v. Weeden,91 and Bayard v. Single-
ton92 are perhaps the best known.93  Though students of judicial review 
have long known of the cases, there remains disagreement about the 
 
 85 See SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 92–94. 
 86 Wood, supra note 31, at 159–60 (characterizing the judiciary as representatives of the 
people). 
 87 SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 2; see also KRAMER, supra note 34, at 63 (“Judicial review, in oth-
er words, was not an act of ordinary legal interpretation.”).  For a different approach, see 
1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 50–142 (1971) (arguing 
that American practices were largely derived from English traditions); HAMBURGER, supra 
note 44, at 4, 17–18. 
 88 See KRAMER, supra note 34, at 63–64 (describing judges’ early rationales for judicial re-
view). 
 89  8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 12 (Va. 1782) (holding the court can declare a state law unconstitutional 
where the house of delegates would have pardon power on its own); See 2 THE LETTERS 
AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, 1734–1803, at 416–27 (David John Mays ed., 1967) 
(outlining the views of the judges who decided Commonwealth v. Caton); William Michael 
Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491, 
529–38 (1994) (discussing Canton). 
 90 See 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON:  DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 392–
419 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964). 
 91 See 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 417–29 (1971) 
(reprinting the case). 
 92 1 N.C. (Mart., 48) 5 (1787). 
 93 These are probably the most commonly discussed cases, but there are other important 
early state authorities, including Holmes & Ketcham v. Walton and the Ten Pound Act Cases.  
See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 407–35 (providing context on the two cases).  The list 
of precedents for judicial review has, naturally, been the subject of intense historical de-
bate.  For recent lists of state authorities, up through the early 1790s, see id. at 655–58 
(listing state court decisions); Scott Douglas Graber, The Myth of Marbury v. Madison and 
the Origins of Judicial Review, in MARBURY VERSUS MADISON, supra note 24, at 7–11; 
Treanor, supra note 44, at 473–517 (“[I]n seven cases . . . judicial review was exercised to 
prevent application of the statute.”).  An older example is CHARLES GROVES HAINES, THE 
AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 88–159 (1914). 
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public’s reception of them.94  Popular constitutionalists would de-
scribe the reaction as an “outcry,” as courts took it upon themselves, 
for the first time, to exercise powers long thought to be held by the 
people themselves.95  The account may be overdrawn.96  Still, it is un-
disputed that several of the early cases of judicial review met with se-
vere criticism.97  Nor can the reaction be understood wholly as ‘sour 
grapes,’ since, as we will see, opponents triggered a dialogue about 
the power of judicial review itself.98 
B.  The “Standard Justification” for Judicial Review 
One of the best-known examples of this dialogue arose out of the 
litigation in Bayard v. Singleton.99  Bayard was a suit for ejectment 
brought by Elizabeth Bayard and her husband against Spyers Single-
ton.  The Bayards’ claim on the property in question derived from a 
deed of transfer executed by Elizabeth’s father, Samuel Cornell.  
Cornell was a loyalist and had fled for Great Britain at the start of the 
war.  Shortly after he deeded his estate to Elizabeth, the state confis-
cated it and then sold the property to Singleton.100  The constitutional 
issue posed in Bayard concerned the summary process for quieting 
title adopted by the state assembly during the pendency of the litiga-
tion.  After Elizabeth Bayard and her husband first brought suit in 
late 1784, Singleton secured passage of an act requiring courts to 
dismiss suits against purchasers who filed an affidavit the the property 
had been acquired from the commissioner of forfeited estates.101  
 
 94 Compare KRAMER, supra note 34, at 65–69 (“[E]arly efforts to exercise judicial review drew 
stinging rebukes.”), with HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 463–75 (“[T]here is little surviving 
evidence of public discussion, other than a few newspaper reports, which glowingly ap-
proved of the decision . . . .”). 
 95 KRAMER, supra note 34, at 63–65 (“Judges might be justified in acting as the people’s 
proxy. . . .”); see also 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 950, 964, 966–68, 971–72 (1953) (describing public 
reaction to Holmes, Rutgers, Trevett, and Bayard). 
 96 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 407; Prakash & Yoo, supra note 9, at 936–39. 
 97 The outstanding example is Trevett v. Weeden.  See CROSSKEY, supra note 95, at 968 (ex-
plaining that judges on Trevett v. Weeden faced legislative threats and lost their seats in 
reelection). 
 98 See, e.g., Letter from Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell (Aug. 12, 1787), in 2 LIFE 
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 84, at 169. 
 99 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 463 (discussing how Iredell tried to influence the judg-
es in Bayard). 
100 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 450 (providing the facts of Bayard v. Singleton). 
101 Bayard v. Singleton, 1. N.C. (Mart. 48) 5, 5 (1787); see also HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 
451–52 (“The act provided that purchars of confiscated estates and those claiming under 
their title ‘shall be deemed not liable to answer any suit or suits in law or equity’ com-
menced by anyone described in the confiscation statutes ‘as inimical to the states’ . . . .”). 
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When Singleton moved for dismissal on the grounds of the act, Wil-
liam Davie, representing the Bayards, argued “warmly” that the act 
was “unconstitutional and therefore no law.”102  The court made some 
brief remarks and took the matter under advisement.103  A year passed 
with no decision.  Finally, at May term 1787, the court reconvened 
and held the summary process statute unconstitutional.104 
Nine months before the decision, in the summer of 1786, an 
anonymous letter entitled “To the Public” appeared in the North Caro-
lina Gazette.105  The author was James Iredell, and it seems likely that 
Iredell wrote the letter in an effort to persuade the North Carolina 
Superior Court to resume the Bayard matter and find for the plain-
tiffs on constitutional grounds.106  As others have recognized, the let-
ter contains one of the most important defenses of judicial review in 
the period.107  Iredell began by recalling the recent experience in 
North Carolina of drafting a constitution.  That process, he said, left 
“no doubt, but that the power of the Assembly is limited and defined 
by the constitution.”108  The assembly was clearly subject to constitu-
tional limits; the question was what remedies there were when the as-
sembly exceeded those limits.  Were the people confined to petition-
ing their government or to popular resistance? 
Iredell argued no.  There was a third remedy for unconstitutional 
acts of the assembly.  He wrote: 
These two remedies being rejected [i.e., petition and resistance], it re-
mains to be inquired whether the judicial power hath any authority to in-
 
102 HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 453 n.153 (citation omitted). 
103 See Bayard, 1 N.C. (Mart. 48) at 5–6. 
104 See id. at 7.  Nevertheless, at trial, the court determined that because Cornell was an alien 
he could not hold lands in the state, and the jury returned a verdict for defendant Single-
ton. 
105 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 463; see also James Iredell, To the Public, in 2 LIFE AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 84, at 145–49. 
106 HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 463 (“Iredell wrote for the public because he could not 
speak before the judges.”).  Hamburger shows that Iredell did not represent the Bayards, 
as is often suggested.  See, e.g., 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 95, at 971—72 (stating that Iredell 
was “of counsel for the plaintiff”).  Instead, he was conflicted out because of involvement 
in a related matter.  The conflict, which had been artfully arranged by Singleton, angered 
Iredell and his friends Archibald Maclain and William Hooper, who were interested in 
protecting loyalists from having their property confiscated.  See HAMBURGER, supra note 
44, at 463 (“When Maclaine learned of how he and his friend had been ‘silenced,’ he was 
furious . . . .”); see also Hulsebosch, supra note 73, at 829, 851 (supporting the idea that at-
torneys in Bayard and other early judicial review cases were targeting antiloyalist legisla-
tion). 
107 See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 46, at 868 (supporting the idea that Iredell, and by associa-
tion “To the Public,” was very influential in the area of judicial review); see also Corwin, 
supra note 72, at 526. 
108 Iredell, supra note 105, at 146. 
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terfere in such a case [i.e., a case where the assembly violates the consti-
tution].  The duty of that power, I conceive, in all cases, is to decide ac-
cording to the laws of the State.  It will not be denied, I suppose, that the 
constitution is a law of the State, as well as an act of Assembly, with this dif-
ference only, that it is the fundamental law, and unalterable by the legisla-
ture, which derives all its power from it.  One act of Assembly may repeal 
another act of Assembly.  For this reason, the latter act is to be obeyed, 
and not the former.  An act of Assembly cannot repeal the constitution, 
or any part of it.  For that reason, an act of Assembly, inconsistent with 
the constitution, is void, and cannot be obeyed, without disobeying the 
superior law to which we were previously and irrevocably bound.  The 
judges, therefore, must take care at their peril, that every act of Assembly 
they presume to enforce is warranted by the constitution, since if it is not, 
they act without lawful authority.  This is not a usurped or a discretionary 
power, but one inevitably resulting from the constitution of their office, 
they being judges for the benefit of the whole people, not mere servants of the As-
sembly.109 
Iredell is impressively clear in this passage, but for my purposes, it 
is important to lay out the argument formally.  Iredell begins with 
what we can call Premise 1, namely, the proposition that “the duty of 
[the judicial] power . . . in all cases, is to decide according to the laws 
of the State.”  Premise 2 is the next sentence:  “[T]he [c]onstitution is 
a law of the State.”  If we substitute Premise 2 into Premise 1, as the ital-
icized language suggests, it gives us (what we might call) Conclusion 
1—namely, that the duty of the judicial power in all cases is to decide 
according to the constitution.  But this is not yet judicial review.  The 
problem, of course, is that an act of the assembly is also a law of the 
state, as Iredell acknowledges.  If we substitute this proposition into 
Premise 1, it gives us Conclusion 2—namely, that it is the duty of the 
judicial power in all cases to decide according to an act of assembly.  
Conclusion 1 and Conclusion 2 describe two different duties.  Those 
duties may coincide, but they may not.  Where an act of assembly and 
the constitution are “inconsistent,” it will be impossible to satisfy both 
Conclusion 1 and Conclusion 2; the court will be unable to discharge 
both duties.  What is required, it would seem, is a judicial rule for 
privileging either the constitution or the unconstitutional act.  Iredell 
proposes such a rule by drawing a simple comparison to legislative 
repeal.  An assembly can repeal any previous act it has passed.  When 
it does, he says, copying Blackstone, the “latter act” (in time) be-
 
109 Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), supra note 84, at 
148. 
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comes the law of the state for purposes of deciding a case.110  Yet the 
Assembly cannot repeal the constitution, since the constitution is 
“fundamental law,” and thus the source of the Assembly’s power.  An 
act inconsistent with the constitution must be void—i.e., not a law at 
all.111  Call this Premise 3.  It follows, says Iredell, that for the court to 
decide a case according to an unconstitutional law would be to violate 
the judicial duty to decide in all cases according to the laws of the 
state.  This proposition, which we can call Conclusion 3 (abbreviated 
“C”), is judicial review. 
Paraphrasing where appropriate, this gives us the following argu-
ment. 
The Standard Justification112 
P1. The duty of the judicial power in all cases is to decide according to 
(and only to) the laws of the state. 
P2. The constitution is a law of the state. 
P3. An unconstitutional act of the assembly is void, and thus not a law of 
the state. 
C. If the judicial power decides according to an unconstitutional act of 
the assembly, rather than the constitution, it does not decide according 
to the laws of the state, and thus it violates its duty. 
To understand this argument, one has to keep in mind that Prem-
ise 3 is not equivalent to judicial review.  Premise 3 says that an un-
constitutional act of assembly is void.  But “void” does not mean “of 
no effect in a court of law.”  As Snowiss and others have shown, one 
cannot assume in this period that a constitution can be enforced in 
legal proceedings within a court of law.113  The constitution was fun-
 
110 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *53 (discussing the nature of law); see 1 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 741 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007) 
(asserting that the later of two inconsistent laws “is the only existing law”). 
111 For this usage of “not a law” or “no law at all,” see, as an example, Prakash, supra note 9, 
at 1665. 
112 This expression “Standard Justification” comes from Charles Hobson.  See CHARLES F. 
HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE:  JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 60–61 
(1996). 
113 See, e.g., SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 42 (“The convention debates . . . indicate that in 1787 
fundamental law was understood to bind morally and politically, not legally.”); Wood, su-
pra note 31, at 161–65 (“The courts might on occasion set aside legislation that violated 
fundamental law, but such an act could not be part of routine judicial business; it neces-
sarily had to be an extraordinary expression of public authority, the kind of extreme and 
remarkable action the people themselves would take if they could.  This kind of judicial 
review was, as it had been aptly described, a ‘subsitute for revolution.’”(citation omit-
ted)). 
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damental law; it regulated the government, not the people.114  Courts 
promulgated and applied ordinary law, which regulated the people.  
Thus Premise 3 is not sufficient for judicial review.  Its role in the 
Standard Justification is, rather, to show why courts should privilege 
the constitution over an inconsistent act of the assembly.  Other 
premises have to get us into court in the first place.  With this point 
in mind, we can think of the propositions of the Standard Justifica-
tion as playing four basic roles, here in order:  (1) describe the judi-
cial office; (2) show that the constitution naturally figures into that 
office; (3) provide a reason to privilege the constitution; and (4) con-
clude that a court is duty-bound to give the constitution effect. 
The most significant premise in Iredell’s argument is, therefore, 
the first one:  that there is a judicial duty to decide cases according to 
the laws of the state.  The burden of the argument really rests here, 
and, indeed, Premises 2 and 3 were relatively well accepted at the 
time “To the Public” was written.115  Yet Premise 1 is far from obvious, 
and, after pausing to examine it, we may wonder whether Iredell has 
simply begged the question.  Why is it the duty of the judiciary, after 
all, to decide cases according to all the laws of the state?  Why consid-
er the constitution, even if it is a law?  The constitution is obviously 
different in kind from ordinary law; and it is easy to describe a system 
in which courts ignore fundamental law.  A court might be obligated 
merely to decide cases in conformance with those laws duly enacted by 
the state legislature, regardless of whether the laws violate substantive 
 
114 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 34, at 29 (“Fundamental law was different from ordinary law, 
or what we typically think of today as ordinary law, both in its conceptual underpinnings 
and in actual operation.  It was law created by the people to regulate and restrain the 
government, as opposed to ordinary law, which is law enacted by the government and re-
strain the people.”); SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 90–91 (discussing the difference between 
fundamental and orindary law). 
115 For Premise 2, see HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 293 (highlighting that Americans be-
lieved “constitutions were laws”).  In assessing Premise 2, it is important to understand 
that it does not entail that a constitution is cognizable in a court of law.  See SNOWISS, su-
pra note 46, at 49 (discussing Iredell’s view of the cognizability of constitutions in court).  
In other words, to deny judicial review, one need not maintain that a constitution is purely 
a social compact, and not a law; one can argue that it is a fundamental law, and that fun-
damental laws are not cognizable in court.  For Premise 3, see Prakash, supra note 9, at 
1658 (providing examples of early American leaders who espoused this view).  See also 
SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 49 (“The judicial duty to decide according to the laws of the 
state meant that the judiciary was precluded from enforcing legislation that by violating 
the constitution was void or not law.”). 
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constitutional limitations.116  Or the constitution might function hor-
tatively, as it does in a number of regimes.117 
Premise 1, it would seem, is in need of its own justification.  A 
number of different justifications are possible, but I want to focus on 
two suggested by the text of “To the Public” and present in other 
leading period defenses of judicial review.  The first justification is 
based on the idea of constitutional agency.  Roughly, constitutional 
agency is the idea that judges are the agents of the people.  Iredell 
closes his argument in the passage above by gently admonishing 
North Carolina judges that they hold their office “for the benefit of the 
whole people.”  They are not, he reminds them, “mere servants of the 
Assembly.”118  Because judges are agents of the people, and not the 
assembly, they “must take care at their peril” to enforce only laws that 
comply with their principal’s constitution. 119  To do otherwise would 
be, in effect, to disobey the principal.  As Iredell put the matter in a 
subsequent letter to Richard Dobbs Spaight, then a delegate at the 
federal convention in Philadelphia, “either . . . the fundamental un-
repealable law must be obeyed, by the rejection of an act unwarrant-
ed by and inconsistent with it, or you must obey an act founded on an 
authority not given by the people . . . .”120  Since one disobeys what 
one does not obey, Iredell’s implication is clear:  judges who gave ef-
fect to unconstitutional laws “themselves would be lawbreakers, acting 
without lawful authority.”121  To remain within the bounds of their au-
thority, judges must decide cases in conformance with the constitu-
tion. 
 
116 See Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is by no 
means clear, that to declare a law void that has been enacted according to the forms pre-
scribed in the constitution, is not a usurpation of legislative power.”). 
117 See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 18–
20 (1969) (“[A] variety of excellent purposes are felt to be served in other countries with 
similar constitutional provisions without detracting from the positive law effect of all legis-
lative acts.”); see also HAINES, supra note 93, at 201 (discussing opinions about the result in 
Rutgers v. Waddington). 
118 Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), supra note 84, at 
148.  See also supra Part I.A (discussing the separation of powers doctrine).  Iredell’s whole 
line of reasoning presupposes the shift in thinking Wood describes, in which the people 
conceived of themselves as standing outside government entirely.  Were the people un-
derstood as part of the government in the state assembly, it would follow from popular 
sovereignty that the courts of law were servants of the assembly. 
119 Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), supra note 84, at 
148. 
120 Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), supra note 84, at 
173. 
121 KRAMER, supra note 34, at 63 (internal quotations omitted). 
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This concept of constitutional agency lay at the center of a cluster 
of interrelated ideas, whose distinctions were not always made explic-
it.  Thus, it was said that agency implied a duty:  a duty not to act 
without constitutional authority,122 or a duty to resist unlawful pow-
er,123 or perhaps a duty not to ‘aid and abet’ another in violating the 
constitution.124  There were a number of suggestions.  To be sure, 
none was entirely without difficulty.  Where law imposes any kind of 
duty, failure to satisfy that duty is a violation; and the conclusion that 
a judge “violates” the constitution by giving effect to an unconstitu-
tional law has seemed to some too strong.125  Another common sug-
gestion was that the legislature’s violation justified others in resisting 
the unconstitutional act.126  A judge could resist, even if he did not 
have to.  This, too, might be connected to judicial review.  In his Lec-
tures in Law, delivered in the early 1790s, James Wilson argued that 
“whoever would be obliged to obey a constitutional law, is justified in 
refusing to obey an unconstitutional act of the legislature—and that, 
 
122 Several theories are possible here.  An unconstitutional law might rob a court of jurisdic-
tion.  See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 553 (2d ed. 1836) (quoting John Marshall as saying, “[i]f 
they were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, . . . [the judges] 
would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction.  They would declare it 
void.”).  Alternatively, enforcing an unconstitutional law might violate a judge’s oath of 
office.  See SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, at 423. 
123 See, e.g., WILLOUGHBY BERTLE ABINGDON, THOUGHTS ON THE LETTER OF EDMUND BURKE 
TO THE SHERIFFS OF BRISTOL, ON THE AFFAIRS OF AMERICA 17 (1777), available at 
http:// archive.org/details/thoughtsonletter00abinuoft (“Obedience is due to the Laws, 
when founded on the Constitution; but when they are subversive of the Constitution, 
then disobedience instead of obedience is due.”); see also 1 GOEBEL, supra note 87, at 127 
(noting the popularity of the Abingdon pamphlet in the states); KRAMER, supra note 34, at 
98 (“[Courts] justified their refusal to enforce laws as a ‘political-legal’ act on behalf of 
the people, a responsibility required by their position as the people’s faithful agents.”). 
124 See Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cas. 20, 59 (Va. 1793) (Opinion of Tyler, J.) (“[C]an one 
branch of the government call upon another to aid in the violation of this sacred letter?  
The answer to these questions must be in the negative.”). 
125 See Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle, 330, 357 (Pa. 1825)  (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“I grant, 
however, that the state judiciary ought not to exercise the power [to deem a law unconsti-
tutional], except in cases free from all doubt, because, as a writ of error to the supreme 
court of the United States lies to correct an error only in favor of the constitutionality of 
the state law, an error in deciding against it would be irremediable.”); Louise Weinberg, 
Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1398 (2003) (“[Chief Justice] Marshall pointed out that 
for judges to fail to enforce the Constitution, when they have adjuged legislslation to be 
in violation of it, would be for them to violate the Constitution themselves.  Although the 
term, ‘violate,’ may express his point a shade too emphatically for our taste, there is no 
escape from his point.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
126 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 122, at  111 (quoting Theophilius Parsons as saying “[a]n act 
of usurpation is not obligatory, it is not law, and any man may be justified in his resistance.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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when a question, even of this delicate nature, occurs, every one who 
is called to act, has a right to judge . . . .”127  The judiciary would thus 
be justified in resisting the legislature by refusing to enforce the 
law.128  This idea, too, was somewhat of an imperfect fit.  To invoke 
Wilson’s reasoning, one must conceive of the judiciary as being 
“obliged to obey” all legislative acts—not just those that expressly 
command courts or judicial officers to do something.129  Yet the no-
tion was a common one. 
A second justification for Premise 1 focuses on the duty to apply 
the law.130  The particular duty of the judicial power, says Iredell, is to 
decide “cases” according to the laws of the state.131  This duty entails a 
set of further tasks.  The tasks are familiar—they are the workaday 
norms of decision-making in courts of law.  Thus, to decide a case ac-
cording to the laws of the state, a judge must first determine what the 
laws of the state are; and to determine what the laws of the state are, 
the judge must make sense of how different laws that are potentially 
relevant fit together.  The constitution is one such law.  It is, Iredell 
tells us, “fundamental law.”  It follows that the judge must determine 
how ordinary acts of the assembly fit together with the Constitution.  
If they are inconsistent, the judge must give effect to the constitution, 
since it is “superior law.”  In this way, reasons Iredell, judicial review 
“is not a usurped or discretionary power, but one inevitably resulting 
from the constitution of their office.”132  The judge’s office requires him to 
consider the constitution, in addition to ordinary law.133 
 
127 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 572. 
128 See KRAMER, supra note 34, at 63 (“In refusing to enforce unconstitutional laws, judges 
were exercising the people’s authority to resist, providing a supplemental remedy for ul-
tra vires legislative acts . . . .”); Treanor, supra note 44, at 534 (making a similar point); cf. 
HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 276–77 (discussing judicial refusal to use stamped paper 
during the 1765 Stamp Act controversy); HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 559–74 (discuss-
ing Cases of the Judges). 
129 Alternatively, one could infer that judicial review is limited to acts that do expressly re-
quire the judiciary to do something.  See Clinton, supra note 24, at 88–89. 
130 See HOBSON, supra note 112, at 64 (discussing judges’ duties to enforce law); SNOWISS, 
supra note 46, at 49 (discussing that the Constitution is subject to judicial application). 
131 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 464 (noting Iredell’s conception of judicial duty).  
Hamburger’s treatment of “To the Public” focuses on this aspect of Iredell’s argument. 
132 Iredell, supra note 84, at 148 (emphasis added). 
133 See Treanor, supra note 44, at 523 (describing this argument made by Tucker in Common-
wealth v. Caton).  Even Sylvia Snowiss, who has contended that American judges of the late 
eighteenth century lacked the authority to expound fundamental law, agrees that these 
judges could “consider” the Constitution in the course of expounding ordinary law.  See 
SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 48–55 (observing that “[t]he judiciary could legitimately take 
notice of the constitution”); Snowiss, supra note 76, at 236 (“The judiciary must resort to 
or take notice of the constitution in order to fulfill its assigned responsibilty to expound 
ordinary law . . . .”). 
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If we want, we can think of these two justifications as supporting 
two different ‘versions’ of the Standard Justification.  One version is 
based, ultimately, on the idea of constitutional agency, the other on a 
duty to apply the law.  Both ideas were widely employed in the peri-
od.134  And both ideas can be made to support an executive power of 
non-enforcement. 
C.  From the Standard Justification to the Non-Enforcement Argument 
Nothing in either version of the Standard Justification appears to 
turn on the unique features of the judicial office.  Take the first ver-
sion, based on the idea of constitutional agency.  If the judge is a con-
stitutional agent of the people, then he ought to resist, or refuse to 
“aid and abet,” legislative violations of the Constitution.  In the very 
least he is authorized to resist such violations.135  Yet the judge is not 
distinguished from the executive insofar as he is a constitutional 
agent of the people.  The President is also the people’s agent; so if 
agency itself implies a duty, or an authority, to resist another agent’s 
unconstitutional action, then it implies such a duty in both the judi-
ciary and the executive.136 
We can make a similar argument using the second version of the 
Standard Justification, based on the duty to apply the law.  Adjudicat-
ing a case by the law of the land requires the judge to determine what 
that law is, and that process requires ironing out conflicts of law.  This 
includes the Constitution, since the Constitution is law.  But it is easy 
to see that this does not distinguish the judiciary from the executive.  
The executive also applies the law, in the sense that he enforces it or 
executes it.137  Since he applies the law, he must interpret the law.  
 
134 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 395–461 (examining the role of judicial duty to apply 
the law in the justification of judicial review); KRAMER, supra note 34, at 57–72 (examining 
the role of constitutional agency). 
135 See supra notes 122–29 and accompanying text. 
136 See Paulsen, supra note 15, at 244–45, 252–55 (discussing the idea of constitutional inter-
preation and how it is affected by the separation of powers in the opinions of Marshall 
and Wilson); cf. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice:  Two 
Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373, 373–74 (1994) 
(arguing that all “institutional officials need concern themselves with questions of consti-
tutional interpretation by monitoring their own decisions and, just as important, by moni-
toring other institutional actors to ensure that they, too, comply with constitutional 
norms”). 
137 See Kramer, supra note 11, at 83 (“[J]udges, no less than any other citizen or government 
official, were bound to take notice of the Constitution if and when it became relevant in 
the ordinary course of business.”) (emphasis added); Prakash & Yoo, supra note 9, at 924–
25 (“[T]he President must be able to determine whether a federal statute is a valid one; 
in other words, whether it conforms to the paramount law of the Constitution.”). 
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Since the Constitution is law, he must interpret the Constitution; and 
since the Constitution is supreme law, he must privilege the Constitu-
tion in his interpretation.138  It is worth noting that the Constitution’s 
text provides an additional footing for this argument.  The Take Care 
Clause commands the President to “take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed.”139  The Constitution is law, so the President must take 
care it is executed; and it is supreme law, so he must take care to priv-
ilege it above inconsistent ordinary law.140  This is the power of non-
enforcement. 
We can highlight the parallel between the judiciary and the exec-
utive by modifying our formulation of Iredell’s argument in “To the 
Public.”  That formulation, recall, was the following: 
P1. The duty of the judicial power in all cases is to decide according to 
(and only to) the laws of the state. 
P2. The Constitution is a law of the state. 
P3. An unconstitutional act of the assembly is void, and thus not a law of 
the state. 
C. If the judicial power decides according to an unconstitutional act of 
the assembly, rather than the Constitution, it does not decide according 
to the laws of the state, and thus it violates its duty. 
It takes relatively little imagination to see how the argument 
would go in the case of the President. 
The Non-Enforcement Argument 
P1′. The duty of the executive power is to execute the laws of the state. 
P2.  The Constitution is a law of the state. 
P3. An unconstitutional act of the assembly is void, and thus not a law of 
the state. 
 
138 See Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 919 (comparing how judges and the President must 
treat the Constitution). 
139 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
140 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 9, at 798–801 (discussing [t]he President’s [d]uty to 
[e]nforce the [l]aw”); Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 919 (discussing the implication of 
the Take Care Clause on the President); Prakash, supra note 9, at 1631–33 (discussing the 
potential limits of the Faithful Execution Clause on the President).  But see Miller, supra 
note 17, at 397 (arguing that giving the President power to easily strike down laws would 
give the “United States . . . a king for president”).  Similar arguments can be developed 
from the Article II Oath Clause and the Article II Vesting Clause.  See Lawson & Moore, 
supra note 13, at 1281–82 (discussing the Vesting Clause); Paulsen, supra note 15, at 257–
62 (discussing the Oath Clause). 
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C′. If the executive power executes an unconstitutional act of the assem-
bly, rather than the Constitution, it does not execute the laws of the state, 
and thus it violates its duty. 
If the Standard Justification is valid, then the modified argument be-
low it is also valid, since its formal validity does not turn on the sub-
stantive difference between the judiciary and the executive.  Thus, if 
the modified premise, P1′, is true, then the President has a power of 
non-enforcement.  I will assume that the modified premise is true. 
This is what I call the “Non-Enforcement Argument.”  There is 
something to recommend it, as I have tried to show.  Nevertheless, I 
think the Framers almost certainly would have rejected the argument.  
More precisely, I think they would have rejected it even though (1) 
they accepted the power of each department to interpret the Consti-
tution, and (2) they accepted judicial review (most of them, anyway).  
But how could the Framers have held these three views consistently?  
My aim in the next two Parts is to show how, beginning with the rejec-
tion of non-enforcement. 
II.  TWO PROBLEMS WITH THE NON-ENFORCEMENT ARGUMENT 
There are two principal problems with the Non-Enforcement Ar-
gument.  First, no one drew the conclusion.  Prior to ratification, 
there is only one known instance of an explicit defense of a presiden-
tial power of non-enforcement.  Yet the premises of the argument 
were widely accepted;141 and the parallel inference—from the Stand-
ard Justification to a putative power of judicial review—was wide-
spread, if not common.142  In the first decade after ratification, as the 
Standard Justification achieved greater acceptance,143 defenses of 
non-enforcement remain absent from the historical record.  This 
needs explaining.  Whatever else they were, the Framers were ready 
practitioners of the constitutional syllogism.  They had reasons to de-
fend non-enforcement.  So if the Non-Enforcement Argument is 
simply a corollary of the Standard Justification, we should expect the 
Framers, or at least some of them, to have drawn its conclusion.144 
 
141 See supra Parts I.B–C. 
142 Prakash, supra note 9, at 1659 (“It certainly is true that references to judicial review dur-
ing the Constitution’s creation substantially outnumber references to a President’s duty 
to disregard unconstitutional statutes.”). 
143 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 34, at 98 (“What achieved acceptance in the 1790s was the 
theory of review formulated by men like James Iredell in the 1780s.”); Treanor, supra note 
44, at 519 (“[J]udicial review early won surprisingly broad acceptance in Virginia.”).  
144 I am not assuming that the Framers drew all conclusions logically implied by other views 
they held.  The point is that they had reason to conclude that executives had a non-
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Yet, second, a number of leading Framers actually advanced posi-
tions inconsistent with the conclusion of the Non-Enforcement Argu-
ment.  Generally, thinking about the role of executives in constitu-
tional enforcement remained relatively unfocused in the 1780s and 
early 1790s.  Yet where the course of argument would have made it 
natural to cite a presidential power to decline to enforce the law on 
constitutional grounds, discussants remained silent, or made conces-
sions at odds with such a power.  Even as the party conflict of the 
1790s crystalized around questions of executive power, Federalists 
and Republicans continued to express views of the President incon-
sistent with non-enforcement.  This is particularly true of Republi-
cans, who professed horror at the abuse of executive authority they 
saw in the Adams administration.145 
Taken together, these points suggest that something is amiss with 
the Non-Enforcement Argument.  By extension, they also suggest a 
problem with our formulation of Iredell’s Standard Justification for 
judicial review.  Indeed, when we take a closer look at the Standard 
Justification with these points in mind, it becomes apparent that 
something more is necessary—something that shows why it is appro-
priate to hear and determine questions of constitutional meaning in 
the institutional setting of a court of law.   
A.  A Lack of Evidence 
The delegates at Philadelphia who most influenced the federal 
presidency were agreed that executive power under the state consti-
tutions had proven defective.146  With the exception of New York, the 
first state constitutions had bound their chief magistrates to councils 
and to the legislature itself, and deprived them of traditional royal 
‘executive’ powers, like pardon and appointment.  In some cases, the 
 
enforcement power, and that these very reasons account for the development of judicial 
review.  See Corwin, supra note 72, at 521 (describing the veto and judicial review as the 
two principal constitutional solutions to “the legislative vortex” of the 1780s). 
145 LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION:  EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY 249–
50 (1978). 
146 See CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789:  A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 22, 52–54 (1923) (“State experieces thus contributed, nothing 
more strongly, to discredit the whole idea of the sovereign legislature . . . .”).  The excep-
tion here is Roger Sherman of Connecticut, but Sherman’s influence on the ultimate 
form of Article II is questionable.  See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:  OFFICE AND 
POWERS, 1787–1984, 10–11 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (quoting Madison 
as stating that Sherman regarded the “Executive magistracy as nothing more than an in-
stitution for carrying the will of the legislature into effect . . . .”(citation omitted)); 
THACH, supra, at 89 (explaining that the Convention rejected the “complete subordina-
tion of the executive” and Sherman’s conception of the Executive magistracy). 
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state governor or president (as the office might be called) was essen-
tially the presiding officer of an executive council, elected by and re-
sponsible to the popular assembly—which, in turn, proceeded to di-
vest him of power when it thought wise.147  These deficiencies were 
addressed in the wave of state constitutional reform described above, 
in particular in Massachusetts and New Hampshire.148  Yet, in a num-
ber of ways, these reforms did not rest on a substantial, fully republi-
can conception of the office.  That remained elusive, and would 
through much of the Philadelphia Convention.  While Madison fo-
cused on the design of a national legislature and its relationship to 
the states, he confessed in the spring of 1787 to having few concrete 
ideas about the form a national executive should take.149   
Few in the states associated the office of chief magistrate with the 
protective function of constitutional exposition or interpretation.150  
Only two states granted their executives vetoes.151  In New York, where 
the veto was used with some success in policing constitutional bound-
aries, it was lodged not in the state executive, but in a judicially af-
forced Council of Revision;152 and when New York’s Council wanted 
to authoritatively pronounce on the meaning of the state’s Constitu-
tion, its veto message was composed in the style and tone of a judicial 
opinion.153  Nor did the mimicry fully convince, given the procedural 
 
147 See WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS:  REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND 
THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 270–71 (2001); 
THACH, supra note 146, at 28–29 (discussing the limitations on the power of state execu-
tives). 
148 See WOOD, EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 434–35 (“Reformers sought to center magisterial re-
sponsibility in the governors by making the executive councils more advisory than they 
were in the early Revolutionary constitutions.  They also sought to make governors less 
dependent on legislature, especially in election.”).  
149 See THACH, supra note 146, at 81 (“The truth is that Madison’s views on executive power 
were extremely vague when he came to Philadelphia in 1787.”); THACH, supra note 146, 
at 83 (quoting Letter of James Madison to George Washington, April 16, 1787, expressing 
this uncertainty). 
150 In the Philadelphia Convention, Governeur Morris described the executive as “the great 
protector of the Mass of the people.”  See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787, at 52 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
151 Massachusetts is the other state that had a gubernatorial veto before 1787.  See MASS. 
CONST. of 1780 ch. I, § I, art. II. 
152 See ADAMS, supra note 147, at 271; see also THACH, supra note 146, at 40–54 (comparing the 
constitutional supremacy in New York through the council with other states and the ten-
sion created with the state legislature).  South Carolina’s Constitution of 1776 also in-
cluded a veto, but this constitution was never submitted to the voters for ratification.  S.C. 
CONST. OF 1776 art. VII. 
153 See Jeff Roedel, Stoking the Doctrinal Furnace:  Judicial Review and the New York Council of Revi-
sion, 69 N.Y. HIST. 261, 270 (1988) (articulating that when the Council of Revision vetoed 
a law on constitutional grounds, it “clearly sounded like a court”); see also id. at 272 (“The 
Council demonstrated its judicial character most clearly when its language carried a de-
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differences between the Council and a court.  In Rutgers, Chief Judge 
Duane would draw a distinction in Rutgers between a decision of the 
Council and adjudication in a court of law on these grounds.154  In no 
case did a state give its governor or president a power to refuse to en-
force duly enacted law.  As a general matter, state executives gave 
force to valid judgments entered by state courts and did not claim a 
power to expound the law themselves, although one can find isolated 
counterexamples.155  During the Revolutionary War, in which Penn-
sylvania Executive Council President John Dickinson refused to carry 
out a warrant of execution issued by the state supreme court against 
Aaron Doan on a bill of attainder.156  Apparently, the power claimed 
by President Dickinson did not set an example.  As for Dickinson 
himself, his comments in Philadelphia on the proposed national ex-
ecutive bear no visible traces of the Doan confrontation.157 
 
liberative tone. . . .  In its deliberative character, the Council offered commentary on the 
law . . . . Particularly significant, then, are Council vetoes that rested on the superior law 
of the state constitution.  There the Council adopted a judicial tenor of language and 
analysis that clearly foreshadowed judicial review.”); cf. STIMSON, supra note 80, at 116 
(arguing that the Council of Revision was not a precedent for judicial review). 
154 See 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note90, at 416 (“[S]urely the 
respect, which we owe to this honorable Council, ought not to carry us to such lengths; it 
is not to be supposed that their assent or objection to a bill, can have the force of an ad-
judication:  for what, in such a case, would be the fate of a law that prevailed against their 
sentiments?  Besides in the hurry of a session, and especially flagrento bello, they have 
neither leisure nor means to weigh the extent and consequences of a law, whose provi-
sions are general, at least not with that accuracy and solemnity, which must be necessary 
to render their reasons incontrovertible, and their opinions absolute.”). 
155 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 544 (“Among those who accepted the force of judg-
ments were the executive officers of the states.”). 
156 See Respublica v. Doan, 1 Dall. 86, 93 (Pa. 1784) (holding that the execution of Doan was 
legal and upholding the warrant for execution); see also G. S. Rowe, Outlawry in Pennsylva-
nia, 1782–1788 and the Achievement of an Independent State Judiciary, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
227, 230–33 (1976) (illustrating the Supreme Executive Council’s refusal to execute the 
warrant for Doan); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILLS OF RIGHTS 77–78 (2001); cf. 
The Constitutionalist, No. 11, THE FREEMAN’S JOURNAL, Dec. 31, 1783, at 1 (describing the 
refusal by the Georgia governor to give effect to a resolution by the state legislature re-
versing an act of attainder and banishment). 
157 See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 85–87 
(noting Dickinson’s remarks at the Federal Convention of 1787); see also, e.g., id. at 108–
09 (“[Y]ou propose to give the Executive a share in Legislation—why not the Judicial—
There is a Difference—the Judges must interpret the Laws they ought not to be Legisla-
tors.  The Executive is merely ministerial . . . .”); Rufus King, Notes in Federal Convention 
of 1787 (unpublished manuscript) available at http:// avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/
king.asp (“Dickinson opposed—you shd. separate the Departments—you have given the 
Executive a share in Legislation; and it is asked why not give a share to the judicial power.  
Because the Judges are to interpret the Laws, and therefore shd. have no share in making 
them—not so with the executive whose causing the Laws to be executed is a ministerial 
office only.”). 
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At the national level, there is little support for the view that any-
one, prior to 1789, thought the Constitution conferred a presidential 
power of non-enforcement.158  Only one explicit endorsement is 
known.  It came from James Wilson in the second week of the Penn-
sylvania ratifying convention.  The convention had gotten off to a 
rocky start.  Following a heated dispute over rules of procedure, dele-
gates turned to an examination of Article I, in hope, said Thomas 
McKean, that “a spirit of conciliation and coolness may prevail.”159  As 
Pauline Maier has shown, what actually did prevail was “pandemoni-
um,” punctuated by lengthy orations that did little to persuade oppo-
nents.160  The chief concerns about Article I voiced by those in oppo-
sition to ratification were real.  On November 28, John Smilie 
pointed to the absence of any bill of rights; McKean and Wilson re-
sponded that no bill of rights was necessary because Congress was 
limited to enumerated powers.161  After a dispute over whether Virgin-
ia’s Constitution contained a bill of rights (Wilson erroneously 
claimed it did not), Robert Whitehill made an important point in re-
joinder:  “If indeed the Constitution itself so well defined the powers 
of the government that no mistake could arise . . . then we might be 
satisfied without an explicit reservation of those rights.”162  But, he 
said, the powers were not well defined; they were “unlimited” and 
“undefined.”163  In fact, observed John Smilie, the language of Article 
I, section 8, was so broad that it would support a “complete system of 
government” and thereby effect a consolidation of the states.164 
Consolidation became the leading issue over the next few days.  
Delegates returned to it repeatedly.  On December 1, after several 
failed attempts to quiet the concern, Wilson again took up the is-
sue.165  His strategy that day proved well-conceived.  He began by 
 
158 The most extensive discussion of this point can be found in MAY, supra note 17, at 867. 
159 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 380 (Merrill 
Jensen ed., 2001). 
160 PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:  THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 
106–11 (2010) (discussing debates that “stretched out over twenty-two increasingly tense 
and exhausting days”). 
161 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
159, at 384–88 (reprinting these statements). 
162 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
159, at 393. 
163 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
159, at 428. 
164 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
159, at 408; see MAIER, supra note 160, at 110 (providing a report by a Pennsylvania news-
paper that characterized the federal government as a “consolidation”). 
165 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
159, at 445–46. 
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denying the premise of the argument.  The states did not possess sov-
ereign power, he argued, and thus could not be deprived of it by con-
solidation.  The people were sovereign, and the people could choose 
to distribute authority among different governments as they thought 
most conducive.166  Under the proposed Constitution, the people 
would distribute only a portion of the legislative power to the nation-
al government.  The national legislature, in turn, would be kept to 
these limits by a variety of devices, including “a division of power in 
the legislative body itself,” “the PEOPLE themselves,” and—most im-
portant for our purposes—by “the interference of those officers, who 
will be introduced into the executive and judicial departments.”167  
Wilson then elaborated: 
[I]t is possible that the legislature, when acting in that capacity, may 
transgress the bounds assigned to it . . . but when it comes to be discussed 
before the judges—when they consider its principles and find it to be in-
compatible with the superior power of the Constitution, it is their duty to 
pronounce it void.  And [independent] judges . . . will behave with intre-
pidity and refuse to the act the sanction of judicial authority.  In the same 
manner, the President of the United States could shield himself and re-
fuse to carry into effect an act that violates the Constitution.168 
Non-enforcement would thus preserve a measure of legislative au-
thority for the states. 
It is clear that Wilson is endorsing the non-enforcement power.  
He is not referring to the qualified veto, since he describes the Presi-
dent as refusing to carry into effect “an act,” rather than a bill, and he 
addresses the veto power expressly a short time later.169  Nor is he re-
ferring to the pardon or to the President’s prosecutorial discretion, 
since he says nothing of remitting or dispensing with the prosecution 
of a crime.170  Wilson’s language does leave the scope of non-
enforcement somewhat unclear.  He describes the President as using 
the power to “shield himself,” which could mean he thought non-
enforcement was limited to preventing other departments from 
 
166 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
159, at 448 ([M]y position is that the sovereignty resides with the people . . . .”); see 
MAIER, supra note 160, at 109 (highlighting Wilson’s view that the people are the sover-
eign). 
167 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISOTRY OF THE RATITIFCATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
159, at 450. 
168 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
159, at 450–451. 
169 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
159, at 452–53 (describing the process of how the President may exercise the veto pow-
er). 
170 See Wilson’s discussion of the pardon in Lectures on Law.  2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON, supra note 110, at 879–84. 
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usurping executive authority.171  In contrast, some have suggested that 
Wilson’s language reflects the idea, common at the time, that an of-
ficer who gave effect to an unconstitutional law would himself violate 
the Constitution.172  Of course, as we have seen, there were other ver-
sions of the Standard Justification, also in circulation, that carried no 
such implication.173  Wilson himself advanced such a version several 
years later in his Lectures on Law.174  Moreover, Wilson’s language at 
the convention suggests a contrast between the judicial duty to pro-
nounce the law void and the President’s authority to do so (“the Pres-
ident . . . could shield himself”)—implying that the President would 
not violate his constitutional duty by executing an unconstitutional 
law.  Still, there would be little point, in the context of a discussion 
about consolidation, to adduce a non-enforcement power limited to 
interbranch defense, for such a power would be of little use in pre-
venting the national legislature from encroaching on the states.  The 
scope of a non-enforcement/anti-consolidation power would have to 
be broader than presidential self-defense, whether or not the Presi-
dent violated the Constitution by giving effect to an unconstitutional 
law. 
Wilson’s endorsement is clear, but it was also isolated.175  It was a 
brief remark in the midst of what was supposed to be a discussion of 
the merits of Article I.  Apparently, the remark fell on deaf ears.  As 
far as we know, it drew no response from the vocal opposition led by 
Smilie, Whitehill, and William Findley.  Wilson’s principal ally, 
McKean, did not pick up on the point.  There was no response in the 
gallery, or in the press.  Perhaps his audience missed the comment 
entirely.  They could be forgiven; Wilson was prone to long lectures 
at the convention, and it is unclear how many delegates paid atten-
 
171 As has been often noted, a number of delegates at the Philadelphia Convention de-
scribed judicial review as a defensive power.  Wilson was among them.  See 2 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 73 (noting that Wilson viewed 
the judiciary would strike down laws in order to defend constitutional rights). 
172 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 15, at 253 (interpreting Wilson’s statement this way). 
173 See supra Part I.B.  Notably, John Smilie advanced a contrary view at the convention.  He 
argued that federal judges would refuse to hold a law invalid out of a fear that Congress 
would impeach them for “disobeying a law.”  In the case of non-enforcement, Smilie’s 
view implies that the President would expose himself to liability, not shield himself, by re-
fusing to enforce an unconstitutional law.  See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 159, at 466. 
174 See 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 572 (“[W]hoever would be 
obliged to obey a constitutional law, is justified in refusing to obey an unconstitutional act 
of the legislature . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
175 In the memorable malaprop of the ABA Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements, it 
was a “vagrant remark.”  Prakash, supra note 9, at 1659 n.182 (citing ABA TASK FORCE ON 
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE). 
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tion to the details.176  Wilson himself did not return to the point, alt-
hough the issues that led him to broach it on December 1 did reap-
pear.177  He brought up judicial review again on December 7, and his 
comments were reported in the press.178  No mention was made of 
presidential non-enforcement.  He thus gave the matter a grand total 
of one sentence in the convention.  Nor did Wilson offer a defense of 
non-enforcement in his ambitious and systematic Lectures on Law.179  
There he adopted the Standard Justification for judicial review,180 but 
focused his discussion of presidential authority almost entirely on the 
pardon power.181  Courts, said Wilson, were the “noble guard against 
legislative despotism,” before the “great and last resort” of the peo-
ple.182 
While Wilson’s is the only known explicit endorsement of non-
enforcement prior to ratification, there were a number of near miss-
es.  In the Massachusetts convention, the eminent Theophilius Par-
sons argued that if Congress were to enact a law that infringed indi-
vidual rights, “the act would be a nullity, and could not be 
enforced.”183  Parsons’s comment is obviously equivocal as between 
judicial review and presidential non-enforcement.184  Before the con-
vention, delegate William Symmes had expressed anxiety that the 
President’s obligation under the Take Care Clause might be insuffi-
 
176 See MAIER, supra note 160, at 114 (describing a speech delivered by Wilson and remark-
ing, “[i]ts printed version remains powerful, but how closely did his fellow delegates listen 
to it?”). 
177 See MAIER, supra note 160, at 111–20 (describing the chaotic nature of the remainder of 
the convention).   
178 See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICANTION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 159, at 517, 524–25 (providing the comments by Wilson and the newspaper reports). 
179 See KRAMER, supra note 34, at 99 (“Wilson wanted nothing less than to produce a com-
plete philosophy of American law . . . .”). 
180 See SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 76 (quoting Wilson when he asserted that the judicial 
branch should act as a check against the legislative department’s constitutional viola-
tions). 
181 See 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 879–84 (discussing the par-
don power).  Wilson suggests that the “executive” can “prevent[]” legislative excess, and 
that he has a “right to judge” whether an act of the legislature is constitutional.  The 
point is that Wilson does not argue that this “right to judge” implies a presidential power 
of non-enforcement.  1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 572. 
182 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 743, 203. 
183 2 ELLIOT, supra note 122, at 162. 
184 Unfortunately, nothing about the context—a discussion of whether the Constitution 
should have a bill of rights—shows whether Parsons had presidential non-enforcement in 
mind.  Some have read Parsons to support jury review.  See RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. 
THE SUPREME COURT 55, 177 (1969) (noting  “[Parsons] stated that if in consequence of 
resistance the government brought a criminal prosecution, a jury of [his] ‘own fellow citi-
zens w[ould] pronounce him innocent’”) (citation omitted). 
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cient to prevent him from ignoring congressional directives as to how 
federal law should be enforced.185  Symmes, an anti-federalist, did not 
think the executive should have such a power.  Apparently his con-
cern was answered, or forgotten, because he did not raise it at the 
convention.186 
Also suggestive are Madison’s comments in October 1788, shortly 
after the Constitution had taken effect.  In his “Observations on the 
Draught of a Constitution for Virginia,” Madison observed that 
courts, “by refusing or not refusing to execute a law,” had been able 
“to stamp it with its final character,” a result that made the judicial 
department “paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was never 
intended, and can never be proper.”187  The language clearly suggests 
doubts about judicial review in a constitutional system that made 
courts independent of the legislature.  Yet the point does not support 
non-enforcement.  Were the President to have a power of non-
enforcement, it would, by Madison’s reasoning, fall to the President to 
“stamp [the law] with its final character,” making him superior to the 
legislature—a result also inconsistent with departmental coordinacy 
and republicanism.188  A more republican solution to Madison’s con-
cern was described by the anti-federalist Brutus.  Six months before 
“Observations,” in the spring of 1788, Brutus had observed precisely 
the same problem, arguing that it arose because the national legisla-
ture could not hear appeals from the Supreme Court.189  Publius, of 
course, rejected the idea.190  Much later, in the midst of the contro-
versy over the Virginia Resolution, Madison conceded that “the judi-
cial department is, in all questions submitted to it by the forms of the 
Constitution, to decide in the last resort . . . in relation to the authori-
ties of the other departments.”191 
 
185 See MAY, supra note 17, at 27 (noting Symmes’ concern). 
186 See id. (“These fears were apparently put to rest.”). 
187 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 39, at 284, 294 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1904). 
188 See infra notes 237–51 and accompanying text. 
189 See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 295, 
306–07 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2003) (expressing concern over the Supreme Court’s pow-
er). 
190 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (addressing Brutus’s argument). 
191 See James Madison, The Report of 1800, in 17 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 311 (Robert A. Rut-
land et al. eds., 1977).  Madison argued that the Virginia Resolution had not usurped ju-
dicial power because it had merely “express[ed an] opinion, unaccompanied with any 
other effect than what [it] may produce on opinion, by exciting reflection.”  Id. at 259.  
In contrast, he said, “[t]he expositions of the judiciary . . . are carried into immediate ef-
fect [and] enforce[] the general will.”  Id.  This reflects the distinction between merely 
interpreting the Constitution and refusing to enforce an unconstitutional law.  Cf. H. Jef-
ferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 949, 983–84 
(1993) (observing that “Madison firmly believed in an active interpretive role for both the 
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To be sure, there is no need to insist on a delicate reading of Mad-
ison’s language in “Observations.”  The point does not depend on 
“Observations,” or any other statement in the rather tangled body of 
commentary Madison left us on this topic.192  We may assume that a 
number of endorsements of non-enforcement escaped the historical 
record, and that there are others preserved somewhere, but presently 
unknown.  The existence of these endorsements does not change the 
analysis.  In one study, Sai Prakash and John Yoo found a total of 109 
discussions of judicial review of federal law during the ratification 
process, either in a convention or in pamphlets or essays published 
during the pendency of a convention.193  It is impossible that a com-
parable number of discussions of presidential non-enforcement have 
escaped notice.194  There was simply no sustained, public discussion of 
such a power, and a fortiori no such defense of it. 
 
executive and legislative branches,” but distinguished departmental expressions of opin-
ion about constitutional meaning from “the enforceable ‘expositions of the judiciary’” 
(quoting James Madison, The Report of 1800, in 17 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at  
348)); see also infra notes 423–430 and accompanying text. 
192 On the difficulty of reconciling Madison’s various claims about constitutional enforce-
ment, see KRAMER, supra note 34, at 146; see also BERGER, supra note 184, at 70–71 (“Un-
deniably Madison was inconsistent over the years . . . .”).  There are other snippets from 
Madison’s writings that could be adduced to support non-enforcement, but the result is 
largely the same.  Madison argued in “Observations” that where a Constitution provides 
for the submission of bills to the executive and the judiciary prior to enactment, and a law 
so submitted is enacted over their objection, “[i]t sd. not be allowed the Judges or [the] 
Executive to pronounce a law thus enacted, unconstitul. & invalid.”  5 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 39, at 294.  The remark suggests that Madison at least con-
templated the idea of presidential non-enforcement.  Yet since our system has executive 
consultation, created by the Presentment Clause, the remark also implies that Madison 
saw no place for the power under the actual Constitution.  Indeed, in a letter written four 
years later, Madison said, “[y]ou know already that the President has exerted his power of 
checking the unconstitutional career of Congress.  The judges have also called the atten-
tion of the public to Legislative fallibility, by pronouncing a law providing for Invalid Pen-
sioners unconstitutional and void[.]”  Letter from James Madison to Gen. Henry Lee 
(Apr. 15, 1792), in 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 554 (1865).  
“[H]is power of checking” must refer to the President’s veto, since no acts of non-
enforcement had then taken place. 
193 Prakash & Yoo, supra note 9, at 975 (providing a table reporting these discussions); Pra-
kash, supra note 9, at 1659 & n.186 (referencing Prakash & Yoo, supra note 9, at 161). 
194 I assume here that there is not some specific reason to think that the historical record is 
skewed, that is, that evidence of non-enforcement was not uniquely suppressed or una-
vailable.  In other words, I am treating the extant, published record as representative of 
the entire range of commentary, including unpreserved statements.  If that is correct, 
then we should assume that a number of discussions of judicial review were also lost or 
remain unknown, and we would need to compare missing discussions of non-
enforcement with the extant and missing discussions of judicial review.  This would make 
the Prakash & Yoo figure too low. 
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The pattern of evidence after ratification confirms this view.  In 
the first decade of government under the Constitution there is no 
known explicit defense of a presidential power to refuse to enforce 
the law on constitutional grounds.  Neither Presidents George Wash-
ington nor John Adams refused to enforce a duly enacted law on 
grounds that he believed it unconstitutional, and neither made a 
claim to enjoy such a power.195  Sai Prakash has observed that Wash-
ington described the obligation to obey “constitutional laws,” which 
Prakash reads as impliedly endorsing a presidential duty of non-
enforcement.196  Washington, however, never identified the phrase as 
carrying such freight, and he never connected the idea to the presi-
dential office—this during a period that saw repeated discussion of a 
judicial duty to apply only “constitutional laws.”  The point suffers 
from a more general defect that, unfortunately, affects much of Pra-
kash’s analysis, which is premised on the proposition that the found-
ing generation widely agreed that an unconstitutional law was void 
and thus “no law at all.”197  One cannot reason from the premise that 
an unconstitutional law is void to the conclusion that the President 
had a power to refuse to enforce it; the basic lesson of Wood, Snowiss, 
and Kramer’s works is that officers had to justify the practice of de-
termining and enforcing constitutional violations within their office, 
since fundamental law was designed to regulate them and was tradi-
 
195 Prakash, supra note 9, at 1662 (“Washington never actually refused to enforce a statute on 
the grounds that it was unconstitutional. . . . [T]here is no instance of President John Ad-
ams refusing to enforce a statute on the grounds that it was unconstitutional.”).  It is like-
ly that President Washington and President Adams impounded funds appropriated by 
Congress, but their doing so is not best described as non-enforcement, since it was “large-
ly attributable to the fact that, unlike today, appropriations bills ‘were quite general in 
their terms and, by obvious . . . intent, left to the President . . . the [power] for determin-
ing . . . in what particular manner the funds would be spent.’”  Nile Stanton, History and 
Practice of Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds, 53 NEB. L. REV. 1, 5 (1974) (citation 
omitted). 
196 See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1660–61 (discussing various remarks of Washington when he 
used the term “constitutional”).  Even if Prakash is correct to connect Washington’s 
phrase to the presidential office, the deontic status seems wrong.  How could non-
enforcement be a duty if constitutionality only created an obligation to follow the law? 
197 See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1616–17, 1658–59 (“At the founding, such laws were seen as 
null and void, ab initio.  Because unconstitutional laws were nullities, they supplied no 
law for the President to enforce.  Necessarily, he could have no power or duty to enforce 
them.  Under the original Constitution, the President had no more power or duty to exe-
cute unconstitutional laws than he had to execute the laws of the states or other na-
tions.”).  Prakash has reiterated this analysis in his recent work with Neil Devins attacking 
presidential duties to enforce and defend unconstitutional laws.  See Devins & Prakash, 
supra note 9, at 522, 533 (“Because unconstitutional laws are void and hence not actual 
laws, the Clause does not oblige the President to enforce or defend them.”). 
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tionally enforced through popular mechanisms.198  Prakash also sug-
gests that Washington never endorsed a presidential power to refuse 
to enforce unconstitutional law because, as the first President, he had 
an opportunity to veto all the bills he thought unconstitutional.199  
Since Congress never overrode Washington’s veto, the President nev-
er had need of a non-enforcement power.  Yet this hardly means that 
non-enforcement was never relevant to the President’s decision calcu-
lus.  Washington had reason to broach the topic when Jefferson, then 
his Secretary of State, advised him that the President could express 
his constitutional objection to the Bank Bill through a veto.200  In-
deed, any constitutional objection to a bill directing action in the ex-
ecutive department should have raised the issue.  In sorting through 
their options, Washington’s advisors had reason to consider the pos-
sibility of a veto override and to plan accordingly.201  Non-
enforcement would have been an alternative.  For these reasons, it is 
difficult to take seriously the speculation that Washington, and Ad-
ams after him, “likely would have refused to enforce” a law enacted 
over a constitutional veto.202  The fact of the matter is that neither 
President did, and neither expressed the view that he had such a 
power. 
In 1801, President Thomas Jefferson ended prosecutions under 
the Sedition Act and pardoned those convicted.  If we date non-
enforcement to these acts, it is at least fifteen years younger than ju-
dicial review.  If we date the defense of non-enforcement to Jeffer-
 
198 See, e.g., Hulsebosch, supra note 73, at 825; Wood, supra note 31, at 160–63. 
199 See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1662 (explaining “why Washington never engaged in Execu-
tive Disregard”).  Prakash also points to President Washington’s refusal to honor a re-
quest from the House of Representatives for communications regarding the negotiation 
of the Jay Treaty, id. at 1661–62, but on this question, a one-house “resolution” is not 
analogous to a bill, due to the lack of a veto.  The existence of the limited veto for uncon-
stitutional bills is the best structural argument against non-enforcement.  Again, the point 
is not that the President would not act on the basis of his understanding of the Constitu-
tion; it is that the President specifically would not refuse to enforce laws he deemed un-
constitutional. 
200 See Secretary of State Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), 
in PAULSEN, CALABRESI ET AL., supra note 18, at 62 (“The negative of the President [the 
veto] is the shield provided by the Constitution to protect against the invasions of the leg-
islature.” (insertion by editors)); MAY, supra note 17, at 37 (discussing Jefferson’s en-
dorsement of the veto when potentially being applied to the Bank Bill).  The Bank Bill 
directed the United States to receive notes issued by the bank “in all payments to the 
United States.”  An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States § 10, 3 Stat. 
191, 196 (1791).  The President could have directed the secretary of the treasury to refuse 
to accept the notes as payment. 
201 See Harry C. Thomson, The First Presidential Vetoes, 8 PRES. STUDS. Q. 27, 30–31 (1978) (dis-
cussing veto of reapportionment act and attempted override). 
202 Prakash, supra note 9, at 1662. 
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son’s defense of his acts in contemporaneous writings and subse-
quent letters,203 it postdates the defense of judicial review by at least 
fifteen years.204  This demands an explanation. 
B. Negative evidence 
Not only is there a lack of evidence that Framers drew the conclu-
sion of the Non-Enforcement Argument, there is evidence that they 
rejected its conclusion.  Christopher May advanced this argument in 
his study of the suspension power and non-enforcement.  Suspension 
was a royal prerogative to temporarily abrogate a statute.205  May anal-
ogized suspension to non-enforcement, and then argued that the 
widespread American rejection of suspension implied a rejection of 
non-enforcement.206  Obviously, the force of May’s argument depends 
on the force of the analogy between suspension and non-
enforcement—and that analogy has been challenged.207  In the course 
of developing his argument, May observed that on several occasions 
Framers spoke as if judicial review were the only institutional protec-
tion against laws violating individual rights.208  This point has force 
whether or not non-enforcement functionally duplicates, or even ap-
proximates, the prerogative of suspension.  Thus, May pointed to Al-
exander Hamilton’s language in Federalist 78 that a Constitution’s ex-
ceptions to the legislative power “can be preserved in practice no other 
way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must 
be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitu-
tion void.”209  Apparently, Hamilton assumed that the President did 
not have a non-enforcement power, since such a power could also be 
used to keep Congress within its constitutional limits. 
 
203 See supra note 43. 
204 Christopher May, who opposes non-enforcement, dates its first assertion to 1860.  See 
MAY, supra note 17, at 127. 
205 See MAY, supra note 17, at 4 (discussing royal perogatives in relation to statutes in Eng-
land). 
206 MAY, supra note 17, at 37.  Interestingly, May adopted the same “deductive” or “Euclide-
an” strategy as Michael Paulsen.  See Paulsen, supra note 15, at 226 (describing his ap-
proach as “Euclidean”).  But he defended a logically contrary view.  Paulsen argued that if 
judicial review was justified, then non-enforcement was as well; and judicial review was jus-
tified.  May argued that if the suspension prerogative was rejected, then non-enforcement 
was rejected as well; and suspension was rejected.  The strategy is indicative of the lack of 
direct evidence we have on the issue of non-enforcement.  No one was talking about it. 
207 See, e.g., J. Randy Beck, Book Review:  Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws:  Reviv-
ing the Royal Prerogative, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 419, 423–24 (1999) (finding flaws in May’s 
argument). 
208 MAY, supra note 17, at 14, 25. 
209 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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Hamilton may have seen a greater need for judicial enforcement 
of the Constitution than did most of his peers.210  But the point about 
‘negative evidence’ does not depend on Hamilton’s idiosyncrasy.  
The argument that courts of law were the only institution that could, 
or would, protect the people from legislative abuses was in fact wide-
spread.  Examples are easy to adduce.  They lie at the surface of the 
historical record, both before and after ratification.  Most of these 
comments assume that the President lacks a non-enforcement power, 
but none implies that judicial review is the only means of enforcing 
the Constitution, or that judges are supreme in determining its 
meaning. 
Thus, for example, the idea that courts alone could protect the 
people from legislative excess drove delegates to the federal conven-
tion to reject the council of revision.  Like the New York body on 
which it was based, the council proposed in Philadelphia as part of 
Madison’s Virginia Plan comprised the President and several federal 
judges, who would together exercise a qualified negative on federal 
and state legislation.211  Almost at once, delegates objected to the 
proposal on the grounds that it might undercut judicial review, by bi-
asing judges in favor of laws they had previously approved.212  Accord-
ing to Rufus King, whose state had granted the veto to the governor 
alone, “the Judges ought to be able to expound the law as it should 
come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its 
formation.”213  The emphasis on judicial review drew its own objec-
tions from John Mercer and John Dickinson.  After listening to Mer-
cer argue that judges should not enjoy an authority to declare uncon-
stitutional law void, Dickinson said he was “strongly impressed,” and 
“thought no such power ought to exist.”  Yet, “at the same time,” 
Dickinson said, he was “at a loss what expedient to substitute.”214  
Madison surely felt exasperated.  He had suggested another “expedi-
 
210 See KRAMER, supra note 34, at 81 (addressing the idea that Hamilton “stak[ed] out” an 
“extreme position”); see also STIMSON, supra note 80, at 119. 
211 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 21 (Resolution 
8).  On the relationship to New York, see Roedel, supra note 153, at 261–62. 
212 See RAKOVE, supra note 65, at 262 (“The opponents of the council of revision were more 
inclined to emphasize the separation of powers . . . .”); see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 75 (providing Caleb Strong’s opinion as 
to the proper role of the judiciary); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, supra note 150, at 79 (providing the objections of Nathaniel Gorham); id. at 80 
(providing the objection of John Rutledge). 
213 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 98. 
214 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 299. 
520 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:2 
 
ent”—the Council of Revision!—only to have Dickinson reject it.215  
Something was driving leading delegates towards a view of constitu-
tional enforcement that involved adjudication in a court of law, re-
gardless of whether they thought such a practice fully consistent with 
republicanism.  Hence Dickinson’s confusion. 
A similar logic was at work in ratifying conventions.  At the Virgin-
ia ratifying convention, for example, where the federal judiciary was 
extensively discussed, both Federalists and Anti-federalists attributed 
to courts alone the power to check legislative violations of the Consti-
tution, but for different reasons.216  The clearest example is a well-
known speech by the young John Marshall, then holding a position 
on Richmond’s hustings court, in which he defended Article III 
against attacks by George Mason and Patrick Henry.217  The day be-
fore, Mason had argued that federal courts would supplant state 
courts, on the grounds that the jurisdiction of federal courts extend-
ed to all cases arising under federal law, and federal law was to be su-
perior to state law.218  Indeed, given that Congress could enact laws 
concerning “every object of private property,” federal courts would, 
in effect, “destroy the State Governments.”219  Marshall met the argu-
ment at what he thought was its obvious point of weakness.  “Has the 
Government of the United States power to make laws on every sub-
ject? . . . Can they go beyond the delegated powers?”220  It was clear 
that the Constitution conferred no such authority on Congress.  If, as 
Henry had suggested, Congress nevertheless did “make a law not war-
ranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by 
 
215 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 510–11 (describing Dickinson’s view); see also 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 108–09 (“Dickerson 
[sic]—agt. it—you must separate the Leg. Jud. & Ex.—but you propose to give the Execu-
tive a share in Legislation—why not the Judicial—There is a Difference—the Judges must 
interpret the Laws they ought not to be legislators.  The Executive is merely ministeri-
al . . . .”).  In “Letters of Fabius,” Dickinson apparently came around to judicial review, 
but the text is ambiguous and must be read against Dickinson’s statements in the conven-
tion.  See BERGER, supra note 184, at 64–65 (explaining how Dickinson passively voted for 
judicial review); see also PAMPHLETS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 
PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 1787–1788, at 184 (Paul Leicester Ford 
ed., 1888) (reprinting Dickinson’s statement that “the president, and the federal inde-
pendent judges, [would be] so much concerned in the execution of the laws, and in the 
determination of their constitutionality”). 
216 On the discussion of the judiciary at the Virginia convention, see MAIER, supra note 160, 
at 286–87; Bilder, supra note 77, at 551. 
217 See 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1430–39 
(John P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter 10 DHRC] (reprint-
ing Marshall’s speech); see also NELSON, supra note 50, at 43. 
218 10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1401–02. 
219 10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1402. 
220 10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1431. 
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the Judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to 
guard . . . . They would declare it void.”221  Federal jurisdiction to ad-
judicate such cases was, said Marshall, “necessary.”  He explained: 
What is the service or purpose of a Judiciary, but to execute the laws in a 
peaceable orderly manner, without shedding blood, or creating a con-
test, or availing yourselves of force? . . . To what quarter will you look for 
protection from an infringement of the Constitution, if you will not give 
the power to the Judiciary?  There is no other body that affords such a protec-
tion.222 
Marshall’s point does not deny that the people themselves interpret 
and enforce the Constitution.  He assumes the opposite—that the Con-
stitution might be enforced by the people themselves, acting ‘out of 
doors.’  Marshall’s concern was with the violence and disorder that 
popular enforcement tended to create.223 
Marshall made no mention of the President, and, indeed, it would 
have made little sense for him to do so.  Mason had suggested that 
the federal courts would shield federal executive officers, who, he pre-
dicted, would be free to abuse the people of Virginia without legal 
consequence.224  An appeal to the executive authority would have 
played right into Mason’s hands.  Just before the convention had tak-
en up the federal judiciary, it had discussed Article II, where “Henry, 
Mason, [James] Monroe, and [William] Grayson raised one objection 
after another” to the President, who, they argued, “had too much 
power.”225  And although the federal judiciary might dominate state 
governments, Henry thought it plainly overmatched by its coordinate 
departments in the national government.  It could not serve as a con-
stitutional check, he said, as the Virginia state judiciary had against 
the excesses of the state assembly.226  A presidential power of non-
 
221 10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1431. 
222 10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1432 (emphasis added). 
223 In this respect, Marshall anticipates the concern with mobbing and protecting property 
rights that came to characterize the Federalist party in the second half of the 1790s.  See 
KRAMER, supra note 34, at 109–11 (describing growing concerns with violence amongst 
the Federalists); NELSON, supra note 50, at 40. 
224 10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1404 (providing an example of the potential for abuse). 
225 MAIER, supra note 160, at 286; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 67(Alexander Hamilton) (discuss-
ing the executive department); cf. RAKOVE, supra note 65, at 273 (describing the Anti-
federalist fear that “ambition or desperation would drive individual presidents to attempt 
to set themselves up literally as kings”). 
226 10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1219 (“The Honorable Gentleman [Edmund Pendleton] 
did our Judiciary honour in saying, that they had firmness to counteract the Legislature 
in some cases.  Yes, Sir, our Judges opposed the acts of the Legislature.  . . . Are you sure 
that your Federal Judiciary will act thus? . . . Where are your land-marks in this Govern-
ment?  I will be bold to say you cannot find any in it.  I take it as the highest encomium 
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enforcement without an executive council would have worsened the 
imbalance.  There was thus no reason for a federalist to defend a 
non-enforcement power at the Virginia convention.227  A sensible del-
egate, like Marshall, argued precisely the opposite.228 
The pattern of evidence after ratification buttresses this conclu-
sion, just as it did above.  Thus, following presentment by the First 
Congress of a bill to fix the seat of government in Washington D.C., 
“Junius Americanus” published a letter in The Daily Advertiser, despair-
ing, for over four columns, about the bill’s unconstitutionality.229  As 
Junius viewed the matter, the Constitution committed to Congress 
alone the determination of when and where to meet, which the bill to 
fix the seat of government would violate when signed by the Presi-
dent.230  Junius was unmoved by the suggestion that once enacted, the 
law would be “inoperative” because “repugnant.”231  “[T]his is howev-
er a mistaken idea,” he said, “for it will have an operation, unless for-
mally annulled by the judiciary, and it is impossible the construction of it 
can ever go before the federal courts.”232  Junius returned to the point 
repeatedly, and in language that evidenced a detailed view of the 
scope of the president’s interpretative authority.  Thus, 
[e]very law does not undergo the revision of the judiciary; this will cer-
tainly not; the President of the United States can alone arrest its progress.  
Having his sanction, the public will consider every part of the bill as valid, 
because they know he would not approve any bill which contained a syl-
 
on this country [i.e., Virginia], that acts of the Legislature, if unconstitutional, are liable 
to be opposed by the Judiciary.”). 
227 That there was no reason for a federalist to defend non-enforcement does not mean fed-
eralists acted strategically.  To take Marshall as an example, it is difficult to imagine—and 
there is no evidence to suggest—that Marshall really believed non-enforcement was de-
sireable and permitted by the draft Constitution, but concealed the belief in order to re-
but Mason. 
228 For other examples, see 10 DHRC, supra note 217, at 1197 (discussing of judicial review 
by Edmund Pendleton); id. at 1327 (reprinting of  George Nicholas’s views on judicial re-
view).  Similar descriptions of the judiciary as the only institution capable of protecting 
the people from legislative violation of the Constitution, without mention of presidential 
non-enforcement, occurred in New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts.  See Bilder, su-
pra note 77, at 551–52 & nn.262–71(discussing these states). 
229 Letter of Junius Americanus, 6 THE DAILY ADVERTISER, July 13, 1790.  See the analysis of 
the bill in David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress:  Substantive Issues in the First Con-
gress, 1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 849 (1994).  On Junius’s letter, see CHARLES 
WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 105 (1925). 
230 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 4–5 (prescribing the meeting of Congress).  The one exception 
is the President’s power to determine adjournment when the houses disagree.  See id. at 
art. II, § 3. 
231 Letter of Junius Americanus, supra note 229.   
232 Letter of Junius Americanus, supra note 229 (emphasis added).  Junius does not explain 
why he thinks the matter could not become a case or controversy. 
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lable that was unconstitutional; the clause will then be deemed binding, 
because every part of the bill must have its operation.233 
According to Junius, the President is the only one positioned to 
arrest the progress of the “law”—but only using the veto.  For, reasons 
Junius, if the President does provide “his sanction,” then every part of 
the “bill” will be considered “valid,” and thus “must have its opera-
tion.”  Had Junius thought there was a power of non-enforcement, it 
should have come as some comfort, enabling the President to sign 
the bill and refuse to enforce the provision fixing a time and place of 
meeting. 
The same set of assumptions animated constitutional argument 
within Congress.  In the First Congress, for example, both propo-
nents and opponents of the Bank of the United States assumed that 
the Supreme Court would adjudicate any question about the bank’s 
constitutionality.234  Madison wanted to avoid such an outcome; Elias 
Boudinot, in contrast, took comfort in the idea that “if, from inatten-
tion, want of precision, or any other defect, he should do wrong, 
there was a power in the Government which could constitutionally 
prevent the operation of such a wrong measure.”235  Boudinot, of 
course, was not referring to the President, but to “the Judiciary of the 
United States, who might adjudge [the Bank law] to be contrary to 
the Constitution, and therefore void.”236 
The point was not confined to those who would later become 
Federalists.  Indeed, as the Jeffersonian Republican party emerged in 
the mid-1790s, distrust of executive authority and of executive influ-
ence on the judiciary became a central pillar in their adaptation of 
English oppositional thought.237  Consider the famous attack on judi-
 
233 Letter of Junius Americanus, supra note 229. 
234 WARREN, supra note 229, at 106. 
235 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1927 (1791).  Boudinot’s comment has had a long life.  Wilson refer-
enced it in Lectures on Law, as did Joseph Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution, and 
Charles Warren in Congress, the Constitution, and the Court.  See 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 541–42 (describing the ability of a nation to ensure citi-
zens do right); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 472 n.3 (1833) (referencing Boudinot’s comment in a footnote); WARREN, supra 
note 229, at 107–08 (quoting Boudinot). 
236 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1927 (1791). 
237 See LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION:  EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY 
52–63, 247–50 (1978) (describing the Republican focus, while in opposition to the Adams 
administration, on the danger of “patronage,” “corruption,” and “executive influence”); 
VILE, supra note 82, at 171 (similar).  This worry was not confined to influence on the leg-
islature through “placement.”  Republicans also objected to the service of Chief Justice 
Jay and Chief Justice Ellsworth as special ambassadors in the conflicts with Britain and 
France.  See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:  THE CHIEF 
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 74–75, 89–95, 118–19 (1995) (noting 
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cial review in the Sixth Congress, by then-Senator Charles Pinckney.  
Introducing his proposal to prohibit plural office-holding by federal 
judges, Pinckney described the judicial power “either to execute [the 
laws] or not, as they think proper,” as “the dangerous right . . . a right 
in my judgment as unfounded and as dangerous as any that was ever 
attempted in a free government.”238  Just to bring the point home, 
Pinckney then asked his audience to imagine the implications for ex-
ecutive power.  “What might be the consequences,” he announced, “if 
the President could at any time get rid of obnoxious laws by persuad-
ing or influencing the Judges to decide that they were unconstitu-
tional, and ought not to be executed?”239  Of course, non-
enforcement would obviate any need for stooping to persuasion.  
Pinckney, apparently, could not imagine such a thing, for it would 
have made nonsense of his point. 
Even after the Republican party took control of the presidency 
and the Congress, during the period in which Jefferson is commonly 
thought to have refused to enforce the Sedition Act, Republicans in 
Congress never mentioned the President in response to repeated as-
sertions that only courts could protect the people from legislative ex-
cess.  Examples of such claims by Federalists in the debate over repeal 
of the Judiciary Act are too numerous to discuss individually.  To take 
a pedestrian example from the debate in the Senate, Aaron Ogden 
asked his fellow senators, “[s]uppose the Legislature should pass bills 
of attainder, or an unconstitutional tax, where can an oppressed citi-
zen find protection but in a court of justice firmly denying to carry 
into execution an unconstitutional law?”240  Ogden’s point assumes 
another department cannot provide similar protection.  The argu-
ment was thought strong enough to become a Federalist refrain.241  
 
some of these oppositions); STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS:  THE ADVISORY ROLE 
OF EARLY JUDGES 152–53 (1997) (noting wariness among “[s]ome members of Congress” 
with regards to sending Chief Judge Ellsworth “on a diplomatic mission”). 
238 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 101 (1800). 
239 Id.  
240 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 175 (1802). 
241 See, e.g., id. at 56 (statement of Uriah Tracy) (“What security is there to an individual 
[from an ex post facto law]?  None in the world but by an appeal to the Judiciary . . . .”); 
id. at 83 (statement of Gouverneur Morris) (“Suppose, in the omnipotence of your Legis-
lative authority, you trench upon the rights of your fellow citizens . . . . If the judiciary de-
partment preserve its vigor, it will stop you short.  Instead of a resort to arms, there will be 
a happier appeal to argument.”); id. at 529–30 (statement of Archibald Henderson) (“In 
vain may he hold out the Constitution and deny the authority of Congress to pass a law of 
such undefined signification, and call upon the judges to protect him; he will be told that 
the opinion of Congress now is, that we have no right to judge of their authority . . . .”); 
id. at 574 (statement of John Stanley) (“Should, unhappily, a Legislature be found 
who . . . should transgress the bounds prescribed, what is the security of the citi-
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Some developed it to considerable lengths.  In the House, for exam-
ple, James Bayard offered a particularly colorful version, which illus-
trates, very clearly, basic assumptions about the President’s role in 
constitutional enforcement.  Bayard said, 
[l]et me now ask if the power to decide upon the validity of our laws re-
sides with the people?  Gentlemen cannot deny this right to the people.  
I admit that they possess it.  But if, at the same time, it does not belong to 
the courts of the United States, where does it lead the people?  It leads 
them to the gallows.  Let us supposed that Congress . . . pass an unconsti-
tutional law. . . . The people [subject to the law] contest the validity of 
the law.  They forcibly resist its execution.  They are brought by the Executive 
authority before the courts upon charges of treason.  The law is unconstitution-
al, the people have done right, but the court are [sic] bound by the law, 
and obliged to pronounce upon them the sentence which it inflicts.  De-
ny to the courts of the United States the power of judging upon the con-
stitutionality of our laws, and it is vain to talk of it existing elsewhere.242 
Far from protecting individuals, Bayard’s “Executive authority” pros-
ecutes them for treason! 
Only one Republican sought to challenge Bayard’s view of the ex-
ecutive.  In written remarks later added to the House record, Repre-
sentative Jonathan Bacon argued that “every officer and . . . every citi-
zen” had an “inherent and . . . indispensible duty” “to judge for 
themselves of the constitutionality of every statute on which they are 
called to act in their respective spheres.”243  Bacon supported his posi-
tion with a version of the Standard Justification.244  If one thinks of 
the law as directing or “calling on” the President to enforce it, then 
Bacon’s position implies a power of non-enforcement.245  The ap-
pearance of this view is significant.  But the real explanans is why the 
point was made only once during the debate over repeal, and never on 
 
zen? . . . The Judiciary are our security.”); id. at 690 (statement of Benjamin Huger) (“I 
hesitate not in saying that, between an independent Judiciary, constituting a tribunal 
which can control the unconstitutional attempts of the other two branches of the Gov-
ernment . . . between such a tribunal and the bayonet there remains no resource or al-
ternative.”); id. at 842 (statement of John Dennis) (arguing that the judiciary was created 
“for [the] purpose” “of giving efficacy to these declarations” against ex post facto laws); 
id. at 884 (statement of Seth Hastings) (“[I]f the Judiciary power has no Constitutional 
check upon the acts and doings of the Legislature, Congress may pass an ex post facto 
law . . . .”); id. at 927–28 (statement of Samuel Dana) (“If any unconstitutional act is 
passed, what must be done for relief against it, according to the plan of the gentlemen 
who advocate the bill on the table? . . . Must persons be subjected to the operation of an 
unconstitutional act until the period of elections comes round . . . ?”). 
242 Id. at 646 (emphasis added). 
243 Id. at 982. 
244 See id. at 982–83 (providing a continuation of Bacon’s argument). 
245 See supra Part I.B. 
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the floor.246  Republicans could avail themselves of a number of dif-
ferent responses to Bayard.  They could challenge the assumption 
that federal courts would actually provide a remedy for legislative vio-
lations of constitutional rights, and describe the courts’ political con-
duct during the Sedition Act controversy.  Naturally, some Republi-
cans made this point.247  They could argue that, whether or not the 
courts were fully independent of legislative control, judges would 
continue to perform judicial review out of duty; some made this ar-
gument as well, drawing on experience in state government.248  And 
they could argue that a proper republican remedy for legislative ex-
cess was the corrective applied by the people themselves during elec-
tion—precisely what had occurred in Jefferson’s ‘revolution.’249  In 
the end, responses like these crowded out Bacon’s view.  It seems like-
ly that, having nurtured such a profound distrust of executive author-
ity during their decade in opposition, Republicans found it difficult 
suddenly to pivot and argue that the President possessed a rather 
broad authority to refuse to enforce the law.  The received Republi-
can view in 1802 was, instead, to distrust the executive, and to assume 
a politically neutral judiciary would protect individuals from both leg-
 
246 Senator John Breckinridge’s well-known defense of Congress’s supremacy in determining 
the boundaries of legislative power, 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 179 (1802), does not support 
non-enforcement, but implies an obligation to give effect to Congress’s interpretation of 
the Constitution.  See infra note 435. 
247 See, e.g., 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 661 (1802) (statement of John Randolph) (speaking nega-
tively about the judiciary as compared to the legislature). 
248 See, e.g., id. at 698 (statement of then-state Legislator Israel Smith) (“Whether the judge 
holds his office at the will of the President, or for one year, or during good behaviour, it 
is equally his duty to decide a law void, which directly infringes the Constitution.”); id. at 
973 (statement of then-state Legislator Joseph Varnum) (“[S]ir, notwithstanding [in New 
Hampshire] the entire dependence on the Legislature for the existence of the courts of 
common pleas, I cannot imagine that the independence of the judges has ever been af-
fected by it.  There is an honorable gentleman from that State now on this floor, a judge 
of one of those courts, who, with his associates, had the independence . . . to declare an 
act of the Legislature unconstitutional.”).  Varnum was likely referring to Abiel Foster, a 
representative from New Hampshire who served as a judge on the Court of Common 
Pleas for Rockingham County from 1784–1788.  See REID, supra note 58, at 29–30; 
FOSTER, Abiel (1735–1806), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 
1774–PRESENT, http:// bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=F000297 
(providing biographical information).  Notably, Foster had no legal training.  See JOHN 
PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW:  LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW 
HAMPSHIRE 24 (2004) [hereinafter REID, CONTROLLING] (labeling Foster as a “lay 
judge”). 
249 See, e.g., 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 531 (1802) (statement of Robert Williams) (“Are we then to 
be told that there is more safety in confiding this important power [i.e., the power to in-
terpret the Constitution] to the last department, so far removed from the people, than in 
departments flowing directly from the people, responsible to and returning at short in-
tervals into the mass of the people?”). 
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islative and executive excess.250  This left them unable to rebut the 
Federalist assumption that the President would be exposed to the 
same partisan forces that produced the legislature’s violation of the 
Constitution in the first place.251 
C.  A Closer Look at the Standard Justification 
When one adds the evidence that Framers rejected a non-
enforcement power to the lack of any sustained, public defense of 
that power, it suggests that something is amiss with the Non-
Enforcement Argument.  No one accepted it.  This conclusion also 
affects the Standard Justification of judicial review.  Since Non-
Enforcement and our formulation of the Standard Justification stand 
or fall together, if something is amiss with Non-Enforcement, then 
something is amiss with the Standard Justification.  But what is amiss, 
and what can it tell us about non-enforcement and judicial review? 
1.  Constitutional Agency 
Recall that there are two versions of the Standard Justification: 
one premised on the idea that judges are the constitutional agents of 
the people, and one premised on the nature of the duty to apply the 
law.  Begin with the version premised on constitutional agency.  As 
Iredell wrote in “To the Public,” judges hold their office “for the benefit 
 
250 See Powell, supra note 191, at 1004 (observing that “a central Republican theme in the 
1790s was opposition to the Federalist ideal of a strong executive”); see also 11 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 73 (1802) (Speech of David Stone) (“The objects of courts of law, as I understand 
them, are, to settle questions of right between suitors; to enforce obedience to the laws, 
and to protect the citizens against oppressive use of power in the Executive offices.”).  It 
was the Federalists who supported a broader executive authority, as even Jefferson recog-
nized.  In a letter to John Dickinson written just after the 1800 election, Jefferson wrote, 
“I consider the pure federalist as a republican who would prefer a somewhat stronger execu-
tive; and the republican as one willing to trust the legislature as a broader representation 
of the people, and a safer deposit of power for many reasons.”  Letter to John Dickinson 
(July 23, 1801), in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 37, at 280, 281 (em-
phasis added). 
251 These forces would align the President with the Congress that, for example, passed a bill 
of attainder.  See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 689 (1802) (statement of Benjamin Huger) (“From 
an ex post facto law, from a suspension of the habeas corpus in time of peace, from a bill of 
attainder, or from any other act of violence, however unconstitutional, on the part of the Ex-
ecutive and Legislature, where are we to look up for relief?”) (emphasis added).  Repre-
sentative Huger’s example perfectly reverses an example Judge Frank Easterbrook ad-
duced (200 years later) in support of non-enforcement—revealing how disparate 
Easterbrook’s own assumptions are from those that guided those in the repeal debate.  
See Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 922–24 (using a bill of attainder as an example and ex-
ploring how it should be treated by the different branches of government). 
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of the whole people,” and are “not mere servants of the Assembly.”252  Being 
an agent of the people implied a duty to comply with their Constitu-
tion.  Since giving effect to an unconstitutional law meant serving the 
assembly instead of obeying the Constitution, it followed that a judge 
must consider the Constitution when deciding a case.253  He could not 
close his eyes to it. 
Even if we suppose that agency implies a duty to comply with the 
Constitution, it does not follow that by giving effect to an unconstitu-
tional law, a judge disobeys the Constitution.  We can see this by con-
sidering the implications of a simple separation of governmental 
functions.  Suppose, for example, that the people give one agent or 
group of agents the power to enforce the law.  We need not assume 
that the delegation is to a single person, or to persons within only 
one governmental “branch”—it just needs to be to a delegation that 
excludes someone.  Other agents lack this power.  The agents without 
enforcement power are, by assumption, unauthorized to make their 
own determinations of how the law should be enforced.  They must 
accept the decisions of the agents given enforcement authority.  This 
does not make the non-enforcing agents subordinate;254 the non-enforcers 
have their own powers, and, as Madison put it, a “will of [their] 
own”—that is, an authority to determine how best to exercise those 
powers and what limits the Constitution places on them.255  It follows, 
then, that merely being a constitutional agent cannot immunize one 
from being subject to the decisions of another agent, including deci-
sions that reflect a view of the Constitution’s meaning.  Indeed, judg-
es could be such agents.  The powers delegated to judges might not 
include the authority to consider the Constitution and determine its 
meaning.  That authority might have been given to some other agent; 
or it might have been given to no agent, and remain with the people 
themselves.256  To know whether judges in fact have the authority to 
consider the Constitution in the course of adjudicating cases, we 
need to know something more about the powers they were delegated.  
Only then can we conclude whether a judge who fails to consider the 
Constitution ‘disobeys’ it. 
 
252 Iredell, supra note 105, at 148. 
253 See supra Part I.B. 
254 See Harrison, supra note 12, at 362–63, 380 (noting that one branch of government can 
“accept another’s determination” without being subordinate to it). 
255 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
256 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison) (observing that powers can recur back to the 
people, the “original authority”). 
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This argument, premised on the separation of powers, would have 
been familiar to the Framers as students of English oppositional poli-
tics.257  Indeed, it is a recognizable variant of an argument Iredell 
himself made at the end of “To the Public.”  In response to the criti-
cism that he had implied a power of judicial review not only in North 
Carolina’s Superior Courts of Law and Equity, but also in the “county 
courts,” whose justices of the peace probably lacked legal training, 
Iredell responded, “I admit it.”258  The county courts, he reasoned, 
“exercise . . . judicial power,” and thus enjoyed its concomitant, judi-
cial review.259  Appeals would lie, in any case, from the county courts 
to the superior courts.  Yet Iredell balked at extending this power to 
refuse to enforce the law beyond the courts.  He continued: 
The objection, however, urged by some persons, that sheriffs and other 
ministerial officers must exercise their judgment too, does not apply.  For 
if the power of judging rests with the courts, their decision is final as to the 
subject matter.  Did ever a sheriff refuse to hang a man, because he 
thought he was unjustly convicted of murder?260 
Ministerial officers are not empowered, said Iredell, to judge 
whether those court orders comply with the Constitution.  This is be-
cause “the power of judging rests with the courts.”261  Sheriffs were not giv-
en the power of judging, and in this respect they were subject to the 
decisions of those who were.262  Judges on the state’s superior courts, 
 
257 See VILE, supra note 82, at 43–44 (discussing the Herle-Ferne debate); VILE, supra note 82, 
at 75 (“In the first half of the eighteenth century the theory of mixed government was in 
the ascendency again . . . . But it was no longer the undifferentiated theory of mixed gov-
ernment that had preceded the Civil War.  The ideas behind separation of powers were 
added to it so that each element of the mixed government might wield an independent 
and co-ordinate authority that gave it the ability to check the exercise of power by the 
other branches.”). 
258 Iredell, supra note 105, at 149.  For a discussion of justices of the peace in royal North 
Carolina during the period immediately preceding the Revolution, see SCOTT DOUGLAS 
GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER:  THE ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606–
1787, at 198 (2011). 
259 Iredell, supra note 105, at 149; see also GERBER, supra note 258, at 196 (discussing the divi-
sion of common law courts in North Carolina). 
260 Iredell, supra note 105, at 149. 
261 Iredell, supra note 105, at 149. 
262 Iredell’s argument applies by its terms to ministerial officers, but its implications extend 
beyond them.  Iredell’s premise is that “the power of judging rests with the courts.”  Ire-
dell, supra note 105, at 149.  It does not lie elsewhere, as the provision in state’s 1776 
Constitution separating powers confirms.  See N.C. CONST. OF 1776 art. IV (providing for 
the separation of powers).  Since the power of judging lies with the courts, and not else-
where, it does not lie with any officer who is not “with the courts,” whatever his rank.  In-
deed, Iredell may have been thinking of North Carolina colonial Governor Richard Ever-
ard, who in 1729 had refused to execute a sentence of death entered on a jury verdict in 
the colony’s General Court.  The effect, widely known to North Carolinians in the 1730s, 
was to undermine the courts and create “chaos.”  See 2 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON 
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at whom Iredell’s essay was aimed, were likely to be concerned about 
the scope of any duty to consider the Constitution.263  If the duty were 
one that an officer had by virtue of holding an office (any office), 
then it would be a duty all officers had; but for all officers to be con-
stantly duty-bound to act only on their own view of the Constitution 
could be thought to invite disorder.  North Carolina had been forced 
to dispatch the self-governing ‘Regulators’ with an army of several 
thousand men only fifteen years earlier.264  Iredell’s response to this 
concern was to distinguish kinds of constitutional agents according to 
the powers of their office.  Those with an office requiring application 
of the law were duty-bound to consider the Constitution when doing 
so.  For the rest, merely being the people’s agents carried no such re-
quirement. 
Other forms of the constitutional agency argument fare no better.  
As noted above, disputants tended to merge the idea that constitu-
tional agency implied a duty of obedience with other, related ideas 
about constitutional enforcement.265  Thus, judicial review was some-
times likened to popular disobedience of an unconstitutional law, jus-
tifying judges in refusing to enforce the law.266  Yet the same problem 
presents itself.  One can assume, as Iredell does in “To the Public,” 
that the people enforce the Constitution on the basis of their under-
standing of its limits.267  The idea is plainly compatible with the exist-
ence of different constitutional offices.  An officer whom (let us sup-
pose) the Constitution obligates to implement the interpretations of 
another may be justified in refusing to obey an unconstitutional act as 
an act of popular resistance.  However, this authority does not flow from 
his office, and, consequently, the officer’s use of the powers of his of-
fice to advance his own views is open to challenge.  As Philip Ham-
burger has shown, and as I discuss below, by the 1790s there was sig-
nificant concern about judges’ use of written “resolutions” to express 
 
LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA 96–97 (2012) (discussing King v. Smith, N.C. Gen. Ct. 1729, in 
2 Colonial and State Records of North Carolina 829 (1886)). 
263 See Iredell, supra note 105, at 149 (observing that the “liberty of appeal . . . rests . . . with 
the superior courts”). 
264 See, e.g., William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power of Colonial American Juries, 71 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1003, 1026–28 (2010). 
265 See supra notes 122–29 and accompanying text. 
266 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 34, at 53–54 (discussing the fact that violence or “civil unrest” 
often ensued when the public did not like a particular law). 
267 See Iredell, supra note 105, at 147 (noting that resistance of the people is one option to 
quell a violation of the Constitution by the Assembly).  Iredell resembles Wilson in this 
respect.  1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 110, at 421 (arguing that law 
should be simple and easy to understand). 
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constitutional protest.268  What required justification was the practice 
of enforcing the Constitution within a court of law.  One could accept 
that popular disobedience was occasionally justified, but maintain 
that judges were constrained by the commands of the assembly in 
discharging their official duties.  Just as above, the office of the judge 
might not extend to constitutional disobedience. 
2.  The Duty to Apply the Law 
In effect, we are pushed towards the second version of the Non-
Enforcement argument, premised on the nature of the duty to apply 
the law.  If the Standard Justification is going to succeed, it is this idea 
that must do the work.  Indeed, the leading defenses of judicial re-
view in the ratification period make consistent use of the notion of 
the duty to apply the law and its connection to the judicial office.  For 
example, Iredell writes that a judge’s consideration of the Constitu-
tion, and his decision to privilege it above ordinary law, “is not a 
usurped or discretionary power, but one inevitably resulting from the con-
stitution of [his] office.”269  Similarly, in Federalist 78, Hamilton asserts 
that it “belongs” to the judicial office to “ascertain [the Constitu-
tion’s] meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceed-
ing from the legislative body.”270  In the influential case of Kamper v. 
Hawkins, which I discuss in detail below, Judge St. George Tucker 
wrote that the Constitution must be “resorted to” anytime it is neces-
sary “to expound what the law is,” and that such “exposition . . . is the 
duty and office of the judiciary to make.”271 
The key question is whether this duty also attaches to the execu-
tive office.  While the President does apply the law, doing so does not 
bring him within the ambit of the Standard Justification.  This is be-
cause the Standard Justification does not turn merely on the applica-
tion of general rules to specific situations.  As we will see, a number of 
the leading defenses of judicial review reflect this point.  Consider 
Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.  As others have 
noted, Marshall’s defense of judicial review in Marbury replicates the 
logic of the Standard Justification, which was, by the 1790s, widely ac-
 
268 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 561 (explaining that the judges adopted a resolution); 
infra notes 335–66 and accompanying text.  There was also concern about federal judges 
exploiting their status and authority toward the political goals of the administration.  See 
infra notes 452–61 and accompanying text. 
269 Iredell, supra note 105, at 148 (emphasis added). 
270 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) 
271 Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 78 (Va. 1793) (Opinion of Tucker, J.) (empha-
sis added). 
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cepted, even by Republicans.272  Marshall begins his defense with the 
assertion that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judi-
cial department to say what the law is.”273  This is Premise 1 of the 
Standard Justification, namely, a characterization of the judicial office 
that supports consideration of the Constitution in the course of adju-
dication.  The next sentence in the opinion justifies this characteriza-
tion.  “Those who apply the rule to particular cases,” says Marshall, 
“must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”274  “Cases” is not 
a throwaway term in this sentence.  It does not mean “instances,” “sit-
uations” or “occasions.”  Rather, as David Engdahl and Charles Hob-
son have argued, Marshall uses “case” in its legal sense, which embod-
ies a vision of the form that a dispute takes within a court of law, and 
the norms that govern the litigation of such a dispute.275  In particu-
lar, says Marshall, litigation of a dispute necessitates expounding the 
law (“those who apply the law to particular cases must of necessity ex-
pound”); and it is expounding the law that, in turn, requires the court 
to consider the Constitution.276 
If this is correct, then it drives a wedge between the Standard Jus-
tification and the Non-Enforcement Argument.  Consider, again, our 
formulation of the Non-Enforcement Argument: 
P1′. The duty of the executive power is to execute the laws of the state. 
P2.  The Constitution is a law of the state. 
P3.  An unconstitutional act of the assembly is void, and thus not a law of 
the state. 
C′.  If the executive power executes an unconstitutional act of the as-
sembly, rather than the Constitution, it does not execute the laws of the 
state, and thus it violates its duty. 
 
272 See, e.g., HOBSON, supra note 11, at 55 (noting that in Marbury, “Marshall was merely re-
stating widely accepted principles and beliefs”); SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 109 (arguing 
that Marshall did not make unique arguments in Marbury).  On the Republican ac-
ceptance of judicial review in 1803, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
CONGRESS:  THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829, at 16, 20 (2001); RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE 
JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS:  COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 66 (1971); WARREN, 
supra note 229, at 122–27; Corwin, supra note 146, at 570; Michael W. McConnell, The Sto-
ry of Marbury v. Madison: Making Defeat Look Like Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 
13 (Michael Dorf ed., 2004); James M. O’Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219, 227 
(1992). 
273 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
274 Id. 
275 See HOBSON, supra note 11, at 52 (highlighting Marshall’s focus on the word “case” and 
applying it in Marbury); David E. Engdahl, John Marshall’s “Jeffersonian” Concept of Judicial 
Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279, 310, 318, 325, 330 (1992) (discussing Marshall’s conception of 
“case”). 
276 See BERGER, supra note 184, at 50–63 (discussing what was meant by “expound”). 
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The problem is with P1′.  The duty of the executive power is to 
execute the laws of the state.  The Constitution is a law, but it is a fun-
damental law.  Because it is fundamental, one must justify the Presi-
dent’s consideration of the Constitution in the course of satisfying his 
official duty to execute the law; one cannot simply assume that fun-
damental law may be enforced by the procedures and institutions 
used to enforce ordinary law.277  Support for presidential considera-
tion of the Constitution had rested on a parallel to the judicial duty 
to apply the law.  However, on closer inspection, the judicial office is 
concerned with applying the law to “cases,” which requires “expound-
ing” the law.  In this way, the idea of a “case” and “expounding” the 
law figure essentially in the Standard Justification, but not in the Non-
Enforcement Argument.  I conclude that if there is a non-
enforcement power, it must rest on some other basis for considering 
the Constitution in the course of satisfying the duty to execute the 
law. 
Does this make the President into an overgrown version of Ire-
dell’s ministerial sheriff?  No.  The President is not an inferior officer 
or an “errand boy.”278  He leads a coordinate department; he enjoys 
an authority to (independently) interpret the Constitution.279  The 
President may give effect to his view of the Constitution in specific 
ways, but a list of these ways is not open-ended.  It includes the power 
to issue vetoes, grant pardons, propose legislation, and to do other 
things as well, depending on the state of constitutional politics.280  But 
the Non-Enforcement Argument can provide no support for adding 
to this list the power to execute the law, such as the Take Care Clause 
and (perhaps) the Article II Vesting Clause grant.281  From the per-
spective of the founding era, at least, the President’s executive power 
 
277 See SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 1–2 (highlighting the differences between fundamental and 
ordinary law). 
278 Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., The Ambivalence of Executive Power, in The Presidency, in THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 315–16 (1981). 
279 See Steilen, supra note 32, at 355–60 (defining “coordinacy” and exploring its implications 
for presidential authority). 
280 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 907–11 (describing the various core powers the 
President possesses); Neomi Rao, The President’s Sphere of Action, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
527, 544–53 (2009) (examining “the nature of limitations on the President’s powers”). 
On the relationship between constitutional politics and executive interpretative authority, 
see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:  THE 
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 1–
27 (2007). 
281 On the Vesting Clause as a source of presidential interpretative power, see Lawson & 
Moore, supra note 13, at 1281–82.  On the Take Care Clause as a source of power, see 
Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 919–22. 
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and his obligation to see that the law is faithfully executed extend on-
ly to ordinary law.  The executive duty of the presidency is a ministeri-
al duty—but the same is not true of the President’s other powers and 
duties. 
III.  RECONSTRUCTING THE STANDARD JUSTIFICATION 
The Standard Justification cannot be adapted to support a power 
of non-enforcement because the argument turns on the judicial duty 
to expound the law.  Judges expound the law to decide a case, which 
the President does not do.  In the final Part of this Article I fill out 
these assertions by examining the ideas of a “case” and “expounding” 
the law.  The effort is preliminary and not exhaustive.  My aim is to 
essay an explanation of how the Framers could have believed that the 
President had a power to interpret the Constitution, but not a power 
to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws. 
The key to the story I tell is the court itself.  Traditionally, Ameri-
can jurisdictions distributed the adjudicatory function relatively wide-
ly.  Judges shared interpretative power (to the extent they had it at 
all) with juries and with popular assemblies, through which the peo-
ple gave effect to their understanding of the law.282  This distribution 
changed in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, shifting away 
from popular assemblies and towards actors embedded within a court 
of law, primarily judges.283  Of course, these shifts occurred at differ-
ent times in different states, depending on the politics of the place.  
In most jurisdictions, however, courts better approximated widely 
 
282 On the interpretive powers of American juries, see NELSON, supra note 72, at 20–34; REID, 
CONTROLLING, supra note 248, at 108–25 (discussing how the judges interacted with ju-
ries); STIMSON, supra note 80, at 48–49, 59–60; Nelson, supra note 264, at 1003.  For re-
cent discussions of assembly adjudication, see REID, supra note 58, at 9–10, 62–70 (discuss-
ing the case of New Hampshire, among other states); Christine A. Desan, The 
Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1463–75 (1998) (discussing “[a]djudication as an [e]lement of 
[g]overnance”).  An older discussion can be found in Corwin, supra note 146, at 556 & 
n.53. 
283 As this point suggests, the “judge v. jury” template adopted by many historical studies of 
interpretative authority is inadequate and in some cases quite distortive.  After the Revo-
lution, the jury’s primary antagonist was not the judge, but the popular assembly, which 
eventually allocated the jury’s interpretative authority to the judge to increase predictabil-
ity and protect business interests.  See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 72, at 8 (noting how the 
jury system was negatively affected by “business entrepeneurs”).  In other cases, judges 
and juries cooperated to enhance their collective interpretative authority; thus, New 
Hampshire judges of the “common sense” school (mostly untrained laymen) sought to 
promote and protect jural decision-making in order to insulate regional courts from the 
controls of precedent and appellate review.  See, e.g., REID, CONTROLLING, supra note 248, 
at 24–26 (showing how New Hampshire judges worked with juries). 
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held ideals about the role of reason in government than did the pop-
ular assemblies, which were driven by local politics.284  In the eyes of 
reformers, courts of law were an attractive place to locate fundamen-
tal political decisions, and, in this sense, it is forum that best explains 
the legalization of constitutional dispute.  Indeed, there is reason to 
believe that ideas we later came to hold about judges—for example, 
about the importance of their ‘independence’ from the legislature—
were a product, in large part, of shared convictions about proper 
proceedings in a court of law.285  We can examine those convictions 
through a close analysis of the ideas of a “case” and “expounding.”  A 
“case” was a dispute shaped by the process of “forensic litigation” in a 
court of law.  Deciding a case required the court to “expound” the 
law, in the sense that the court was supposed to show how its judg-
ment was rooted in the law of the community, as opposed to the in-
terests of judge or jury.  Expounding the law, in turn, might require 
the court to engage in judicial review.  It was thus the demands of the 
forum that distinguished the interpretative powers of the judiciary 
from those of the executive.  The President did not decide cases or 
expound the law. 
A.  The Idea of a “Case” 
I want to begin by examining the idea of a “case.”  By the 1790s, 
and probably earlier, “case” was regularly used to describe legal pro-
ceedings.286  A “case” was a dispute that had assumed a form that 
 
284 See Kent, supra note 51, at 941–42; WOOD, EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 190–91 (describing 
the use of instructions in state assemblies).  Disappointment with adjudication by popular 
assemblies also drove the development of due process doctrine.  Some of the early judi-
cial review cases can be read as due process cases, where the animating idea is separation 
legislative and judicial functions.  See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. 
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1704–06, 1709–13 
(2012). 
285 See G. Alan Tarr, Contesting the Judicial Power in the States, 35 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 643, 
660–61 (2012) (“Judicial independence and arguments in its favor are premised on a pic-
ture of judges engaged in the resolution of controversies.”).  Keep in mind that judges in 
most American jurisdictions were not independent at the time the federal Constitution 
was ratified.  See GERBER, supra note 258, at 327 (noting that of the original colonies, “only 
Virginia and North Carolina completely constiutionalized the idea of judicial independ-
ence in the federal conception of the judicial instutition prior to the Federal Constitution 
of 1787”). 
286 See JAY, supra note 237, at 62–63; see also 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 
110, at 703 (“The judicial authority consists in applying, according to the principles of 
right and justice, the constitution and laws to facts and transactions in cases, in which the 
manner or principles of this application are disputed by the parties interested in them.”) 
(emphasis added).  But see HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 536–37 (arguing that “case” had 
a wider meaning in the 1780s). 
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made it properly resolvable within a court of law.  It was a dispute 
“judicially determined,” as it was sometimes put, rather than “extra-
judicially.”287  As Marshall described the idea in a speech given in 1800 
on the floor of the House, 
[a] case in law or equity was a term well understood, and of limited signi-
fication.  It was a controversy between parties which had taken shape for 
judicial decision.  If the judicial power extended to every question under 
the Constitution it would involve almost every subject proper for legisla-
tive discussion and decision . . . . [T]he other departments would be swal-
lowed up by the judiciary. . . . By extending the judicial power to all cases 
in law and equity, the Constitution had never been understood, to confer 
on that department, any political power whatever.  To come within this 
description, a question must assume a legal form, for forensic litigation, 
and judicial decision.  There must be parties to come into court, who can 
be reached by its process, and bound by its power; whose rights admit of 
ultimate decision by a tribunal to which they are bound to submit.288 
The key distinction in the passage is between a “case” and a “ques-
tion.”  A “question” would appear to be any reasonably unsettled 
proposition in the law.289  A “case,” in contrast, is a kind of dispute.290  
 
287 JAY, supra note 237, at 151–52 (discussing New York Governor John Jay’s request for an 
advisory opinion from state judges and their refusal); see Bloch, supra note 19, at 594 & 
n.107 (discussing the Invalid Pension Act cases); Letter from the Justices of the Supreme 
Court to President George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in JAY, supra note 237, at 179, 179–
80 (“The Lines of Separation drawn by the Constitution between the three Departments 
of Government—their being in certain Respects checks on each other—and our being 
Judges of a court in the last Resort—are Considerations which afford strong arguments 
against the Propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to . . . .”). 
288 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 95–96. 
289 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 537 (“[W]hereas in law a ‘cause,’ ‘case,’ or ‘controversy’ 
ordinarily referred to a particular dispute, a ‘question’ usually alluded to a more abstract 
disagreement, which rose above a particular legal dispute and thus might just as well be 
debated by a philosopher or a politician.”). 
290 At times in his lengthy address, Marshall uses “case” in its loose sense of particular cir-
cumstance.  See, e.g., 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 95 (“This Mr. 
Marshall said led to his second proposition, which was—That the case was a case for execu-
tive and not judicial decision.”) (emphasis added).  Nevertheless, I follow David Engdahl 
and Charles Hobson in identifying “case” as the relevant term, and not “case in law,” 
which Marshall also used in his 1800 speech.  See HOBSON, supra note 112, at 52 (noting 
Marshal’s view that judicial power extends only to “cases,” not to all “questions” arising 
under the Constitution); see also Engdahl, supra note 275, at 311 n.103, 318, 325–26 (simi-
lar); JAY, supra note 237, at 62 (“[I]n that period [i.e., the late 1780s], ‘controversy’ com-
monly was used interchangeably with the word ‘case’ in reference to litigation.”).  Samuel 
Johnson’s 1768 dictionary identifies both legal and non-legal meanings for “case,” but no 
entry for “case in law.”  See SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 757 
(3d ed. 1768) (defining “case”).  “Case in law” could be understood as a legal case at 
law—i.e., subject to the common law or the law of the state.  A key question is whether 
one can, without begging the question, interpret “case” in Marbury as referring to a dis-
pute in court, rather than simply “particular circumstances.”  Engdahl has argued that 
one can, based in part on other occurrences of “case” in Marbury.  See Engdahl, supra note 
 
Nov. 2014 JUDICIAL REVIEW AND NON-ENFORCEMENT AT THE FOUNDING 537 
 
It is distinguished by the “shape” it has taken, namely, a shape that 
makes “judicial decision” possible.  So what makes it possible to re-
solve a dispute by judicial decision?  At the very least, the court must 
be able to enter a valid judgment, which means, says Marshall, that 
the parties to the dispute must be “reached by [the court’s] process, 
and bound by its power,” and the court must have jurisdiction to 
make an “ultimate decision” about the rights at issue.291  But, in addi-
tion, Marshall argues that the dispute “must assume a legal form, for 
forensic litigation, and judicial decision.”292  In other words, it must be 
suited for resolution in a court of law, using the procedures and tools 
employed in that forum to resolve disputes. 
This definition of “case” played a crucial role in Marshall’s de-
fense of President Adams against charges that the President had 
usurped judicial authority.293  The term thus perfectly captures the 
distinction between executive and judicial interpretative authority.  
Adams had received a diplomatic request to extradite a man, Thomas 
Nash, accused of participating in a mutiny aboard a British ship.294  
After considering the request, he transmitted his own “advice and re-
quest” to the federal judge with jurisdiction over the matter, asking 
the judge to deliver Nash to the British government.  The judge held 
a habeas hearing, in which Nash desperately claimed to be an Ameri-
can by the name of Jonathan Robbins.  Nevertheless, the judge com-
plied with the request to hand over Nash/Robbins, whom the British 
promptly had transported to Jamaica, court-martialed and hanged.  
House Republicans were outraged.295  They introduced a resolution 
censuring Adams for answering “questions” about the meaning of 
federal law, a federal treaty and the Constitution—authority they be-
 
275, at 325–26 (noting that this distinction of “case” had been both featured in public 
debate and emphasized by Marshall himself). 
291 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 95–96. 
292 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 95–96.  
293 See Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall’s Questions, 2 GREEN BAG 367, 369–70 
(1999) (detailing Marshall’s defense of Adams and Judge Bee against Republican led 
constitutional attacks and the role the word “case” played); Engdahl, supra note 275, at 
304–14 (describing how Marshall rose to the occasion to protect Adams’ interests and 
made the distinction between “cases” and “questions”). 
294 Engdahl, supra note 275, at 308. 
295 Republicans tended to credit Nash’s claim to be an American citizen, which Dellinger 
and Powell suggest had some merit.  See Dellinger & Powell, supra note 293, at 369 n.11 ( 
“Robbins's daim of United States citizenship, despite its suspicious timing, may well have 
been correct.” (citing Larry D. Cress, The Jonathan Robbins Incident:  Extradition and the Sep-
aration of Powers in the Adams Administration, 111 ESSEX INST. HIST. COLLECTIONS 99 
(1975)).  Republicans were undoubtedly primed to take offense by what they perceived to 
be the Adams administration’s pro-British leanings.  See Engdahl, supra note 275, at 307–
09. 
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lieved was reserved under Article III for the federal courts—and for 
interfering “in a case where those courts had already assumed and 
exercised jurisdiction.”296  In response, Marshall argued that the Con-
stitution did not actually give federal courts jurisdiction over all such 
“questions,” as the resolution maintained, but only over “cases.”297  To 
claim an exclusive authority over questions arising under federal law, 
treaties, and the Constitution would lead the judiciary to usurp exec-
utive authority.  “A variety of legal questions must present themselves 
in the performance of every part of Executive duty,” Marshall ob-
served, “but these questions are not therefore to be decided in 
court.”298  The questions in this case were “questions of law, but they 
were questions of political law,” while the grant of jurisdiction to the 
federal courts “had never been understood, to confer on that de-
partment, any political power whatever.”299 
Marshall’s defense shared much in common with an earlier de-
fense of presidential authority against similar charges of usurpation, 
which he cited in his speech.300  Writing in 1793 as “Pacificus,” Alex-
ander Hamilton had defended President Washington’s authority to 
proclaim the United States a neutral in the war between Britain and 
France, and, as he had stated, “under no obligations of Treaty, to be-
come an associate” of one warring power or the other.301  In response 
to the objection that such a determination should have been made by 
the “Judiciary Department,” Pacificus maintained that “the province 
of that Department is to decide litigations in particular cases,” and that 
while it could interpret treaties, it should do so “only in litigated cas-
es; that is, where contending parties bring before it a specific contro-
 
296 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 533 (1800). 
297 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 95 (emphasis added). 
298 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 103. 
299 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 103 (emphasis added).  Walter 
Dellinger and Jeff Powell rightly emphasize the idea of “political law” in Marshall’s de-
fense, which casts an important light on the first two issues in Marbury, written by Marshall 
only three years later.  See Dellinger & Powell, supra note 293, at 371, 373–74 (presenting 
Marshall’s argument “that our constitutional system gives the  political branches exclusive, 
de jure authority to answer some questions of law”). 
300 See 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 103–04. 
301 Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus Number I (June 29, 1793), in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS 
DEBATES OF 1793–1794, at 9 (Morton Frisch ed., 2007); see also; CASTO, supra note 237, at 
73; JAY, supra note 237, at 156; George Washington, The Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 
22,  1793), in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794, supra, at 1. 
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versy.”302  The judicial department had “no concern with pronouncing 
upon . . . external political relations.”303 
At bottom, then, what made a dispute resolvable by judicial deci-
sion was that it was non-political.  “Cases” were non-political.  It was 
also a point of foundational importance for Marshall; Charles Hob-
son has argued that “the separation of law and politics was perhaps 
the fundamental proposition underlying Marshall’s jurisprudence.”304  
The question is what made a case non-political.  How did a mere dis-
pute become non-political, and thus a full-blooded case?  The answer 
lies in the process of “forensic litigation” that characterized proce-
dure in courts of law.  It was forensic litigation that “shape[d]” and 
“form[ed]”305 a dispute into one that could be resolved in a non-
political way.  It did this, ideally, by limiting the discretion of the 
judge.  Litigation replaced unbounded or even prudential political 
discretion with legal discretion, and it was the exercise of legal discre-
tion that distinguished “judicial decision.”306  As Hobson summarizes 
the idea, “[a]s long as [judicial] creativity was perceived to operate 
within the confines of legal discretion, judges were not ‘legisla-
tors.’”307  Litigation could do this because it was, in the common law 
 
302 Hamilton, supra note 301 (emphases added). 
303 Hamilton, supra note 301 (emphases added).  Subsequently, in one of the Virginia debt 
cases, John Jay took the view that courts were incompetent to judge a treaty void for non-
performance.  See JAY, supra note 237, at 164.  Jay wrote,  
[o]n comparing the principles which govern and decide the necessary validity of a 
treaty, with those on which its voluntary validity depends, we cannot but perceive 
that the former are of a judicial, and the latter are of a political nature. That diversity 
naturally leads to an opinion that the former are referable to the judiciary, and the 
latter to those departments which are charged with the political interests of the 
state.   
  Jones v. Walker, 13 F. Cas. 1059, 1062 (C.C.D. Va. n.d.) (No. 7,507) (emphasis added); see 
also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 260 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“These are considera-
tions of policy, . . . certainly entirely incompetent to the examination and decision of a 
Court of Justice.”). 
304 HOBSON, supra note 112, at 52; see also NELSON, supra note 50, at 59–60. 
305 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 95–96. 
306 See Kent, supra note 51, at 942 (“[T]he interpretation or construction of the Constitution 
is as much a JUDICIAL act, and requires the exercise of the same LEGAL DISCRETION, 
as the interpretation or construction of a law.”).  H. Jefferson Powell examined the histo-
ry of the expression “legal discretion” in some detail in his important article, “The Politi-
cal Grammar of Early Constitutional Law.”  See Powell, supra note 191, at 1006 (“‘Discre-
tion’ in the judicial context thus had little to do with choice; it was, rather, the court’s 
skillful exercise of judgment in discerning and applying correctly the rules of law.”); id. at 
1007 (“[L]egal discretion and politics were usually differentiated sharply.”); cf. 
HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 135–36 (describing Coke’s distinction between the discre-
tion of the individual man and the discretion of the law). 
307 HOBSON, supra note 112, at 35.  For the development of this idea on the national level in 
the early nineteenth century, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND 
CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835, at 135–55 (Oxford U. Press 1991) (1988). 
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tradition, an oral practice of “deliberative reasoning and argument in 
an interlocutory, indeed forensic, context.”308  Using the tools of 
rhetoric, grammar, and logic, in open disputation in a public forum, 
the parties and the judge could shape the dispute into one that a 
judge or jury could resolve neutrally, according to recognized com-
munity standards.309  What emerged in this process, Marshall said lat-
er, was “human reason applied by courts, not capriciously, but in a 
regular train of decisions, to human affairs, according to the circum-
stances of the nation, the necessity of the times, and the general state 
of things.”310 
These ideas were linked to movements for institutional reform in 
the 1780s and 1790s, particularly those aimed at state court systems.  
Virginia is an outstanding example, and events in that state shed light 
on why the idea of a “case” was significant to Marshall.311  Formally, 
after 1776 Virginia had a three-tiered system of courts, with its “Court 
of Appeals” serving as a court of last resort, the “General Court” as a 
central court of civil and criminal jurisdiction, and county courts 
headed by justices of the peace at the bottom.312  But, in reality, Vir-
ginia had an extremely decentralized court system, since the county 
 
308 Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD U. COMMONW. 
L.J. 1, 7 (2003); see also Alan Dillard Boyer, “Understanding, Authority, and Will”:  Sir Edward 
Coke and the Elizabethian Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REV. 43, 50 (1997) (“[B]oth 
Coke and Fraunce shared the belief that the truest understanding of an issue is that 
reached by disputation and discussion . . . .”). 
309 See MICHAEL LOBBAN, THE COMMON LAW AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 1760–1850, at 58–
64 (1991) (discussing early “espistemological approach[es] to legal reasoning”); Boyer, 
supra note 308, at 50–60 (discussing early ideas that “the wisdom of the group will be 
fuller and more  trustworthy than the opinion of any one lawyer or orator”); Postema, su-
pra note 308, at 7–10 (discussing the “form and structure of legal reasoning”).  Note that 
Lobban, Postema, and Boyer are all describing generally Cokean views of the common 
law, whereas Marshall was much more of a Blackstonian deductivist. 
310 Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411) (emphasis added). 
311 On reform efforts in Virginia, see F. THORNTON MILLER, JURIES AND JUDGES VERSUS THE 
LAW:  VIRGINIA’S PROVINCIAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1783–1828, at 12–33 (1994); A.G. 
ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS:  CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL 
CULTURE, 1680–1810, at 161–202 (1981).  Similar reform efforts occurred in New Hamp-
shire, but about a decade later.  See REID, CONTROLLING, supra note 248, at 119 (placing 
this reform in the early 1800s); REID, supra note 58, at 24–70 (discussing judicial reform 
in New Hampshire).There were reform and counter-reform movements in Pennsylvania 
and Georgia as well.  See WOOD, EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 425–431 (discussing the debates 
about “the role of law and the judiciary in American life . . . in the states”); REID, supra 
note 58, at 7–23 (highlighting that the events that occurred in New Hampshire were also 
occurring in other states). 
312 See GERBER, supra note 258, at 60 (discussing the roles of each of the types of judges who 
served in these courts); THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 193 (3d 
Am. ed. 1801) (discussing Virginia’s court structure).  In addition, coordinate to the 
General Court were a Court of Admiralty and a Court of Chancery. 
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courts handled nearly all litigation, as well as a wide variety of admin-
istrative matters.313  Indeed, Virginia justices of the peace had long 
controlled almost every important issue of county policy—including 
tax levies, licensing, agricultural inspections, and road mainte-
nance.314  Nor did the system admit of any ready controls.  Appeals 
from the county courts to the General Court were possible, but might 
take “six or seven” years.315  Justices of the peace were formally ap-
pointed by the governor, but in reality had long been permitted to 
nominate their own successors, which they used to perpetuate the in-
fluence of their families and associates.316  The result was a kind of 
‘country’ aristocracy.  Unsurprisingly, this aristocracy conducted their 
courts in a homespun and sometimes inquisitorial manner.  While 
William Nelson has argued that early royal Virginia quickly adopted 
the common law in order to encourage private investment,317 trained 
lawyers that came to Virginia before the turn of the eighteenth cen-
tury complained loudly about the lack of sophistication and proce-
dural informality at all levels of Virginia courts, but especially the 
county courts.318  Justices were untrained in the common law, mixed 
law and politics, and were essentially unchecked by any republican 
authority. 
In the 1780s, as reform efforts struggled along, Marshall practiced 
law before the Virginia General Court and the Court of Appeals, as 
well as the state’s Court of Chancery.  It was in practicing before the 
central courts that Marshall developed the approach to litigation for 
which he later became well-known.319  Almost invariably, Marshall’s 
strategy was to identify relevant high-level principles, and then de-
duce from those principles the proper result in the instant case—a 
 
313 See MILLER, supra note 311, at 24–25 (discussing the many roles of the justices of the 
peace). 
314 See James A. Henretta, Magistrates, Common Law Lawyers, Legislators:  The Three Legal System 
of British America, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 555, 560 (Michael 
Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (discussing that most of the power in early 
Virginia was held by the justices of the peace). 
315 ROEBER, supra note 311, at 196 (quoting VA. INDEP. CHRONICLE (Mar. 28, 1787)). 
316 See Henretta, supra note 314, at 560 (“The county courts had become self-perpetuating 
oligarchies of justices . . . .”). 
317 See 1 NELSON, supra note 262, at 36–37 (discussing the adoption of common law in Virgin-
ia). 
318 See ROEBER, supra note 311, at 57–60 nn.37–45 (providing support for this conception of 
the Virginia courts); Henretta, supra note 314, at 571 (noting the absence of professional 
lawyers in Virginia). 
319 HOBSON, supra note 112, at 30–33, 42–43 (discussing “Marshall’s common law litigation”); 
see NELSON, supra note 50, at 43. 
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distinctively Blackstonian version of forensics.320  What made the ap-
proach so forceful was the impression of ‘logical’ or ‘geometric’ cer-
tainty that Marshall was able to convey, which suggested a severe con-
straint on the discretion of the judge or jury.321  Reform proposals 
that would create intermediate assize or district courts, staffed by cen-
tral court judges, promised to encourage the growth of these litiga-
tion methods, and perhaps even bring trained lawyers and common 
law procedures to the county courts.322  This would enhance the re-
publican legitimacy of those courts, by reinforcing “an emerging dis-
tinction between ‘legislative will’ and ‘justice’ . . . [which] became the 
foundation of a conception of judicial independence and discretion 
that was consistent with the republican belief in the sovereignty of the 
people.”323 
The movement for reform of Virginia’s courts was also connected 
to developments in the state’s assembly.  Like the popular assemblies 
of several other states, described above, the Virginia General Assem-
bly in the 1780s was riven by party disputes, divided in its case along 
‘country’ and reform lines.324  Justices of the peace, sitting as a signifi-
cant voting bloc in the Virginia House of Delegates, worked to pro-
tect the interests of indebted rural planters against the interests of 
merchants and creditors in the state’s population centers.325  The 
country party pushed through measures to prevent the efficient col-
lection of debt and derailed proposals that would have made it possi-
ble for British and American creditors to collect even principal in a 
timely fashion.326  The party supported its measures in the familiar 
 
320 See HOBSON, supra note 112, at 32–33 (discussing Marshall’s tactics); LOBBAN, supra note 
309, at 57–61 (describing Blackstone’s methodology). 
321 See HOBSON, supra note 112, at 32–33 (arguing that in litigating cases, Marshall “followed 
the straight and narrow path of logic, presenting his case like a geometric proof”). 
322 See, e.g., ROEBER, supra note 311, at 197 (discussing the possibility that “a more profes-
sional court system” would be the result of reform in Virginia). 
323 HOBSON, supra note 112, at 39; see also ROEBER, supra note 311, at 166–69 (discussing Jef-
ferson’s impact on judicial reform in Virginia); WHITE, supra note 307, at 129 (“American 
judges were conceded to be the expositors of common law rules, but since the rules 
themselves needed to retain their consonance with fundamental principle, exposition was 
not the same as lawmaking.”). 
324 See ROEBER, supra note 311, at 33–61, 178–79.  For the effect of party politics in other state 
assemblies, see supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.  See generally WOOD, supra note 
46, at 191 (noting a rift between eighteenth century American politicians and their con-
stituents regarding matters of public policy). 
325 See, e.g., Henretta, supra note 314, at 589 (“Roughly half the members of the House of 
Burgesses sat as justices in their home counties and opposed proposals that would limit 
their legal authority or replace them with elected aldermen.”); see also HOBSON, supra 
note 112, at 38; MILLER, supra note 311, at 12–16. 
326 One example of impeding collection is Virginia’s practice of assuming private debts.  See 
Jones v. Walker, 13 F. Cas. 1059, 1067 (C.C.D.Va. 1793) (No. 7,507) (“Here it becomes 
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language of the English opposition, ably deployed by Patrick Henry—
less government meant less corruption—but to the eyes of reformers, 
like Marshall and Madison, the “laws were passed merely to satisfy the 
interest of a majority.”327  Court reform at the state level was thus cru-
cial not only because it could grease the skids for debt-collection pol-
icies reformers thought vital, but because it promised to create an in-
stitution for collective decision-making that would give effect to 
“human reason,” rather than the passion and self-interest that 
gripped the assembly.328  In the terminology of the period, courts 
could play a decisive role in ensuring the rule of “public opinion”—
that is, “the reason[] of the public,” rather than the passion of a bare 
majority.329  The key to securing a government founded on public 
opinion was to encourage both the communication of ideas and their 
evaluation in open forums suited to subjecting the organic sentiment 
of the people to the scrutiny of reason.330  While this may have been a 
 
necessary to inquire . . . [w]hether the payment into the loan-office, and the receipt and 
discharge thereupon given by Virginia to the debtor, is a lawful impediment . . . [.]”); JAY, 
supra note 237, at 162–65 (“Private debtors in the various states owed staggering sums to 
British Creditors . . . . Virginians, who topped the list, owed almost half of the overall debt 
due to British creditors. . . . One [Virginia] statute provided that the debt obligations 
would be discharged to the extent payment that was made to the Virginia treasury . . . .”). 
327 MILLER, supra note 311, at 13, 15–16. 
328 Again, there is a striking parallel to draw between judicial review and the development of 
due process doctrine according to Chapman and McConnell.  As Chapman and 
McConnell tell it, the idea that due process prohibited legislative adjudication grew out of 
a sense that the legislative process was incapable of providing the kinds of pre-deprivation 
protections that existed in courts of law.  See, e.g., Chapman & McConnell, supra note 284, 
at 1712, 1716, 1729–32 (“To say that due process cannot be ‘referred to an act of legisla-
ture’ is not to say that due process principles do not apply, but that the legislature is insti-
tutionally incapable of satisfying them.  Hamilton specifically rejected the argument that 
whatever the legislature does is by definition consistent with ‘the law of the land.’”).  The 
many sources quoted and described by John Reid show that Chapman and McConnell 
underestimate the degree to which state assemblies continued to exercise adjudicatory 
authority well into the 1800s, at least in New Hampshire, but probably in other states as 
well.  See, e.g., REID, supra note 58, at 7–11, 61–70 (providing historical evidence on this 
point). 
329 The quoted language is, of course, from Federalist 49.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James 
Madison), supra note 32, at 276.  See also KRAMER, supra note 34, at 114 (“[P]ublic opinion 
would work to secure rather than undermine republican government only if and for so 
long as the public was guided by reason . . . . [J]udicial review . . . add[ed] another voice 
capable of forcing further public deliberation when it came to constitutional matters.”); 
Colleen A. Sheehan, Madison and the French Enlightenment:  The Authority of Public Opinion, 
59 WM. & MARY Q. 925, 948 (2002) (describing the notion of “public opinion”). 
330 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 34, at 114 (“[P]ublic opinion would work to secure rather 
than undermine republican government only if and for so long as the public was guided 
by reason.”); Sheehan, supra note 329, at 937−38 (“The proponents of a politics of public 
opinion agreed on the vital importance of the enlightened members of society to the 
formation of a public voice grounded in reason.”).  Wood has argued that the leadership 
role provided by gentlemen in the process of forming public opinion was essentially gone 
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traditional function of popular assemblies, it was not one well served 
by assemblies in the 1780s.331  Yet it was a purpose that (properly re-
formed) courts of law could serve—and that they naturally should 
serve, in light of the process of litigation.  Because forensic litigation 
forced the parties publicly to test their claims against one another, 
before a neutral decision-maker, according to community standards, 
it would be difficult for party politics to control the outcome of a 
case.332  In this sense, courts of law could discipline legislative will by 
channeling that will within boundaries set by the reason of the politi-
cal community.333 
B.  Kamper v. Hawkins and Judicial Resolutions 
For courts to play such a role, American judges would have to 
change some of their ways.  In particular, if the authority of the judge 
 
by 1800, and that the more horizontal, democratic practices that became dominant were 
premised on the idea that a collision of ideas would result in the emergence of truth.  See 
Gordon S. Wood, The Democratization of Mind in the American Revolution, in LEADERSHIP IN 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 63, 82 (1974) (arguing that public opinion “became the re-
solving force not only of political truth but of all truth”).  This notion of a “collision of 
ideas” fit naturally with the classical account of litigation in common law courts as “delib-
erative reasoning and argument in an interlocutory, and indeed forensic, context.”  
Postema, supra note 308, at 7; see supra note 308 and accompanying text. 
331 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 33, at 48–51.  For this function of 
the popular assembly, see Sheehan, supra note 329, at 939 (“Turgot . . . promoted the es-
tablishment of a multilayered system of deliberative assemblies and institutional devices 
and checks that were intended to transform individual wills and preferences into a com-
mon reason.”).  Until the middle of the eighteenth century, most colonial assemblies in 
America had conducted themselves like courts.  See MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, 
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 54 (1943) (“Not only did the co-
lonial assemblies perform various judicial functions, but most of them also, by their 
equipment and methods of procedure, as well as by specific statements, proclaimed 
themselves to be courts.”); Alison G. Olson, Eighteenth-Century Colonial Legislatures and 
Their Constituents, 79 J. AM. HIST. 543, 559 (1992) (stating that, as state assemblies concen-
trated more on legislation, they “began divesting themselves of judicial functions”). 
332 Justice Paterson described the contrast between proceedings in a court of law and those 
in an assembly in his charge in Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).  
The case involved a dispute over title that the Pennsylvania Assembly had quieted by legis-
lative act.  Paterson argued that the “proofs and allegations” presented to a jury in title 
proceedings in a “court of law” were preservative of individual rights; in the Assembly, in 
contrast, “[t]he proprietor stands afar off, a solitary and unprotected member of the 
community, and is [stripped] of his property, without his consent, without a hearing, 
[and] without notice . . . .”  Id. at 315. 
333 This is what distinguishes “public opinion” theory from mixed government theory.  In 
mixed government theory, the departments of government contend with each other po-
litically, and in so doing limit government; in the theory of “public opinion,” in contrast, 
governmental power is not limited by contending political forces, but by reason, given ef-
fect by appropriate institutional design.  See Sheehan, supra note 329, at 931 (discussing 
Madison’s theory of public opinion). 
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was attached to the case, then it threw into doubt the legitimacy with 
which the judge acted outside legal proceedings, as he often did in the 
decades prior to the Revolution.  Consequently, as the justification 
for judicial review matured in the 1790s, the idea of the “case” began 
to figure more prominently.  Kamper v. Hawkins illustrates this propo-
sition.  Kamper was the “best known and most influential” discussion 
of judicial review in the years before Marbury.334  The leading opinions 
in Kamper, written by Judge Spencer Roane and Judge St. George 
Tucker, defend judicial review in terms familiar from “To the Pub-
lic.”335  Yet the most important issue in the case was not judicial review.  
Instead, it was what judicial acts were legally authoritative. 
The case in Kamper arose out of a 1792 act of the Virginia General 
Assembly altering the state’s system of district courts, which the re-
form party had eventually succeeded in pushing through.336  District 
courts were then staffed on the model of a circuit system, by judges 
sitting on the state’s central General Court.337  The act of 1792 gave 
these judges an authority to stay proceedings by the issuance of an in-
junction, apparently in an effort to “decentralize chancery jurisdic-
tion.”338  The arrangement raised a number of constitutional ques-
tions.  Among these, the most important was the status of the district 
courts relative to the Assembly.  As Judge Tucker put it, the district 
courts were “legislative,” in the sense that the Assembly had created 
them; yet they would exercise powers under the 1792 reform that the 
state Constitution had impliedly given to courts independent of the 
 
334 KRAMER, supra note 34, at 100. 
335 See SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 53 (presenting Tucker’s arguments); HOBSON, supra note 
112, at 65. 
336 See GERBER, supra note 258, at 65.  The district courts were intermediate courts, which 
Madison and other reformers had finally succeeded in creating in the late 1780s.  See infra 
note 341. 
337 See 13 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL 
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 
430 (1823) (reprinting the laws of Virginia relating to judges in the general court). 
338 HOBSON, supra note 112, at 45; see HENING, supra note 337, at 432–33 (providing a law 
relating to “[t]he district courts in term time”).  Virginia law granted jurisdiction over 
causes in chancery to the high court of chancery, which was staffed by judges in chancery.  
HENING, supra note 337, at 406 (providing a law relating ot the jurisdiction of this court).  
The 1776 Constitution made judges in chancery independent of the assembly.  See 
VIRGINIA CONST. OF 1776 (“The Legislative, Executive and Judiciary Departments, shall be 
separate and distinct . . . .”). 
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Assembly.339  Such an arrangement threatened to undermine the 
state’s commitment to the separation of powers.340 
Arguably, the judges had a precedent they could use to invalidate 
the questionable provisions in the 1792 act.  The act of 1788 creating 
the district courts had originally staffed them using judges commis-
sioned to sit on the state’s Court of Appeals.341  This arrangement sig-
nificantly increased the workload of Court of Appeals judges, who 
viewed it as an end-run around judicial salary protections in the 
state’s Constitution.342  In April 1788, several months before the dis-
trict court term was to begin, Court of Appeals judges refused to ap-
point district court clerks, preventing the district courts from operat-
ing.343  They defended their action in a “Respectful Remonstrance of 
the Court of Appeals,” which argued that the 1788 act was an uncon-
stitutional diminution of salary.344  Along the way, the “Remonstrance” 
observed that the state Constitution “seems to require” judges of the 
different constitutional courts to be distinct persons—a principle that 
the 1792 district court act arguably violated.345  The judges closed with 
an appeal to the Assembly for reform—and, failing that, to the peo-
ple themselves, “whose servants both [the judges and legislators] 
are.”346 
The Kamper court was thus possessed of a friendly precedent.  Yet 
there was disagreement on the bench as to whether “Remonstrance” 
 
339 See Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 21 (1793) (discussing the jurisdiction and 
powers of the district courts). 
340 See VIRGINIA CONST. OF 1776.  Virginia was unique in this regard.  See GERBER, supra note 
258, at 61 (“A number of states declared in their respective bills of rights that the separa-
tion of powers was a right guaranteed to the people.  However, none phrased that right 
with as much concern for the independence of the judiciary as did Virginia.”). 
341 See GERBER, supra note 258, at 64 (“[T]he District Court Act of January 1788 . . . required 
existing court of appeals judges to sit on newly established district courts without addi-
tional compensation.”); ROEBER, supra note 311, at 193–201 (discussing Madison’s role in 
court reform). 
342 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 560.  See generally Cases of the Judges of the Court of 
Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135 (Va. 1788). 
343 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 562. 
344 Cases of the Judges, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 141. 
345 Id. at 144.  The argument was that General Court judges were made into judges in chan-
cery by the act’s grant of injunctive power.  See Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 22–23 (“This 
is a motion for an injunction, adjourned from the District Court of Dumfries on the con-
stitutionality of the eleventh section of the district court law, which gives the district court 
in term time, or a judge thereof in vacation, the same power of granting injunctions to 
stay proceedings on any judgment obtained *23 in a district court, and of proceeding to 
the dissolution or final hearing of suits commencing by injunction, under the same rules 
and regulations as are now prescribed to the high court of chancery.”) 
346 Cases of the Judges, 8 Va.(4 Call) at 146. 
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was a proper legal authority at all, since it had not decided a case.347  
As Judge James Henry put it, “the question did not then come before 
the court in a judicial manner,” but had been “taken up as a general 
proposition.”348  “Remonstrance” was, wrote Henry, not an opinion in 
“an adjudged case, to be considered as a binding precedent,” but in-
stead “an appeal to the people,” which “looked like a dissolution of 
the government.”349  To Henry’s eye, “Remonstrance” was not an ex-
ercise of proper judicial authority, but an act of resistance producing 
a sort of governmental shutdown.  The “Remonstrance” judges had 
acted out of a duty to prevent violations of the state Constitution, but 
this ‘political’ duty differed from the duty of the judicial office.350  
Henry’s caution on this point might be explained by the state assem-
bly’s reaction to “Remonstrance,” which was to strip the Court of Ap-
peals of jurisdiction and to staff an entirely new high court.351  Judge 
Henry had sat on the Court of Appeals in 1788 and signed the “Re-
monstrance;” after the assembly stripped the court of its jurisdiction, 
he accepted a commission on the General Court, whose judges now 
had no power to hear appeals.  The experience likely encouraged a 
distinction between freestanding ‘resolutions’ and judicial review in 
the context of a case.352 
 
347 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 559–60 (“In expounding law in resolutions rather than 
cases . . . the judges of the Court of Appeals stepped outside the realm in which they 
could expect authority or even independence . . . .”); see also Treanor, supra note 44, at 
513 (“The Cases of the Judges were not actual cases.”). 
348 Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 50. 
349 Id. at 50, 108. 
350 HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 561.  But see GOEBEL, supra note 87, at 129 (treating “Re-
monstrance” as an authority for judges to determine constitutionality). 
351 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 570–71 (“[A]lthough the Assembly left the old Court of 
Appeals undisturbed, it established a new Court of Appeals, with jurisdiction to hear the 
cases depending in the old Court of Appeals and all future appeals.”).  William Treanor 
points out that technically the Court of Appeals judges resigned, and insisted that they 
had done so freely.  See Treanor, supra note 44, at 514. 
352 Judge Tyler also sat on both the “Remonstrance” and Kamper courts.  While Tyler did not 
take up the precedential value of the “Remonstrance” expressly, he did write, 
I will not in an extra-judicial manner assume the right to negative a law . . . but if 
by any legal means I have jurisdiction of a cause, in which it is made a question 
how far the law be a violation of the constitution, and therefore of no obligation, I 
shall not shrink from a comparison of the two, and pronounce sentence as my 
mind may receive conviction.—To be made an agent, therefore, for the purpose 
of violating the Constitution, I cannot consent to.—As a citizen, I should complain of 
it; as a public servant, filling an office in the one of the great departments of government, I 
should be a traitor to my country to do it.”   
  Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 61 (emphasis added). 
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Others on the Kamper court, however, disagreed with Judge Henry 
and thought the “Remonstrance” a binding legal precedent.353  Judge 
Tucker observed that “decisions of the supreme court of appeals in 
this commonwealth . . . are to be resorted to by all other courts, as 
expounding, in their truest sense, the laws of the land.”354  He then 
turned to “the authority of a previous decision of that court, on a sim-
ilar question”—i.e., the “Remonstrance”—and described it as the 
outcome of something like litigation in a court of law.355  He quoted 
court records, which read, “[o]n consideration of a late act of assem-
bly, . . . after several conferences, and upon mature deliberation, the 
court do adjudge that clerks of the said [district] courts ought not now 
to be appointed.”356  Tucker observed that the Court of Appeals could 
hardly have avoided the issue, since the 1788 act obligated the judges 
to hire clerks, thereby forcing them to consider the constitutional is-
sues the act raised.357  The judges “found themselves obliged to de-
cide, whatever temporary inconveniencies [sic] might arise, and in 
that decision to declare, that the constitution and the act were in op-
position . . . .”358  Such a declaration did not pass beyond conventional 
judicial powers, since, as the Court of Appeals itself had explained, 
“when they [i.e., the judiciary] decide between an act of the people, 
and an act of the legislature, they are within the line of their duty, 
declaring what the law is, and not making a new law.”359  Thus, while 
Tucker could not plausibly argue that the “Remonstrance” had actu-
ally decided a case, he could argue that the process resembled adju-
dication enough to make the “Remonstrance” an authoritative ex-
pression of the law. 
Tucker’s notion of judicial duty—the duty to expound the law in 
the course of adjudication—then became the centerpiece of his and 
Judge Roane’s famous defenses of judicial review.  Their defenses are 
thus best understood as describing institutional contours for that 
power.  Tucker begins with the principal objection to locating this 
power in courts:  the assumption that the Constitution is “a rule to 
the legislature only, and not to the judiciary, or the executive; . . . [and 
thus] neither the executive nor the judiciary can resort to it.”360  This 
 
353 HOBSON, supra note 112, at 45 (arguing that the Kamper decision was similar to Marbury v. 
Madison due to the court’s constitutional scrunity and refusal of additional jurisdiction). 
354 Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 93. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. at 94–95. 
357 Id. 
358 Id. at 95. 
359 Id. at 107. 
360 Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 77 (Va. 1793) (emphasis added). 
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view, he says, is a concomitant of the English system, in which the 
Constitution is determined by usage alone, making acts of Parliament 
constitutive of fundamental law.361  English courts of law thus have no 
choice, Tucker says, but to “receive whatever exposition of [the Consti-
tution] the legislature might think proper to make.”362  American 
courts of law, in contrast, need not accept the legislature’s view.  
Since American constitutions are written, they govern judges “on eve-
ry occasion, where it becomes necessary to expound what the law is.”363  
To expound the law, judges have to examine the Constitution, since 
the Constitution is “the first law of the land.”364  Indeed, observes 
Tucker, under the Virginia Constitution’s provision for separation of 
powers, “the duty of expounding must be exclusively vested in the ju-
diciary.”365  Tucker thus appears to believe that both the judiciary and 
the executive can “resort” to the Constitution, but only judges “ex-
pound” it.  Roane makes a similar argument.366 
The idea of a “case” thus figured centrally in the version of the 
Standard Justification presented by Tucker and Roane.  In contrast, 
the principles of popular disobedience play at best a subordinate 
role.  Had popular disobedience sufficed to support judicial review, 
the “Remonstrance” could have stood on its own feet; instead, Tucker 
had to refashion it as an adjudicated case, somewhat unconvincingly, 
to show that the judges who issued it had remained within their “line 
of duty.”  In this sense, American practices in the last decade of the 
eighteenth century came more into line with the English notions of 
judicial duty that Philip Hamburger has described.  But this was the 
product of institutional reform and politics, not simply an inher-
itance of English ideas.367  By intrinsically connecting review to the ad-
 
361 Id. at 78. 
362 Id. (emphasis added). 
363 Id. (emphasis added).  For the written character of American constitutions as crucial, see 
HOBSON, supra note 112, at 65. 
364 Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 78.   
365 Id. at 79 (emphasis added).  Notably, Tucker had advanced the same position in 1782, 
during his argument in the Case of the Prisoners.  See Treanor, supra note 44, at 522–23, 
554–55 (“Echoing his argument in the Case of the Prisoners, Tucker in Kamper appealed to 
‘the text of the Constitution, and the spirit of our government.’ He noted that the legisla-
ture had repealed statutes that were ‘contrary to the true spirit of the Constitution.’”). 
366 See Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.)  at 38–39 (Opinion of Roane, J.) (“It is the province of the 
judiciary to expound the laws, and to adjudge cases which may be brought before 
them . . . . In expounding laws, the judiciary considers every law which relates to the sub-
ject:  would you have them to shut their eyes against that law which is of the highest au-
thority of any . . . ?”). 
367 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 283 (“As in England, so in each American state, a con-
stitution made with the authority of the people was part of the law of the land, and the 
judges had a duty to decide in accord with the law of the land, including the Constitu-
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judication of a case, Tucker effectively narrowed the judicial office.  
Outside the confines of a case, the judge acted only as a citizen—not 
as a ‘magistrate,’ or officer of the government, the role he had played 
before the Revolution and in the first decade after.  In effect, then, 
the forum was shaping the office; the American court of law was creat-
ing the American judge. 
C.  “Expounding” the Law, and its Variants 
By the turn of the century it was widely understood that the core 
function of a court of law was to decide cases.  Deciding cases re-
quired courts to “expound” the law.  As Marshall put it in Marbury, 
those who apply a legal rule to cases, “must of necessity expound and 
interpret that rule.”368  What did it mean, in the late eighteenth cen-
tury, to “expound” a legal rule? 
To “expound” a rule was not merely to state it or describe it.  As 
Philip Hamburger has shown, judges in the English tradition had an 
authority to explain the law,369 and this idea, which retained currency 
through the eighteenth century, was sometimes expressed with “ex-
pound.”  Samuel Johnson’s 1768 and 1792 English dictionaries define 
“expound” as meaning “[t]o explain; to clear; to interpret,” and “to 
 
tion.  Much was different after 1776, but these basics and what they required of judges 
remained largely the same.”).  Hamburger does acknowledge changes in the practices of 
American judges, see id. at 536–74, but it is unclear how those developments should be 
understood in light of his basic thesis that judicial review emerges out of “the common 
law ideals of law and judicial duty . . . taken together . . . .” Id. at 17.  The office of the ear-
ly American judge was not a strictly judicial office; it was the office of a magistrate, and in 
acting, the American judicial magistrate drew on his political authority and his position as 
a community leader.  See supra note 314; NELSON, supra note 50, at 12–14.  In my view, 
when reformers sought to position courts of law as checks on popular assemblies in the 
mid-1780s, the English common-law ideals Hamburger describes—which the elite under-
stood and accepted, even if those ideals did not describe the actual practices of courts—
served as a convenient vocabulary for pressing their case. 
368 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
369 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 219–20 (“At common law, when judges explained their 
judgments, they reasoned or exercised judgment with the authority of their office.”).  
The Middle English term from which “expound” derived could connote a sort of public 
explanation of meaning.  See Expôunen Definitions 1 and 2, MIDDLE ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
(2001), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/m/mec/med-idx? type=id&id=
MED14979; Expounen Definitions 1 and 2, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 317 (2013), avail-
able at http://oed.com/view/Entry/66731?redirectedFrom=expounen&.  The English 
term came by way of the French “espundre”; the Anglo-Norman Dictionary defines 
“espundre” as meaning “to explain, interpret,” “to mean, signify,” and “to fulfil [sic].”  
Espundre Definition, ANGLO-NORMAN DICTIONARY (2007), available at http://www.anglo-
norman.net/gate/index.shtml?session=SAB119369T1391560465.  The Latin form “ex-
ponere,” from which the French derived, had a similar meaning.  OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, supra. 
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examine, to lay open.”370  Late-eighteenth century American legal 
sources confirm this usage, in some cases by interchanging “explain” 
with “expound.”  In the notes that lawyer St. George Tucker prepared 
in 1782 for his argument in Commonwealth v. Caton, he asserts that it is 
“uncontrovertible . . . that the power properly belonging to the Judi-
ciary Department, is, to explain the Laws of the Land as they apply to 
particular cases.”371  Eleven years later, now on the bench, Judge 
Tucker reasoned in Kamper that the Constitution should be resorted 
to “on every occasion, where it becomes necessary to expound what the 
law is,” and that “the duty of expounding must be exclusively vested 
in the judiciary.”372  Other prominent jurists interchanged the terms, 
or interchanged “explain” with terms like “construe” or “construct.”373  
Overall, usage was somewhat uneven; but there was, nevertheless, a 
substantive difference between explaining and merely restating a 
rule, or simply defining its terms.  A court explaining the law might 
equitably reject an expression’s plain meaning in favor of one suited 
to the intent of the legislature or the purpose of a legal instrument.374  
 
370 See JOHNSON, supra note 290, at (defining “interpret”); SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1792).  The 1792 dictionary defines “interpret” as 
meaning “to explain; to translate; to decipher; to give a solution of,” which is largely the 
same as the 1768 definition. 
371 Treanor, supra note 44, at 522 (emphasis added). 
372 Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 78–79 (Va. 1793) (emphasis added). 
373 See, e.g., Turner v. Turner’s Ex’x, 8 Va. (4 Call) 234, 237 (Va. 1792) (“It is the business of 
the legislators to make the laws; and of the judges to expound them.  Having made the 
law, the legislature have no authority afterwards to explain its operation upon things al-
ready done under it.”).  “Explain” might also be used interchangeably with “construe” or 
“construct.”  See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395 (1798) (Chase, J.) (“I am under a 
necessity to give a construction, or explanation of the words, ‘ex post facto law,’ because they 
have not any certain meaning attached to them.”); “Brutus” (Jan. 31, 1788), in THE ANTI-
FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 189, at 
293, 294–295  (“The cases arising under the Constitution must include such, as bring into 
question its meaning, and will require an explanation of the nature and extent of the 
powers of the different departments under it. . . . This article vests the courts with author-
ity . . . to explain [the Constitution] according to the rules laid down for construing a 
law.”). In a later period, John Reid quotes Daniel Webster as describing law as “composed 
of received rules and received explanations.”  REID, CONTROLLING, supra note 248, at 39. 
374 See, e.g., Cole v. Clayburn, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 262, 264 (1794) (argument of attorney Duval) 
(arguing that a will could “with propriety receive a different exposition.  It is not unusual, 
in the construction of wills, and even of deeds, to enlarge, or limit the meaning of partic-
ular words, so as to fit them to the subject on which they are meant to operate, and to 
avoid contradiction or absurdity”); ”Brutus” (Jan. 31, 1788), supra note 373, at 295 (“By 
[the grant of equity jurisdiction], they are empowered, to explain the constitution ac-
cording to the reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter.”).  
Philip Hamburger has argued that expounding in this sense was limited to equitable rules 
of interpretation.  See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 336–57 (“They [judges] could some-
times avoid minor injustices and inconvenience through mechanisms such as equity and 
equitable interpretation, [but] they could not hold a government act unlawful for being 
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Pressed to its limits, explaining was clearly a creative act.  As the au-
thors of an open letter criticizing the decision in Rutgers v. Wadding-
ton fumed, rather than “speak the plain and obvious meaning of the 
law,” a court could “explain it to mean any thing or nothing.”375  Simi-
lar criticisms were directed at judicial “construction.”376  In this sense, 
“expounding” or “construing” or “constructing” the law was not 
merely restating it or defining its key terms.377 
Yet expounding the law was also not changing the law.  It was con-
sistent with obeying the law.  “A Constitution,” said Madison in a late 
letter, “is to be expounded and obeyed, not controlled or varied.”378  
Delegates at the federal convention repeatedly insisted that “the 
power of making ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding 
the laws,” a basic principle in Montesquieu’s version of separation of 
powers.379  Outside the convention, as well, reformers argued that the 
powers to expound and to make law should be placed in different 
hands.380  If expounding and its variants were thought to be creative 
 
unjust, not useful, or otherwise unreasonable.”).  This is consistent with Blackstone, but I 
doubt the practice can be cabined in this way.  Whatever the black letter law, the lines 
separating equitable and common law doctrines of interpretation were historically po-
rous.  See Boyer, supra note 308, at 71–79 (discussing Coke’s views).  Unsurprisingly, then, 
it is often unclear whether a court is invoking an equitable or common law doctrine of in-
terpretation.  See, e.g., Ham v. McClaws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93 (S.C. Com. Pls. Gen. Sess. 
1789); 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 81, at 424–28 (citing the argument of J. M. Varnum in 
Trevett v. Weeden). 
375 Melaneton Smith et al., To the People of New York. N.Y. PACKET AND AM. ADVERTISER, Nov. 4, 
1784, at 1. 
376 See, e.g., “Brutus” (Jan. 31, 1788), supra note 373, at 300. 
377 In this respect, there are obvious similarities between the usage of “expound” and “con-
struct” in the late eighteenth century, and the interpretation-construction distinction so 
popular today.  See Larry B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95, 96 (2010) (claiming that “the difference between interpretation and con-
struction is real and fundamental”).  However, the modern thesis that it is a “political 
task” to construct a text, rather than merely interpret it, see KEITH WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 6 (1999), does not appear to be supported by the late-
eighteenth century sources examined here. 
378 Letter from James Madison to Charles Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4 ELLIOT, supra note 
122, at 615, 615.  See also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 448 (1793) (Iredell, J.) 
(“[T]he distinct boundaries of law and Legislation may be confounded, in a manner that 
would make Courts arbitrary, and in effect makers of a new law, instead of being (as cer-
tainly they alone ought to be) expositors of an existing one.”). 
379 5 ELLIOT, supra note 122, at 345 (statement of Caleb Strong); see also id. at 345 (statement 
of Elbridge Gerry) (arguing that the proposed Council of Revision “was making the ex-
positors of the laws the legislators, which ought never to be done”).  On the origin of this 
principle in Montesquieu, see GWYN, supra note 82, at 105. 
380 See, e.g., REID, supra note 58, at 32 (“[W]e think it our duty solemnly to protest 
against . . . the dangerous precedent of one person holding the aforesaid offices, being at 
the same time a Legislator in New-Hampshire, and Judge of the Federal Court . . . where 
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acts, then, their creativity operated within certain limits, set by the 
norms of the explanatory process.  That process involved fitting a le-
gal rule into a more comprehensive body of law.  “In expounding the 
laws,” said Judge Roane in Kamper, “the judiciary considers every law 
which relates to the subject.”381  In this respect, Roane was mimicking 
Blackstone, who observed at the outset of the Commentaries that the 
“academical expounder of the laws . . . should consider his course as 
a general map of the law, marking out the shape of the country, its 
connections and boundaries, its greater divisions and principal cit-
ies[.]”382  The seventeenth century common law had aimed merely at 
local coherence between the present case and earlier decisions, as de-
termined by the judge in deliberation with the parties; but American 
courts under the influence of Blackstone and then Mansfield became 
more ambitious and ‘scientific.’383  They sought to formulate the 
“principles” behind decisions, and then forced those principles into a 
kind of system or overarching theory (sometimes organized around a 
“keyword”), from which an outcome in the present case could be de-
duced.384  As Brutus described it, “the court must and will assume cer-
tain principles, from which they will reason, in forming their deci-
sions.”385  Ten years later, in 1798, Jesse Root was even more 
deductive; he argued that the “principles” and “precepts” of the 
 
as Judge he may explain and interpret laws which as Legislator he assisted to make . . . .” 
(quoting Jeremiah Smith, Osbourne’s Spy, Jan. 13, 1790)). 
381 Kamper  v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1. Va. Cas.) 20, 38 (Va. 1793). 
382 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at *26. 
383 On the classical common law, see LOBBAN, supra note 309, at 57–58; GERALD J. POSTEMA, 
BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 31–37 (1986).  On American jurisprudence, 
see HOBSON, supra note 112, at 34–35; WHITE, supra note 307, at 79, 81–82; Daniel J. 
Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights:  “Navigability” and the Transformation of the Common Law in the 
Nineteenth Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1058–59 (2002).  On the institutionalist tra-
dition in which Blackstone wrote, see JOHN LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER ET AL., 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW:  THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS 839 (2009). 
384 See Hulsebosch, supra note 383, at 1051 (“Keywords, signifying abstract principles, became 
the benchmarks of legal reasoning.”); S.F.C. Milsom, The Nature of Blackstone’s Achievement, 
1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 1, 9 (1981) (referencing “abstract principles”); Powell, supra 
note 191, at 965 (“Taylor instead described the Federal Constitution as designed to em-
body the ‘master principles and comprehensive truths’ of political morality and thereby 
“to give them practical effect.”) (citation omitted); Treanor, supra note 44, at 526 (de-
scribing Justice Paterson’s charge in Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, which focused on “first 
principles”). 
385 “Brutus” (Feb. 7, 1788), in   THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 189, at 298, 299; accord 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 159, at 451 (statement of James 
Wilson) (“When [an unconstitutional law] comes to be discussed before the judges—
when they consider its principles and find it to be incompatible with the superior power of 
the Constitution, it is their duty to pronounce it void.”) (emphasis added). 
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common law “enable[] us, to explain the laws, construe contracts and 
agreements, to distinguish injuries, . . . to determine their degree and 
the reparation in damages which justice requires.”386  In this context, 
the rather modest observation that authorities were inconsistent, or 
mutually “repugnant,” became a matter of central importance, be-
cause it served to measure the degree to which legal rules could be 
regarded as part of the same system.387  Ultimately this is what distin-
guished “expounding” the law from making it.  Expounding was not 
stipulating additional law, but explaining how a judgment followed 
from (and thus was part of) existing law, which itself enjoyed republi-
can legitimacy.388 
Expounding the law thus occupied a middle ground between re-
stating the law and making it.389  It was neither, but instead a sui gene-
ris form of creative-deductive explanation.  The appearance of this 
idea complicates, to some extent, our understanding of the transfor-
mation in the American common law at the turn of the nineteenth 
century.  According to the leading account of that transformation, as-
sociated principally with Morton Horwitz and William Nelson, Ameri-
can courts turned away from a static private-law regime that enforced 
shared community values, towards an instrumental conception of law 
that was flexible and relatively tolerant of self-interested conduct.390  
 
386 1 JESSE ROOT, The Origin of Government and Laws in Connecticut, in REPORTS OF CASES 
ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT AND SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS x (1798). 
387 See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 87, at 141 (“[I]t seems nearly inevitable that the power to ex-
pound statutes would be manipulated to encompass constitutional repugnancy.  The 
precedents for judicial interpretation of legislative intent were many of them old and well 
pedigreed and so much a part of the accepted common law technique of adjudication as 
to minimize political objection.”); cf. Bilder, supra note 77, at 512–13, 541–55 (relating 
repugnancy to judicial review). 
388 See Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 96 (Va. 1793) (“[W]hen they [i.e., the judi-
ciary] decide between an act of the people, and an act of the legislature, they are within 
the line of their duty, declaring what the law is, and not making a new law.”); see also 
HOBSON, supra note 112, at 39 (discussing the need for judges to explain the laws via ju-
dicial discretion); Chapman & McConnell, supra note 284, at 1748–49 (discussing Kent’s 
opinion in Dash v. Van Kleeck which was based on “legal principle[s]”); cf. WHITE, supra 
note 309, at 79 (noting that American legal commentators in the first decades of the 
nineteenth century “set out . . . to establish themselves as professional guardians of repub-
lican principles, persons whose special knowledge of ‘legal science’ enabled them to re-
cast law in conformity with the assumptions of republican government”). 
389 See Bilder, supra note 54, at 1141–42 (“To expound law suggests interpretation from a 
particular source—interpretation the way judges do it or the way a judicial tradition un-
derstands it.”). 
390 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 7–9, 22–
27 (1992) (discussing “[t]he [s]tructure of [c]lassical [l]egal [t]hought”); NELSON, supra 
note 72, at 36–37, 143–44, 163–64 (discussing the changes in law); Hulsebosch, supra note 
383, at 1051–1052 (“[Nelson and Horwitz] characterize law before that time as static and 
communal rather than uncreative.”). 
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Under the former regime, we are told, judges were bound by a strict 
doctrine of precedent, and their task was merely to discover preexist-
ing law; by the turn of the century, a new ideology had emerged in 
which judges could openly describe themselves as making law.391  Ex-
pounding, however, fits into neither of these categories; it was neither 
discovering the law nor making it.  Expounding was creative, but 
without amounting to an expression of will.  It was creative reason.  A 
republican judge could not persuade litigants to comply with the 
court’s judgment by making public law—his office did not extend so 
far.  He had to show litigants how that judgment was rooted in their 
law, including their fundamental law, in order to give it traction.392 
The proposition that expounding the law means explaining it 
makes sense of much of what the Framers said on the topic.  First, it 
makes sense of why the Framers “almost invariably” related expound-
ing to judicial review.393  As Elbridge Gerry put it, “exposition of the 
laws . . . involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality.”394  
The point came up repeatedly at the Philadelphia Convention, as 
delegates tried to sort through their views on the proposed Council 
of Revision.395  The only delegate to deny the connection was John 
Mercer, who likely rejected judicial review altogether.396  Outside the 
convention, as well, the connection between expounding the law and 
judicial review was drawn, again and again—by Brutus,397 by Hamilton 
 
391 See, e.g., HORWITZ  supra note 390, at 9, 23 (discussing judges’ responses to the “public 
purpose” doctrine); NELSON, supra note 72, at 19–20, 171–72 (discussing the changing 
role of judges). 
392 In this sense, expounding the law was part of a larger judicial project of serving as the 
community’s “republican schoolmaster.”  See generally Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as 
Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127.  I discuss Lerner’s important essay further 
below.  See infra Part III.D. 
393 Corwin, supra note 146, at 561; see also BERGER, supra note 184, at 55–56 (referencing 
Corwin). 
394 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 97. 
395 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 73 (discuss-
ing Wilson’s argument); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra 
note 150, at 78 (presenting the arguments of George Mason); cf. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 76 (presenting the argument of Luther 
Martin) (“As to the Constitutionality of laws, that point will come before the Judges in 
their proper official character.”). 
396 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 298 (document-
ing the statement of John Mercer disapproving of “the Judges as expositors of the Consti-
tution”); see BERGER, supra note 184, at 63 (describing Mercer as against judicial review).  
See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text. 
397 See “Brutus” (Feb. 7, 1788), supra note 385, at 299 (“[T]he courts are vested with the su-
preme and uncontrollable power, to determine, in all cases that come before them, what 
the constitution means; they cannot, therefore, execute a law, which, in their judgment, 
opposes the constitution . . . .”). 
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in Federalist 78,398 and later by Judge Roane in Kamper,399 among many 
others.  In Hamilton’s hands it took on a highly ‘positive’ character; 
expounding the law became the task of “interpreting conflicting stat-
utes,” a label that was, perhaps, easier to swallow.400  But this point, 
which is often made, should not obscure Hamilton’s description of 
what a court of law actually does when it interprets a statute.  Hamil-
ton says that the court must determine whether the statute can be 
made to cohere with “the laws,” meaning all laws, including the Con-
stitution (“fundamental law”), which the court does by describing the 
statute’s “sense.”401  Hamilton’s ‘interpreting’ judge thus does much 
more than give meaning to the words of a statute.402  He locates the 
statute within a state’s comprehensive body of law, which forces him 
to determine whether there is “an irreconcilable variance” between 
the statute and the Constitution.403  Only then can he adjudge the 
lawful outcome in the case.  It is this process that, as Gerry put it, “in-
volve[s]” a power of determining whether the statute is constitution-
al.404 
Second, this account of expounding the law explains why most 
Framers associated exposition with courts of law alone, and, in par-
ticular, with judges.  Here the evidence is considerable, as others have 
noted.405  There were three powers of government, said the Address of 
the 1781 New Hampshire constitutional convention:  “The legislative, 
or power of making laws—The judicial, or power of expounding and 
applying them to each particular case—And the executive, to carry 
 
398 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is far more rational to suppose, that 
the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legisla-
ture . . . to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.”). 
399 Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 38 (Va. 1793) (“It is the province of the judici-
ary to expound the laws . . . . It may say . . . that an act of assembly has not changed the 
Constitution, though its words are expressly to that effect . . . .”). 
400 See, e.g., SNOWISS, supra note 46, at 77–78 (discussing Hamilton’s arguments in Federalist 
No. 78). 
401 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
402 As Dean Alfange has argued, drawing on Judge Gibson’s influential dissent in Eakin v. 
Raub, simply as applying a legal rule to a case need not involve the Constitution at all.  
Alfange, supra note 46, at 424–25 (citing Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sergeant & Rawle (Pa. 1825) 
(Gibson, J., dissenting)); cf. 1 GOEBEL, supra note 87, at 111 (“The effect of the declara-
tions that nothing repugnant to the constitution [was] in the law hitherto observed or the 
common law, as the case might be, was to require the courts to make what amounted to 
political decisions.”). 
403 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
404 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 97. 
405 See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Intellectual Background of Marbury v. Madison, in ARGUING 
MARBURY V. MADISON 47, 51 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) (“There is no dispute, however, 
that judges’ primary role was as expositors of the common law.  On this, even Coke and 
Blackstone agreed.”). 
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them into effect.”406  The idea became commonplace in the late 
1780s.  As described above, a principal objection in Philadelphia to 
the Council of Revision was that it might interfere with a judge’s de-
termination of constitutionality in his capacity as an “expositor[] of 
the Law[].”407  Others agreed, but nothing similar was said of the Pres-
ident.408  In the years that followed, leading jurists repeatedly ex-
pressed the view that it was the role of the judiciary to expound the 
law.  The idea appeared in Pendleton:  “It is the business of the legis-
lators to make the laws; and of the judges to expound them.”409  In 
Roane:  “It is the province of the judiciary to expound the laws, and 
to adjudge cases which may be brought before them . . . .”410  In 
Tucker:  “This exposition it is the duty and office of the judiciary to 
make.”411  And in Iredell:  courts “alone ought to be[] expositors of an 
existing [law].”412  Variations on the theme included a judicial duty to 
“declare the law” or to “construe” it, although the term “declare” 
might also be used to express older ideas about the judicial discovery 
of law.413  The ideas were not limited to Federalists or to supporters of 
 
406 An Address of the Convention for Framing a New Constitution of Government for the 
State of New-Hampshire 7 (1781). 
407 See supra notes 211–15, 396–97.  The quoted language comes from 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 73 (statement of James Wilson). 
408 E.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 98 (state-
ment of Rufus King relating to judges); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, supra note 150, at 75 (statement of Calen Strong)(“The Judges in exercising the 
function of expositors might be influenced by the part they had taken, in framing the 
laws.”); id. at 79 (statement of Nathanial Ghorum) (“Judges ought to carry into the expo-
sition of the laws no prepossessions with regard to them.”); BERGER, supra note 184, at 61 
(“Charles Pinckney ‘opposed the interference of the Judges in the Legislative busi-
ness . . . .’”) (citation omitted); accord THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It 
is impossible to keep the judges too distinct from every other avocation than that of ex-
pounding the laws.”).  King again expressed the view that judges were expositors during 
the debate over Jay’s appointment to head a delegation to England.  “[T]he judge in this 
business on their [the North Carolina senators’] opinion should a new Treaty be made 
will become a legislator, and on his return will assume the judicial Chair, and be the Ex-
positor and Judge of his own legislation.”  CASTO, supra note 237, at 89. 
409 Turner v. Turner’s Ex’r, 8 Va. (4 Call) 234, 237 (Va. 1792) (opinion of Pendleton, J.); see 
also Kennon v. McRoberts & Wife, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 96, 99 (Va. Ct. App. 1792) (Opinion of 
Pendleton, J.) (Judges “disclaim all legislative power to change the law, and only assume 
our proper province of declaring what the law is . . . .”). 
410 Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 38 (Va. 1793). 
411 Id. at 78. 
412 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 448 (1793) (Opinion of Iredell, J.). 
413 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 7 (Va. 1782) (Opinion of Wythe, J.) 
(“[T]he tribunals, who hold neither [the power of the purse nor the sword], are called 
upon to declare the law impartially between them.”); Address of Melancton Smith’s Committee 
(1784) in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON:  DOCUMENTS AND 
COMMENTARY, supra note 90, at 314 (“The design of courts of justice in our government, 
from the very nature of their institution, is to declare laws, not to alter them.”); Henry 
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judicial review.414  In a 1788 letter to James Madison opposing judicial 
review, Alexander White wrote, “[t]he duty of the judges, men hold-
ing office for life and exempt from legislative punishment, was to ex-
pound the laws.”415 
If one thinks of expounding as a kind of deductive explanation, 
then the logic that gripped this generation of commentators is not 
hard to understand.  Judges heard cases; cases were disputes present-
ed forensically; these disputes were supposed to be resolved neutrally, 
i.e., without bias or favoritism; expounding the law was a means for 
the judge to do so, and to publicly demonstrate the fact.  By ex-
pounding the law, the court could show that its resolution of the case 
followed from the law of the community, rather than political preju-
dice, passion or whim.  Courts of law were suited to expounding be-
cause of the nature of forensic litigation, discussed above;416 and 
judges were suited to expounding because, said Oliver Ellsworth, they 
had “a systematic and accurate knowledge of the Laws.”417  At least, 
they were supposed to.  That was the aim of reformers in Philadelph-
ia, Virginia, New Hampshire, and elsewhere, who hoped to place 
trained lawyers on the bench, presiding over courts conducted ac-
cording to (adapted) common law procedures.418  In a sense, “ex-
pounding” the law was a descriptive claim that embedded within it a 
series of normative claims—about the way proceedings in a court of 
 
Lee, Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 22, 1799), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 136, 138–39 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“It is their 
province [i.e., the federal courts’ province], and their duty to construe the constitution 
and the laws, and it cannot be doubted, but that they will perform this duty faithfully and 
truthfully.”). 
414 See Powell, supra note 191, at 981 (“[T]here was general agreement, over a broad range of 
political and constitutional opinion, about the special responsibility of the judiciary in 
constitutional interpretation.”). 
415 Letter from Alexander White to James Madison (Aug. 16, 1788), in THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON DIGITAL EDITION 232 (J.C.A. Stagg ed., 2010); cf. REID, CONTROLLING, supra 
note 248, at 117 (“[A] jury legally enpanelled is a tribunal independent of the Court, as 
the Court is of the Jury—each independent in their own department . . . it is the duty of 
the Court to sum up the evidence, and expound the law to the Jury—that after the Jury 
return their verdict, the Court have no right to set it aside . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
416 See supra notes 305–10 and accompanying text. 
417 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 73–74. 
418 See REID, CONTROLLING, supra note 248, at 95–130 (describing the reform movement in 
New Hampshire and the counter-reform movement based on “common sense jurispru-
dence”); REID, supra note 58, at 122–34 (discussing New Hampshire Judge Jeremiah 
Smith).  For Virginia, see supra notes 311–32 and accompanying text (detailing the exten-
sive reform efforts in Virginia).  On the expectations of national reformers, see JAY, supra 
note 237, at 60–61 (discussing the reforms considered by the Founders in Philadelphia).  
However, to the extent that Stewart Jay describes the expectations of those at Philadelph-
ia as growing out of the settled practices of American courts, I disagree with the analysis. 
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law ought to be conducted, about the role of judges and juries in the-
se proceedings, and about the institutional function of courts within 
government—each associated with its own movement for reform.  
The actual practices of American courts were, at least in some states, 
distant from reformer ideals.419  In jurisdictions like New Hampshire, 
those opposed to reform drew on deep feelings of anti-
professionalism to support what John Reid has called a “common 
sense jurisprudence,” in which the jury largely determined the law.420  
To the extent that jurors were regularly expected to make substantive 
judgments about the law—say, because they had received different 
charges from the different judges sitting in a case—juries could be 
said to share in the power of expounding the law.421  This role only at-
rophied with time.422 
Even among reformers, expounding the law was not universally 
associated with judges or courts of law.  At Philadelphia, Madison re-
peatedly used the term to describe the interpretative activity of the 
President and the national legislature.  For example, he observed that 
judicial independence was important to prevent judges from being 
“tempted to cultivate the Legislature . . . and thus render the Legisla-
ture the virtual expositor, as well as the maker of the laws.”423  Madi-
son then drew a comparison between the executive and the judiciary:  
“The latter executed the laws in certain cases as the former did in 
others.  The former expounded & applied them for certain purposes, 
as the latter did for others.”424  In Madison’s mind, all three depart-
 
419 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 51–59 (3d ed. 2005); Tarr, supra 
note 285, at 652–61.  In some cases, reformers would pronounce an independent and 
strong federal judiciary necessary to protect liberty, while accepting a dependent and 
weak judiciary at home.  See REID, supra note 58, at 62, 111, 115–20 (describing the lack of 
judicial independence in New Hampshire despite reform efforts at the federal level). 
420 See REID, CONTROLLING, supra note 248, at 18–32, 108–10 (discussing “[j]urisprudence of 
[c]ommon [s]ense”). 
421 By another view—the view held by many reformers—juries were not applying legal rules 
at all, but deciding cases on an ad hoc basis, according to “passion” or “prejudice.”  See 
REID, supra note 58, at 24 (preseting the argument that juries followed “their passions and 
prejudices”); REID, CONTROLLING, supra note 248, at 32 (arguing that juries decided cases 
based on impulses). 
422 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 419, at 19 (discussing how justice evolved over time); HORWITZ, 
supra note 390, at 28–29 (discussing the changing relationships between judges and ju-
ries).  This may be because the power of the jury to determine the law was regarded by 
some as a centerpiece of republican government; John Adams is the obvious example 
here.  See, e.g., STIMSON, supra note 80, at 78–84. 
423 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 32. 
424 Id.; see also id. at 342 (“Mr. Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to extend 
the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising Under the Constitution, & whether 
it ought not to be limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature.  The right of expounding the 
Constitution in cases not of this nature ought not to be given to that Department.”).  As 
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ments expounded the law.  This view reappeared in Federalist 44, 
where Madison assured his audience that Congress’s ability to extend 
its power beyond constitutional limits would depend “[i]n the first in-
stance . . . on the executive and judicial departments, which are to 
expound and give effect to the legislative acts.”425  As a member of the 
First Congress, during the debate on the President’s removal power, 
Madison argued that “an exposition of the Constitution may come 
with as much propriety from the Legislature, as any other department 
of the Government,” at least as “it relates to a doubtful part of the 
Constitution.”426 
It is clear that Madison did not associate expounding with courts 
alone.  He was in the minority in this regard.427  Still, it should be not-
ed that there is some support for the view that Madison did recognize 
the distinctive role courts played in explaining law, as opposed to its 
“exposition,” which was a matter committed, in Madison’s usage, to 
each of the coordinate departments.  As early as the Virginia ratifying 
convention, for example, Madison observed that it was “a misfortune 
that, in organizing any government, the explication of its authority 
should be left to any of its coordinate branches. . . . There is a new 
policy of submitting it to the judiciary of the United States.”428  Much 
later, he connected this explanatory role to the nature of proceedings 
in a court of law.  Madison observed that it was in “the judicial de-
partment” that constitutional questions generally found “their ulti-
mate discussion and operative decision,” noting that “the public def-
erence to and confidence in the judgment of the body are peculiarly 
inspired by the qualities in its members; by the gravity and delibera-
tion of their proceedings; and by the advantage their plurality gives 
them” over the other departments.429  Arguably, late in his life Madi-
son connected judicial review to judicial explanation of the law, just 
as his peers had.  By that date, the movements to standardize legal 
procedure, to professionalize the judiciary and the bar, and to devel-
 
Philip Hamburger has noted, in this speech Madison uses “case” to mean something 
broader than action or litigation.  HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 541–43 (discussing Mad-
ison’s attempt to qualify the meaning of “cases”). 
425 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (Alexander Hamilton). 
426 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 461 (1834); see WARREN, supra note 229, at 99–102 (discussing early 
constitutional debates); Corwin, supra note 146, at 563–64 (discussing Madison’s argu-
ments).  The view was not confined to Madison.  See Powell, supra note 191, at 975–76 
(presenting the view of Fisher Ames). 
427 See HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 548–52 (discussing “theoretical explanations for judicial 
authority). 
428 3 ELLIOT, supra note 122, at 532. 
429 Letter From James Madison (1834), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF MADISON: 
FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 349–50 (1867). 
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op a body of ‘scientific’ American legal literature had firmly taken 
root.430 
D.  “Expounding” During the Repeal Act Debate 
The proposition that courts decided cases by expounding the law 
proved to be both a persistent one and a fragile ideal.  It played a 
leading role in the debate over repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801.  
Discussants on both sides of the aisle used the idea both to defend 
the newly created circuit courts from legislative dissolution and to 
criticize the political conduct of federal judges, especially their extra-
judicial activity. 
There is little question that most of the congressmen who spoke 
on the subject of judicial power during the Repeal Act debate 
thought it was the role of the judiciary to expound the law.  Federal-
ists broached the issue as they tried to describe, in lurid detail, the 
implications of what they regarded as a Republican effort to under-
mine judicial independence.  As Jonathan Mason put it, the federal 
judiciary had been made independent because it was their duty “to 
expound and apply the laws.”431  And it was this duty, said Mason, 
which implied a power of judicial review:  “[T]he duties which they 
have to perform, call upon them to expound not only the laws, but 
the Constitution also; in which is involved the power of checking the 
Legislature.”432  Thus the basic elements of the discussion at Philadel-
phia were reproduced.  For the most part, Republicans were willing 
to grant these assumptions,433 but, at times, they insisted on making 
express the understanding that expounding and judicial review were 
limited to the adjudication of cases.  Thus, Robert Wright of Mary-
land  
admitted . . . that judges ought to be the guardians of the Constitution, 
so far as questions were constitutionally submitted to them . . . [but] he 
had not supposed the judges were intended to decide questions not judi-
cially submitted to them, or to lead the public mind in Legislative or Ex-
ecutive questions.434   
 
430 See REID, supra note 58, at 162 (discussing the rise of professional lawyers); WHITE, supra 
note 307, at 154–56 (discussing the development of law in the early nineteeth century). 
431 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 82 (1802). 
432 Id.; see also id. at 180–81 (reprinting the statement of Gouverneur Morris); id. at 574 (re-
printing the statement of John Stanley); id. at 788–89 (reprinting the statement of Roger 
Griswold). 
433 See WARREN, supra note 229, at 126 (discussing the Republican position); Engdahl, supra 
note 275, at 320 (discussing the common Republican view). 
434 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 115 (1802). 
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A few Republicans pressed further; Jefferson’s close ally in the Sen-
ate, John Breckinridge, argued for something like legislative suprem-
acy in determining the extent of congressional power,435 and in the 
House, John Randolph delivered a characteristically sardonic defense 
of what might be called Virginia-style ‘common-sense jurisprudence,’ 
along with a legislative power to expound the law.436 
Yet if most Republicans agreed that it was the role of courts to ex-
pound the law, including fundamental law, then they ought to be 
concerned, reasoned Federalists, that repeal would undermine this 
function by politicizing the judiciary.  Thus the same institutional vi-
sion for the courts was present.  James Ross warned that “[i]nstead of 
an august and venerable tribunal, seated above the storms and oscil-
lations of faction . . . you have a transient, artificial body, without a 
will or understanding of its own, impelled by your own machinery.”437  
Since principled judges would “never consent to become the tools 
and victims of factions,” they would refuse to take office, leaving the 
federal courts to be piloted by “the dregs of the law.”438  In the House, 
Bayard took up the point, linking judicial independence to the 
Framers’ effort “to curb the fury of party.”439  “No menacing power 
should exist,” argued Samuel Dana, “to bias [judges’] decisions by the 
influence of personal hopes and fears.”440  Without judicial independ-
ence, there would be little prospect of a neutral exposition of the law, 
eliminating “the further security [that] the judicial power” provided 
 
435 Id. at 179 (“The doctrine of constructions . . . is dangerous in the extreme. . . . My idea of 
the subject, in a few words, is, that . . . the construction of one department of the powers 
vested in it, is of higher authority than the construction of any other department; and 
that, in fact, it is competent to that department to which powers are confided exclusively 
to decide upon the proper exercise of those powers:  that therefore the Legislature have 
the exclusive right to interpret the Constitution, in what regards the law-making power, 
and the judges are bound to execute the laws they make.”); see 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, 
THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 58 & n.1 (1919) (discussing Breckenridge’s role). 
436 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 654–55 (1802) (“And here permit me to express my satisfaction, 
that gentlemen have agreed to construe the Constitution by the rules of common sense.  
This mode is better adapted to the capacity of unprofessional men, and will preclude the 
gentleman from arrogating to himself, and half a dozen other characters in this Commit-
tee, the sole right of expounding that instrument . . . . Indeed, as one of those who would 
be unwilling to devolve upon that gentleman the high-priesthood of the Constitution, 
and patiently submit to technical expositions which I might not even comprehend, I am 
peculiarly pleased that we are invited to exercise our understandings in the construction 
of this instrument.”); accord id. at 531–33 (statement of Robert Williams) (arguing for leg-
islative and executive power to interpret the Constitution). 
437 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 167 (1802). 
438 Id. 
439 Id. at 650 (statement of Rep. Bayard).  
440 Id. at 920. 
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beyond elections alone.441  The point gained momentum as Federal-
ists sought to draw into the debate the logic that had moved delegates 
at Philadelphia to reject the Council of Revision.  A dependent court, 
they argued, could not fulfill its expository function, and thus, its 
constitutional function of giving effect to ‘public opinion’ over the 
passion of the majority.442  As Benjamin Tallmadge reminded the rep-
resentatives, “passion and party views too frequently mislead the 
judgment and obscure the understanding.  A sober and dispassionate 
corrective becomes, therefore, absolutely necessary.  Your tribunals of 
justice afford the necessary relief.”443 
Almost no one was willing to concede the conclusion.  In private 
conversation, radicals like William Branch Giles might argue that the 
federal courts should be “political.”444  In larger gatherings, however, 
Giles would take the opposite position.445  And most Republicans re-
sponded by turning the argument against the Federalists, pointing 
with disapproval to the political conduct of federal judges in the crisis 
of 1798–99.446  The move was a natural one, since the dominant Re-
 
441 Id. at 926 (statement of Samuel Dana). 
442 Id. at 649–50 (statement of Rep. Bayard) 
443 Id. at 948; see also Letter from James Bayard to Andrew J. Bayard (Jan. 21, 1802), quoted in 
1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 211–12 (1922) (“A 
judge, instead of holding his office for life, will hold it during the good pleasure of the 
dominant party.  The Judges will of course become partisans and the shadow of justice 
will alone remain in our Courts.”); Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Rufus King (Feb. 
20, 1802), in 1 WARREN, supra, at 213. 
444 See REID, supra note 58, at 107 (discussing Giles’ statements).  Reid treats Giles as repre-
sentative of the Republican view in 1800 of judicial independence, which I think is a seri-
ous mistake.  See id. at 106 (presenting Giles as a leader). 
445 Kathryn Turner cites a toast delivered by William Branch Giles after passage of the 1801 
Judiciary Act:  “The Judiciary of the United States—from the 4th of March next, may the 
judges lose their political sensibilities in the recollection that they are Judges, not political 
partisans.”  Kathryn Turner, The Midnight Judges, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 494, 522 (1961) (cita-
tion omitted). 
446 Indeed, the principal Republican complaint about Federalist judges was that they had 
become political.  See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 237, at 255–56 (describing the Republicans’ 
objection to the Alien and Sedition Acts and the “partisan judiciary” that would enforce 
the new laws); O’Fallon, supra note 272, at 234 (similar).  Republicans were angered by 
judges’ political grand jury charges.  See CASTO, supra note 237, at 128–29 (discussing how 
Jefferson and his allies grew to dislike the judges’ use of grand jury charges to deliver lec-
tures); WOOD, EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 261–62 (noting that Republicans were angered by 
what judges said in grand jury charges).  Republicans were also angered by judges’ ac-
tions barring juries from deciding on the constitutionality of the Sedition Act, Engdahl, 
supra note 275, at 297.  Similarly, Republicans resented judges’ refusal to allow defend-
ants to call witnesses in defense, CASTO, supra note 237, at 166–67; WOOD, EMPIRE, supra 
note 77, at 261 (2009) (noting that Judge Chase badgered defense attorneys and did not 
allow them to call witnesses).  Furthermore, the Republicans were angered by judges in-
voking the common law of libel, which, unlike the Sedition Act, did not admit truth as a 
defense, WOOD, EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 260 (“Neither truth as a defense nor juries’ de-
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publican criticism during the crisis had been that Federalist judges 
“were partial, vindictive, and cruel,” “obeyed the President rather 
than the law, and made their reason subservient to their passion.”447  
Here the logic of court reform, which aimed to de-politicize courts of 
law, would work in favor of Republicans.  Federal judges who en-
gaged in politics while on the bench could now expect impeach-
ment.448  Indeed, avoiding a wave of judicial impeachments was one of 
Marshall’s primary aims in Marbury.449  His strategy, as others have 
shown, was to draw a substantive distinction between law and politics, 
and to limit the domain of the courts to the former.450  Judicial review 
was tied to the core task of deciding “particular cases,” i.e., disputes 
capable of non-political resolution, thus reinforcing the narrowed ju-
dicial office that emerged from court reform efforts in Virginia, and 
which was described in Kamper by Judges Tucker and Roane.451 
While the effect of judicial politics on the Marbury opinion is well 
known, what is less appreciated, but just as important, is its effect on 
the judicial office itself.  Indeed, the danger this generation per-
ceived in a politicized judiciary is best evidenced by the fate of so-
called “extrajudicial activities,” in which federal judges often assumed 
an expressly political function.452  In the period immediately before 
1800, the most visible of these activities was the Supreme Court Jus-
tices’ practice of delivering “political charges” while riding on cir-
 
ciding the law was allowed under the American common law.”); Alfange, supra note 46, at 
350–51 (discussing that many were disappointed with judge’s invocation of “a federal 
common law of crimes.”). 
447 1 WARREN, supra note 443, at 191. 
448 This was the Republican theory of the Pickering impeachment, and explains the Republi-
cans’ steadfast denial that Judge Pickering was suffering from some form of mental ill-
ness.  See REID, supra note 58, at 90–109 (discussing trials that Judge Pickering presided 
over while mentally ill). 
449 See J.M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG ROBE 306 (1989); Jed Glickstein, Note, 
After Midnight:  The Circuit Judges and the Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, 24 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 543, 574–75 (2012) (discussing Marshall’s reaction to judicial impeachment tri-
als). 
450 See, e.g., NELSON, supra note50, at 60–67. 
451 See supra Part III.B (discussing the Kamper opinions and the narrowing of the reach of 
judicial review). 
452 The two leading examples of extrajudicial activity that took on political content and func-
tion in the late 1790s are political charges and advisory opinions, but there were a variety 
of other activities as well, including ex officio service.  See generally Maeva Marcus & Emily 
Field Van Tassel, Judges and Legislators in the New Federal System, 1789–1800, in JUDGES AND 
LEGISLATORS:  TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 31 (Robert A. Katzman ed., 1988).  On 
the issue of advisory opinions, see JAY, supra note 237, at 149–70; Russell Wheeler, Extra-
judicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 144–58 (1973) (“The 
general understanding during that period was that federal judges, like their English 
counterparts, were to render advice to the executive and legislative branches.”). 
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cuit.453  Political charges were charges delivered to grand juries in 
which the judge might defend (or criticize) the President’s admin-
istration, or offer his own views on the political controversies of the 
day.454  The practice had a significant history in America.  Grand ju-
ries had long been used as a bidirectional point of influence:  both as 
a means for government to shape public opinion, and as a means for 
the leading members of the community to present the government 
with complaints about its officers’ nonfeasance and corruption.455  
The Revolution deepened the government’s need for this institution, 
primarily as a means to convince the people to honor their obliga-
tions under law.456  Yet it also transformed the understanding and 
practice of political charging, by giving it an educational function firm-
ly rooted in republican theory.457  In Ralph Lerner’s memorable 
phrase, the Supreme Court became a kind of “republican schoolmas-
ter,” whose Justices, riding on circuit, were tasked with ensuring that 
the people understood their rights and duties—knowledge necessary 
not only to making appropriate choices as voters and jurors, but, ul-
timately, to ensuring the survival of republican government.458  Yet the 
political charge was a delicate task, and it could be badly mishandled 
by the wrong judge in the wrong circumstances.459  It required the 
 
453 See CASTO, supra note 237, at 127–29; Lerner, supra note 392, at 129–55. 
454 See Lerner, supra note 392, at 127–31 (“The Justices were quick to see and seize the 
chance to proselytize for the new government and to inculcate habits and teachings most 
necessary in their view for the maintanance of self-government.”). 
455 See, e.g., ROEBER, supra note 311, at 176–77; John D. Cushing, The Judiciary and Public Opin-
ion in Revolutionary Massachusetts, in LAW AND AUTHORITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 168, 168 
(George Athan Billias ed., 1965). 
456 See David J. Katz, Grand Jury Charges Delivered by Supreme Court Justices Riding Circuit During 
the 1790s, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1045, 1056–62 (1992) (“[O]ne might think that the philo-
sophical theme of these grand jury charges would be individual liberty; it was not.  The 
theme which pervades these charges is duty.”).  This was also true at the state level, as 
judges used grand jury charges to legitimize proposed or recently ratified state constitu-
tions.  See Cushing, supra note 455, at 175–76 (discussing the way that judges used jury 
charges in an obvious attempt to gain support for new state constitutions). 
457 See Lerner, supra note 392, at 127–32; Katz, supra, at 1060–61. 
458 Lerner, supra note 392, at 127–32 (suggesting that judges regarded themselves as educa-
tors whose mission was to “sustain republican government.”); see also Marcus & Van Tas-
sel, supra note 452, at 32 (arguing that grand jury charges gave justices “a forum for polit-
ical discourse.”).  As Shannon Stimson has shown, the petit jury also had an educational 
function in republican theory.  People were educated by serving on the jury with their 
peers—but also had to be educated in order to serve appropriately.  STIMSON, supra note 
80, at 88. 
459 Lerner, supra note 392, at 155 (“The manner in which the judge performed his duties was 
of decisive importance. . . . It took high political finesse to use the grand jury charge as a 
means of political education.”).  Even at the height of political charging, grand juries 
rarely returned responsive indictments, and a Justice could even acknowledge that he ex-
pected none.  There was a staged quality to the whole affair.  See Katz, supra note 456, at 
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judge to “travel[] out of the line of Business,” and to offer remarks 
that were, in the words of Chief Justice John Jay to one jury, 
“not . . . very pertinent to the present occasion . . . .”460  By the late 
1790s, it was difficult for nationally minded judges to engage in polit-
ical charging without stirring the anger of an audience inclined to-
wards Jeffersonian principles.461  And if the matter was difficult to 
handle for those with judgment and tact, then a fortiori it was impos-
sible to handle for men like Justice Samuel Chase, whose blunderbuss 
charges resulted in his own impeachment.462  During the Chase trial, 
neither party was willing to defend political charging; Chase’s own 
counsel dutifully announced to the Senators that he was “one of 
those who have always thought, that political subjects ought never to 
be mentioned in courts of justice.”463 
The practice of political charging, then, could not be sustained.  It 
was inconsistent with the emerging understanding of judges and of 
courts of law in a republic.  If judges were duty-bound to decide cases 
by expounding the law, and if this process was to be a non-political 
one, then federal judges could not maintain a statesman’s diet of po-
litical activity.464  The same tension led to the demise of other extraju-
dicial activities with a political character, such as advisory opinions.465  
 
1052, 1055 (“Justice John Blair candidly admitted that did not expect [the grand jury] to 
indict anyone . . . .”). 
460 Lerner, supra note 392, at 133l; see also Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 452, at 32 (“The 
grand jury charge took [judges] outside the limits of a case or controversy. . . .”). 
461 To understand why, consider an example of a charge delivered by Justice William Pater-
son sometime in the 1790s:  “What, indeed, can be expected from uninformed and igno-
rant minds?  They know no country; they have no patriotism.  Enough, if they know the 
spot, on which they were born and rocked; that is their country.  Enough, if they know 
and consult the little interests and narrow politics of the neighborhood, in which they live 
and move; that is their patriotism. . . . Persons, ignorant and uninformed, are easily im-
posed upon and led astray; they are unable to detect error . . . they are the fit, and, in-
deed, usual instruments in the hands of artful and aspiring men to serve the purposes of 
party, and to work out the ruin of a state.”  3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 458 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1990). 
462 See Lerner, supra note 392, at 152–55 (discussing Chase’s “frontal attack against Jefferso-
nian doctrine” and Chase’s resulting impeachment). 
463 Lerner, supra note 392, at 154. 
464 Wood, supra note 31, at 165 (“This legalization of fundamental law and the development 
of judicial review went hand in hand with the demarcation of an exclusive sphere of legal 
activity for judges.  If determining constitutional law were to be simply a routine act of le-
gal interpretation and not an earth-shaking political exercise, then the entire process of 
adjudication had to be removed from politics and from legislative tampering.  After 1800, 
judges shed their traditional broad and ill-defined political and magisterial roles . . . and 
adopted roles that were much more exclusively legal.”). 
465 Cf. Wheeler, supra note 452, at 152–53 (describing a similar development in the case of 
advisory opinions, and concluding, “[t]he advisory relationship for which Washington 
and Jefferson hoped also threatened the judicial process itself.  For one thing, in stating 
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In theses cases and others, judges would have to give up the politics.  
What they received in exchange was an understanding of their role 
within republican government that made sense of judicial independ-
ence and of the legalization of constitutional dispute.  That under-
standing recognized in courts alone a power to refuse to enforce un-
constitutional laws. 
CONCLUSION 
The inquiry into the idea of a “case” and “expounding” the law 
suggests the following interpretation of the Standard Justification.  
Premise 1 of the Standard Justification was the proposition that it was 
the duty of the court to decide cases according to the laws of the 
state.  This included the Constitution, on the grounds that the Con-
stitution was fundamental law.  The question was what justification 
there was for including the Constitution.  In brief, the answer is that 
(1) a court decides cases, (2) deciding cases requires the court to ex-
pound the law, and (3) expounding the law involves explaining how 
the court’s judgment follows from, and thus is part of, state law.  The 
last step requires the court to consider the Constitution, since if the 
law on which the court’s judgment is based is inconsistent with the 
Constitution, the court is making law, rather than deciding the case in 
accordance with existing law. 
This reading of the Standard Justification supports the following 
three conclusions.  First, we cannot modify the Standard Justification 
as proposed above to support a presidential power of non-
enforcement.  The President does not decide particular cases, and 
since he does not, he has no duty to expound the law.  Since he has 
no duty to expound the law, nothing about his office of enforcing 
ordinary law requires him to consider and give effect to fundamental 
law.  The executive duty of the presidency is a ministerial duty, at 
least from the perspective of the Federalist era. 
Second, while other arguments in support of a non-enforcement 
power are possible, it seems unlikely that there is a colorable original-
ist argument to that end.  As I have argued, there is little evidence 
that the Framers thought the Standard Justification supported a pres-
 
the law extrajudicially, the Court would not be stating the law through the process best 
designed to secure a true interpretation of it.  Courts reach decisions through a process 
designed to formulate the issues sharply.  They are aided by counsels’ debate . . . . Absent 
those arguments, the decisions stood a greater chance of being in error.  More im-
portant, the Justices thought they would retain a bias toward an opinion once publicly 
stated.”). 
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idential power to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws.  The same 
argument applies to the Article II Vesting Clause, the Oaths Clause, 
or the Take Care Clause, which are the textual foundations most of-
ten recruited to support non-enforcement.  The Framers were at least 
as good as we are at drawing inferences, and if they believed the Vest-
ing Clause (or whatever) supported a power of non-enforcement, 
they should have concluded so.  We have no record that they did.  
More than that, we have no record that they did despite the evidence 
that they had reason to draw the conclusion.  If the concern that led 
to the development of judicial review was the politics of ‘passion’ 
that, at various points during the period, infected the legislature, the 
executive could have served as a check just as much as the judiciary. 
Third, the Standard Justification rests on ideas about the forum of 
a court of law, not about judges per se.  This is important for under-
standing how judicial review could emerge in a system that regarded 
constitutions as a special kind of law—fundamental law—that “dif-
fered in kind” from ordinary law, inasmuch as they were an act of the 
people regulating the government.466  I have not argued here that the 
Constitution was legalized because of an English tradition that fea-
tured the judge as the repository of fundamental law, which he ap-
plied against the sovereign in his common law court (assuming there 
was such a tradition).  American practices were somewhat different.  
Fundamental law was legalized in the 1780s because of independently 
held convictions about proper proceedings in a court of law, and 
about the role courts could and should play in giving effect to ‘public 
opinion,’ ideas which derived from the political experience of the 
1780s and the French Enlightenment, as much as the common law 
tradition.467  These ideas pinned the legitimacy of republican gov-
ernment to “the reason of the public,” and after the Revolution foren-
sic litigation seemed a natural vehicle in which to determine and ap-
ply this reason.468  Since it was supposed to be the public’s reason, not 
the court’s, it was crucial that the judge faithfully expound the law ra-
ther than make it.  That distinction has proved difficult to maintain. 
 
466 See Snowiss, supra note 46, at 90 (discussing the judicial charge as “agents of a constitu-
tional principle.”). 
467 See supra notes 304–33, and accompanying text. 
468 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).  
 
